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PREFACE 
 
The basic context for this work is my lived experience and the lived experience of the two other 
people who were a part of the platonic dialogue that is the heart of this dissertation.  Our lived 
experiences, informal education and formal education, both in our homeland and since coming to 
the United States were blended in the dialogue. 
 
The influences of being born and raised in Ethiopia are evident in this dissertation even though it 
was edited to formalize the writing for the purpose of the dissertation.  Among the elements that 
are evident is the repetition of stories and historical information in chapters two and four. A great 
influence is the oral tradition of repetition to commit things to memory.  The repetition has been 
left to reflect my voice and my authorship of this dissertation. 
 
Chapter four, A Platonic Dialogue was edited for spelling errors only, the remainder is the voice 
of three Ethiopians in a dialogue about the meaning of nation, nationalities, Gossa/tribes and how 
these have contributed to the mess in our home country of Ethiopia.  
 
My greatest hope is that those who read this will understand that we who come from the Horn of 
Africa do not have violence and inhumanity in our nature, and that the current unrest, violence 
and political upheaval in that part of the world have more to do with colonialism and conquest of 
our country by foreign interests.   
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ABSTRACT 
 The ultimate purpose of this dissertation is to explore social change, as characterized by 
critical pedagogy, within Ethiopian Gossa (in English tribes). Critical pedagogy, as a discipline, 
is vociferous against oppression of any form. The mechanism it uses to accomplish social change 
is adult education. Adult education within the framework of critical pedagogy is dialogical in 
nature and grounded in the daily lives of human beings. The fact of its nature being dialogical is, 
empowering and brings critical consciousness into being. 
 Critical pedagogy is said to be empowering in the sense that it affirms, confirms, and 
upholds the truth and validity of one’s experience as a springboard into the dialogue. This is 
where individuals take charge of their own experience and assert them. This dissertation is about 
the dialogue of Ethiopians who are asserting their experiences and the lives they have lived, or 
are living.  Their views on ethnicity/tribe/Gossa are reflective of their experiences and social 
knowledge. 
 The dialogical aspect of critical pedagogy is where critical consciousness is brought into 
being. In this dialogical aspect, there is the give and take of ideas, concepts, beliefs, arguments 
and counterarguments. Consequently, this is where people change their minds about their views 
or just maintain the status quo.  
 In this researcher’s view, Vladimir Lenin’s doctrine of self-determination was the 
foundation for the current problems of ethnic strife within Ethiopia. A study of Russian history, 
revolving around this doctrine, is made to demonstrate its inapplicability to effective government 
in Ethiopia. Furthermore, a rigorous philosophical examination of the notion of ethnicity or 
Gossa is made to pave the way for social change. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
 The socio-political atmosphere in Ethiopia today is filled with tension at people-to-
people, and political levels. People are not friendly towards each other, and they do not trust each 
other. This distrust came into existence during the period of the socialist government which 
governed from 1974-1991.  The early months, of the socialist government were characterized by 
a great deal of bloodshed. Although the Leninist language of nations and nationalities was used 
in the 1960s by the leadership of the student movement, the social government put it into official 
use, resulting in the tribes being recognized as nations.  Here, the critical point to note is that no 
explanation or justification was given as to why the tribes were being viewed as nations. The 
concept of nations and nationalities became prominent within the Marxist-Leninist framework, 
which characterized the revolutionary aspect of the socialist government. People were shot on 
the spot, if, for some reason, they were deemed to be counter-revolutionaries. Personal grudges 
became an excuse for killing anybody with whom the person doing the killing had a political or 
personal disagreement or falling out.   
 The socialist government, with the help of United States, was replaced by the current 
tribe-based government. The tribe-based government took the concept of nations and 
nationalities and made it part of the Ethiopian constitution, which will be further discussed in the 
dissertation. Once again, no justification was given for the use of the Leninist language of 
nations and nationalities, but Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi, was a part of the student 
movement in the 1960’s, which made broad use of this language. 
 The political atmosphere became tense and hostile after the assumption of power by the 
current tribe-based government. There are three actions that this government took that 
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demonstrated its hostility for the people of Ethiopia. I should point out parenthetically here that 
the tribe-based government is a government crafted by a few members of the Tigre tribe, rather 
than one decided by representatives of a majority of the tribes. The three actions were:  
 1. The government fostered and realized the secession of Eritrea.  
 2. The government made sure that the two Red Sea ports of Massawa and Assab were 
ceded to Eritrea, thereby making Ethiopia landlocked.  
 3. The internal provincial territories were restructured into tribal enclaves called Kilil. 
What is important to know at this point is that the people of Ethiopia had absolutely no say when 
all these things were done. They were not included in the decision-making process. In other 
words, the will of the people was totally disregarded. Absolute dictatorship reigned and still 
reigns today in Ethiopia.  
Statement of Problem  
 
 There are many Ethiopians in Diasporas, but their voices have not been heard in any 
collective regard with respect to the current government and political conditions in Ethiopia. A 
full understanding of the current governmental and political conditions in Ethiopia and the 
tensions among various groups/tribes/Gossa requires some basic historical knowledge of colonial 
and Soviet influences.  This study is intended to be a contribution to making those voices heard 
and understood through a general depiction of Ethiopians living in the Diasporas.  
  The most important and common characteristic that these Ethiopians display, in the 
United States and Europe, is their opposition to the current tribe-based government in Ethiopia. 
The current tribe-based government has succeeded in dividing the people into their tribal and 
linguistic groupings, thereby cultivating exclusive loyalty to their tribes and languages which 
undermines loyalty to the entire nation. This sort of loyalty seems to be evident in the behavior 
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of those who claim to be Oromos. In fact most, but not all dispersed Oromos reject the fact that 
they are Ethiopians and claim that they are from Oromia and not from Ethiopia.  
 Foundational to this view is the fact that the current tribe- based government 
restructured the earlier internal provincial territories into tribal enclaves in 1991 (Vestal, 1999) at 
which time Oromia was created for the first time. These tribal enclaves are called Kilil, thus 
Oromia is a Kilil. Each tribe is supposed to use the language of the tribe in educational settings. 
However they do not have their own alphabets, there is only the Amharic alphabet indigenous to 
Ethiopia; an alphabet that was widely used by everybody until the tribe-based government came 
along. Additionally, the Amharic language was, and still is, widely spoken. The Oromos 
insistence on using the so called Latin letters, (i.e. a-z), is a source of much of the opposition to 
their views. Furthermore, they also insist on the right to secede the way Eritrea did, and yet with 
respect to government jobs, such jobs are given to members of the Tigre tribe. As a result, there 
is so much tension amongst dispersed Ethiopians with the main tensions occurring between 
Tigres and other Ethiopians, and Oromos and other Ethiopians. The Tigres made a mess out of 
Ethiopia as pointed out earlier and the Oromos are secessionist in their outlook. The diasporic 
Ethiopians, therefore, reflect the Ethiopians at home.  
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Significance of the Study 
 The significance of the study is that it shows a way of thinking and reasoning (in 
dialogical form) as a means, path, or strategy for solving social problems. The significance 
springs out of the need for social change in Ethiopia, and the need for social change arises out of 
social conditions that create general or widespread social mal-contentment. In the case of 
Ethiopia, the doctrine of self-determination, the concepts of nations and nationalities, and the 
notion of tribe itself are the causes of the problems. These issues have created a tremendous mal-
contentment in Ethiopia. As a result, solving these problems/issues is tantamount to bringing 
about social change. Social change, therefore, is the transformation of mal-contentment to 
contentment. In a pedagogical framework, there are two fundamental steps to lay the foundation 
for social change. First, specific issues that have causal connections to the mal-contentment 
(such as mentioned above) must first be identified. Secondly, a philosophical approach is used 
towards the solution; this is approach is applied to the dialogue presented in this dissertation. The 
philosophical approach is characterized by two elements (a) investigation of the language 
surrounding the problems, and (b) explicating the findings of the investigation.  
 The stance social mal-contents is rooted in history, therefore a study of history sheds 
light on current social problems and provides context for dialogue. In other words, a study of 
history lends clarity to the social problems in question. For instance, the study of Russian history 
as it relates to the doctrine of self-determination and the question of nations and nationalities 
shows that the conditions that gave rise to these concepts in Russia are completely asymmetrical 
to the conditions in Ethiopia, supporting a conclusion that concepts are inapplicable in Ethiopia., 
However both of these concepts were taken from the ideologies of Lenin and Stalin by the 
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Ethiopian student movement of the 1960s. That is why including some Russian history is 
important to this study.  
Design of the Study 
 The most appropriate method for this study was the qualitative research method, more 
specifically the historical research method. The reason is that recorded history clearly shows and 
presents the historicity and evolution of current institutions in Ethiopia.  A good example to cite 
is recognizing how the tribes of Ethiopia became nations. This fact came into being over 35 
years ago in the 1960s. The generation born after this fact simply does not know the origin of the 
language of nations and nationalities that catapulted tribes to the level of nationhood. As a matter 
of fact, most of the people who were there during the factualization (the act of making a fact out 
of something that is not a fact) of the notion tribes being nations and nationalities, do not know 
the origin of the concept of nations and nationalities or of the structures, institutions, loyalties 
and ideologies that most of the world thinks of when speaking of nations or nationalities.  
Looking at the partial history of the Soviet Union demonstrates the asymmetry between 
the conditions that gave rise to the language of nations and nationalities in what became the 
Soviet Union and the conditions in Ethiopia prior to the imposition of these titles. The source of 
the language used in Ethiopia to impose an organizational structure which led to strife, lies in the 
history of the Soviet Union. More specifically, when Lenin was faced with problems at the turn 
of the 20th century, he concocted the concept of nations and nationalities to solve the problems 
created by the different nationalities, some examples of which are- Ukrainians, Armenians, 
Georgians, and others that Tsarist Russia colonized and which became key blocks for building 
the Soviet Union. Reviewing a partial history of the Soviet Union helps determine whether or not 
there are in fact nations and nationalities in Ethiopia as is commonly defined. That is: A people 
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who inhabit a specific territory who share common customs, origins and history.  It will also help 
determine what sort of meaning the phrase nations and nationalities acquired in the way Lenin 
concocted it, which will in turn determine if it carries the same meaning in Ethiopia. 
 Furthermore, a portion of the history of Ethiopia was studied in order to determine the 
source of the problem pertaining to Eritrea, which culminated in its secession from Ethiopia 
through the employment of the doctrine of nations and nationalities. Furthermore with respect to 
Eritrea being a colony of Italy, Emperor Minilik is accused by Tigres and Eritreans of selling it 
to Italy. Does history support this accusation or, did Emperor Yohannis, because of his 
miscalculations, hand it over to the Italians? Or better yet, answering the question- when and 
how did Italy acquire the geographical land mass of what today is called Eritrea helps us answer 
the previous questions.  Since all these questions are at the root of current problems, recorded 
history would help us understand the current socio-political turmoil in Ethiopia.  
 Through this understanding and knowledge, the possibility of social change is 
improved. As stated in the discussion so far, the fundamental cause of the turmoil (the Gossa 
problem) in Ethiopia is the concept of nations and nationalities. That is why a determination will 
be made, in this dissertation, with respect to the reality or unreality of Gossa.  
Limitations of the Study 
 Pertaining to possible biases, I have absolutely no sense of identity with any of the 
Ethiopian tribes, however in my frame of reference the notion of tribe is a primitive social 
concept almost suggestive of a pre-logical way of life and a social concept which undermines 
uniting as one country. I was careful throughout to ensure that this attitude did not interfere with 
the study in this dissertation. My lack of tribal sense of identity reflects the way I was brought 
up. My father never identified himself with any tribe other than the entire people of Ethiopia. I 
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look at Ethiopians as Ethiopians regardless of their region in Ethiopia or what tribe they are 
from.  
 Therefore, this is the bias I do bring to the study is a strong belief in a country, a nation 
with all the people of Ethiopia sharing their common origins, customs and cultures selecting a 
government which is for all the people.  Although I brought this bias to the platonic dialogue, I 
did not bring it to detailing and discussing the platonic dialogue that is the heart of this 
dissertation.   
Definition of Terms 
Abune- an Amharic term which means bishop 
Amhara or Amara- one of the tribes in Ethiopia 
Amharic- the language spoken by the Amhara tribe and the official language of Ethiopia 
Atse- an Amharic word which means Emperor 
Dejazmach- title of the leader of warriors 
ESUNA- Ethiopian Students Union in North America 
Fitawrari- title given to a man leading a siege during war time 
Gojam- a western province 
Gossa- this is an Amharic word which means tribe 
Gurage- one of the tribes in Ethiopia 
Kilil- Amharic word which means a tribal enclave 
Kotu/Qotu- an Oromo in the province of Harargie all of whom are Moslems 
  For political reasons the Kotu/Qotu are now called Oromos 
Lij- A term of respect for a young boy/man, it literally means boy 
Mahdists- Islamic insurgents and warriors in Sudan 
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Oromia- this is a tribal enclave designated for the Oromo tribe by the Tigre tribe. 
Oromo- one of the tribes in Ethiopia 
Shewa/Shoa- A province in central Ethiopia and the seat of power and capital of Ethiopia; 
                      Addis Ababa, the capital city, is located in the province of Shewa. 
Tigrai- Northern Province of Ethiopia (province of the Tigre tribe) 
Tigre- one of the tribes in Ethiopia 
Welamo- one of the tribes in Ethiopia 
Weyane- a political party exclusively for the Tigre tribe 
Wichale- The town in which the treaty of Wichle was signed by Emperor Minilik and Italy 
Zemene Mesafint- The era in which different regions had their own leaders and no central    
 government                                                                                                                                     
Zer- This word is an Amharic word which means biological relations like father, son, daughter, 
uncle, aunt, etc. (pedigree) 
Organization of the Study 
 This dissertation is organized into five chapters. Chapter one is an overview and 
introduction. Chapter two the literature review, looks at the partial histories of Russia and 
Ethiopia looks at the extent of causal connection to the current turmoil in Ethiopia warrant. In 
chapter three, the research method used is discussed along with an explanation of why this 
particular method was used. Chapter four contains the dialogue that is foundational to critical 
pedagogy as a framework for social change. The rigorous dialogue goes on among three 
Ethiopians one woman, and two men. A broad range of social issues were discussed with the 
purpose of determining the reality or un-reality of Gossa. The dialogue was rigorously 
philosophical with continual investigation and explication. Concepts, ideas, and beliefs, as they 
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are depicted using human language, were rigorously probed to reach the interstitial particles that 
impart murkiness to the Ethiopian social issues. In short, nothing was taken for granted. Chapter 
five is a discussion of my journey in andragogy. It focuses on my journey in adult education and 
the informal education I gained from face-to-face engagement which, I believe, taught me 
tactfulness and patience. My inquiry into Gossa was difficult to handle with diehard tribalists, 
some of whom threatened physical fights. They had never been asked to state clearly what 
Oromo is. They never questioned whether or not there is such a thing as a distinct Oromo 
culture. As baffling situations arose, people tended to lose their temper. It was an amazing 
experience in which I learned that social change can mean a high cost for those promoting that 
change. 
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CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Introduction 
 Vladimir I. Lenin’s doctrine of the right of nations to self-determination has been more 
destructive than helpful to the Ethiopian society.  This doctrine was a direct outgrowth of the 
political conditions Lenin and Stalin were faced with as a result of the colonization of 
neighboring nations (i.e. Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, etc.) by the Russian empire of the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries. Lenin (1947) states the meaning of his doctrine this way: 
. . ., the tendency of every national movement is towards the formation of 
national states, under which these requirements of modern capitalism are best 
satisfied. The profoundest economic factors drive towards this goal, and therefore, 
for the whole of Western Europe, nay, for the entire civilized world, the typical, 
normal state for the capitalist period is the national state.  
Consequently, if we want to learn the meaning of self-determination of nations 
not by juggling with legal definitions, or “inventing” abstract definitions, but by 
examining the historical and economic conditions of the national movements we 
shall inevitably reach the conclusion that self-determination of nations means the 
political separation of these nations from alien national bodies, the formation of 
an independent national state (p. 11). 
     Lenin (1947) tells us the meaning of the right of nations to self-determination this way:  
The right of nations to self-determination means only the right to independence in a 
political sense, the right to free, political secession from the oppressing nation. 
Concretely, this political democratic demand implies complete freedom to carry on 
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agitation in favor of secession, and freedom to settle the question of secession by means 
of a referendum of the nation that desires to secede (p. 76). 
 With the preceding doctrine in mind, we look to a portion of Russian history to see 
what conditions helped give rise to the doctrine.                                                                                                                                           
A Partial History of the Russian Empire 
  Pipes’ book (1964), The Formation of the Soviet Union, is most primarily concerned 
with how the Soviet Union was formed and built. Succinctly, it was built through military 
conquest, by Russia, of the neighboring countries such as Latvia, Lithuanian,  The Ukraine, 
Belorussia, Muslim Borderlands, Pipes (1964, p. 30) tells us that there were two principal 
socialist parties- the Socialist Revolutionary Party and the Social Democratic Party. These two 
parties had different visions of the relationship between Russia and the colonized nations. There 
was a great deal of debate revolving around this relationship. Pipes also tells us that the debate 
dealt with the concept of federalism (equal distribution of power between Russia and the ethnics, 
as they were called), and concepts like regional and cultural autonomy. Dr. Pipes (p. 30) tells us, 
too, that in the population of Russia was almost greater in number than the total number of all the 
ethnics put together. Let me parenthetically add here that Ukrainians and Russian Jews were 
considered minorities (Pipes, p. 36). This huge population difference made it difficult for Lenin 
to accept the notion of federalism. This social fact soon gave rise to the problem of nations 
comprising the Soviet Union, i.e. Russia, Ukraine, Belorussia, Armenia, Georgia, and others. 
Consequent on that, politicians like Lenin and Stalin, but mainly Lenin, were confronted with the 
so called National Problem, which Pipes (1964) discusses extensively. The question is: What is it 
that gave rise to the so called national problem? Here is how Pipes (1964) answers it: 
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The outbreak of the Russian Revolution had, as its initial consequence, the 
abolition of the tsarist regime and, as its ultimate result, the complete breakdown 
of all forms of organized life throughout Russia. One of the aspects of this 
breakdown was the disintegration of the Empire and the worsening of relations 
between its various ethnic groups. In less than a year after the Tsar had abdicated, 
the national question had become an outstanding issue in Russian politics (p., 50).  
Although Lenin became aware of “The national question” belatedly, he gave it the form it has 
today. What was/is this form? It is “national self-determination” (Pipes, p. 43). This was the 
clause around which Lenin and others of his type vehemently debated. But, what did self-
determination mean to Lenin? Pipes (1964) tells us the following: 
Lenin . . .  reinterpreted it in a way best suited to his purposes. In the summer of 
1913, he thus defined what he understood by the right to self-determination:  
The paragraph of our program [dealing with national self-determination] cannot 
be interpreted in any other way, but in the sense of political self-determination, 
that is, as the right to self-determination and creation of an independent 
government.” Every nation living in the state had as a nation, one right and one 
right only: to separate from Russia and to create an independent state. A people 
who did not desire to take advantage of this right could not ask from the state for 
any preferential treatment, such as the establishment of federal relations, or the 
granting of extraterritorial cultural autonomy. It had to be satisfied with the 
general freedoms of the state, including a certain amount of regional autonomy 
inherent in ‘democratic centralism’ (p. 43).   
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             Lenin knew that his position would appeal to the nationalistic impulses of Russian 
nationalities, which would garner the support of these minorities when he needed them. Lenin, as 
a social democrat, believed that the right of nations to self-determination “if properly interpreted, 
was in no way contradictory to the general principles of Marxism” (Pipes 1964, p. 35).  
      Given the preceding excerpt, Lenin was not without his critics. There were at least two 
criticisms leveled against his doctrine of national self-determination. The first one was that the 
notion of self-determination would inevitably lead each ethnic group to breakup and go its own 
separate way. Lenin had an argument that counters the notion of separation- “. . .  the economic 
forces- the ultimate determinant in history- worked against the breakup” (Pipes, p.44). In other 
words, the economic needs of the ethnics will force them to stay with Russia. The second 
criticism pertains to the notion of nationalism. To counter that, Lenin argued that “. . .  
nationalism in all its aspects was essentially a phenomenon proper to the capitalist era and 
destined to vanish with the demise of capitalism itself” (Pipes, p. 41).  
     An important fact that Dr. Pipes (1964) did not lose sight of is the fact that Lenin was a 
politician who wanted to win. Here is what Pipes says to support that: 
Though Lenin was perhaps the most doctrinaire of all prominent Russian Marxists        
in his fundamental assumptions, he was also the most flexible in his choice of 
means. Once he realized the value of the national movement as a weapon for 
fighting the established order, he stopped at nothing to employ it for his own ends 
(p., 35). 
       The preceding discussion on Lenin establishes that: 
1. Russia colonized the nations around it to build up the Soviet Union. 
2. Lenin and other Marxists referred to the colonized nations as ethnics or minorities. 
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3. A major problem, Lenin and his Marxist colleagues called it the national problem, arose. 
4. A principle was formulated by Lenin and other Marxists as a solution to the national       
problem. The principle was “The right of nations to self-determination.” 
5. Lenin exploited the national problem for his political advantage. 
Leninist Influence on Ethiopian Students 
       The current problems in Ethiopia are rooted in the Marxist-Leninist student 
movement of the 1960s. Randi Balsivik (1985) tells us the following: 
“Before 1974 Ethiopian university and secondary school students emerged as the most outspoken 
and visibly the only consolidated opposition group to Haile Selassie’s government” (p. xiii). In 
the 1960s and the early part of the 1970s, the Marxist-Leninist student movement had highly 
reticulated cells in Ethiopia, Europe, and United States in which informal Marxist-Leninist-
Maoist education (a form of education almost as organized as formal education) was going on. 
It was during the Marxist-Leninist student movement that the notion of Ethiopia’s colonization 
of its own northernmost province of Eritrea, planted by Eritrean students, came into being, which 
was created for reasons of propaganda in Ethiopia, Europe, and America. Regarding the notion 
of Ethiopian colonialism, Dr. Daniel Kendie (2005) states the following: 
Whether inspired by unbridled opportunism or forced by the Eritreans to toe the 
line, the TPLF (Tigrayan Peoples’ Liberation Front) echoed the EPLF (Eritrean 
Peoples’ Liberation Front) position and began to present the Eritrean conflict as a 
colonial question. Like its EPLF mentor, the TPLF also presented its own cause 
as a struggle against what it called Ethiopian colonialism. But strangely enough, 
even if the Amhara (a tribe in Ethiopia) were identified with the so called 
“Ethiopian colonialism,” very few Amhara lived in Tigrai [a northern province of 
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TPLF people]. Those who ran the provincial machinery, the judiciary, the civil 
service and the police force were Tigrayans.  . .Tigrayans ran the provincial 
administration from top to bottom. No Amhara community had any economic or 
social dominance in Tigrai . . . (p. 166). 
  More of the false claim of colonialism will be discussed in the main body of the dissertation, 
but it is important to note that Eritrean students fully supported the leaders of the student 
movement in their false claim. The reason for this support was that the activists in the student 
movement could be taken advantage of as a vehicle in the realization of the ultimate goal 
Eritrean students had in minds—the secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia. Here, what must be 
noted is that the colonial incursion of Italy into Ethiopia in the 1890s triggered the creation of 
Eritrea, which simply fell into the hands of colonial Italy due to its leader, Atse Yohannis’s lack 
of political acumen. The history surrounding the emergence of Eritrea (a name given to it by 
colonialist Italy) is explored more fully in the main body of the dissertation. A fundamental 
problem that still threatens the very existence of Ethiopia is the Leninist/Stalinist doctrine of the 
right of nations to self-determination up to and including secession. Needless to say that the 
students simply did not understand what Lenin and Stalin meant by it, this statement is still 
carried around Europe and America by the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF, Oromo is one of the 
tribes in Ethiopia). The terms nations and nationalities found their way into the language of the 
leaders of the student movement and one of them, Walleligne Makonnen, wrote an article 
entitled “On the Question of Nationalities in Ethiopia” (Balsivik, p. 227) that reinforced the use 
of this language. At this point, it is important to point out that the issue of nationalities did not 
abruptly appear on the Ethiopian social scene. In fact, Balsivik (1985) tells us the following: 
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The national question also had been discussed for a couple of years within the 
Ethiopian student organizations in Europe and North America, and the 17th 
Annual Congress of ESUNA (Ethiopian Student Union in North America) in 
September 1969 had concentrated its deliberations on the problem of regionalism 
in Ethiopia. . . . They consistently, for example, referred to ethnic diversity as 
“regionalism,” whereas Walleligne used the more controversial “nationalities” (p. 
278). 
          In other words, the term nationalities, according to the preceding excerpt, was not fully 
accepted by everybody involved in the student movement of the 1960s. What I personally find 
very perplexing is that no one seems to notice the contradictions in Walleligne’s views. A good 
example might be that he looked at the tribes as nations while pointing out that Ethiopia was not 
yet a nation. Here is what Balsivik (1985) says: 
The article “On the Question of Nationalities in Ethiopia,” by Walleligne 
Makonnen, argued that Ethiopia was not yet a nation but an Amhara-ruled 
collection of a dozen nationalities “with their own languages, ways of dressing, 
history, social organizations and territorial entity” (p. 277). 
            Nevertheless, this was the period in which the activists began to see Ethiopian tribes as 
nations, which presented itself to non-Marxists as a new social construct. It is clear, however, 
from the discussion on Lenin that this social construct actually was not new; it was, in fact, a 
concept adapted from Stalin’s 1913 publication entitled “Marxism and the National Question”.   
The students failed to understand that both Stalin and Lenin were confronted with their own 
sociopolitical problems and that whatever they wrote had nothing to do with the people of 
Ethiopia. When they used the terms nations, nationalities, and minorities, they did not, in the 
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least, have the people of Ethiopia in mind. Be that as it may, the student leadership was not 
organic to the Ethiopian social conditions; to wit, the leadership did not, by necessity, evolve out 
of the social conditions indigenous to Ethiopia. The question at this point is- could the Marxist-
Leninist philosophy have solved the sociopolitical and economic problems in Ethiopia? This 
question and others will be looked at in the main body of the dissertation. 
             Before I continue this literature review, it is important to bring forth the two maps of 
Ethiopia that show the provincial and the Kilil demarcations. The provincial map depicts the 
boarders and boundaries within Ethiopia that was for centuries. The Kilil map, or tribal enclaves, 
is the restructured internal subdivisions of Ethiopia made by the current tribe-based government.  
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Figure 1.   Provincial Map of Ethiopia 
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Figure 2.  Kilil Map of Ethiopia 
 
 
 
 
 
The scheme in the provincial map is similar to the concept of the provinces in Canada or 
Australia; while the Kilil map shows the internal subdivisions along tribal lines. The term Kilil is 
an Amharic term, which means a line of demarcation or territory. Its precise meaning can be 
inferred from the way it is used. If you look at the Kilil map, you can see the names Oromia, 
Social Change:  A Pedagogic Inquiry of Ethiopian Ethnicity/Tribe/Gossa      28 
 
Amhara, etc. Those are the territories designated to the Oromo and Amhara tribes respectively. 
So, when the officials of the current government translate the word Kilil into English, they 
translate it as state similar to what is conceptualized in the name United States. This translation 
is wrong. Kilil implies a tribal designation of an internal piece of land, while the term state has 
no implication of any kind in Ethiopia other than what it means in the English language. This 
deceptive use of language is designed for Western consumption. Dr. Mohammed Hassen (1994) 
in the article titled Why Did Oromo Nationalism Develop only in the 1960s? wrote: 
In different parts of colonial Africa, nationalism developed between the 1920s and 
the 1950s. In Oromia, which is still the last colony in Africa, nationalism 
developed only during and after the 1960s. Why did it take so long for Oromo 
nationalism to develop? There are four valid explanations for this. First and 
foremost, Oromo nationalism, like other nationalisms in Africa, developed in 
response to colonial oppression. It is still developing and changing. It took its 
shape against economic exploitation, military subjugation ‘political and cultural 
domination.’ Oromo colonial experience makes it different from other 
nationalisms in Africa. It has been said that ‘Oromo nationalism differs from 
other nationalisms in so far as the experience of Ethiopian rule differed from that 
of being ruled by a western colonial power. Ethiopian colonial power was 
centered in the country itself and not in some distant metropolis. The rulers were 
also ‘natives’, and did not have immense technological superiority over the ruled 
nor enjoy vastly superior standard of living (Jalata, p.186). 
The above excerpt can trigger so many questions in the mind of anybody who might 
have some familiarity with Ethiopian history. The falsifications of history that Dr. 
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Mohammed seems to inject in his depictions of Ethiopia are difficult to accept. For 
instance, he depicts Ethiopia and the Oromo tribe as a colonizer-colonized dichotomy, 
reminiscent of the Eritrean lies. Isn’t one implicitly acknowledging the notion of two 
socio-politically distinct and sovereign nations in that kind of depiction? If that in fact is 
true, why is he then using the term natives in reference to the colonizers? Are the 
colonizers natives to what the Oromo tribe is native to? Furthermore, he uses the phrase 
Oromo nationalism. What exactly does that mean? When one uses the term nationalism, 
isn’t the concept of a nation, with its own sovereign territory, implied by virtue of the fact 
that there has to be a nation about and towards which one is nationalistic? If that is true, 
then what nation does he have in mind? Another thing that must be noticed is that the 
name Oromia is used in the excerpt. If you look at the two maps provided in Figures 1 
and 2, the name Oromia can be found only on the Kilil map constructed by the current 
tribe-based government. Why isn’t it recorded on the provincial map? Was Oromia in 
existence in the 1960s, as the excerpt above suggests? Needless to say that Dr. 
Mohammed has not outgrown his tribal sense of identity, these questions and others will 
be fully clarified in the main body of the dissertation. Finally, look at the parts of the two 
maps that look like horns; the provincial map has the name Harargie, while the Kilil map 
of the same area has the name Somali. Figure 3 is the contemporary map of Ethiopia as 
published by the Ethiopian United States embassy on its homepage. 
 
 
 
 
Social Change:  A Pedagogic Inquiry of Ethiopian Ethnicity/Tribe/Gossa      30 
 
Figure 3.  Map of Contemporary Ethiopia 
 
 
 
History of Ethiopia 
The reign of Emperor Tewodros II (1855-68) 
 The coming to prominence of Tewodros was a turning point in the history of Ethiopia. Before 
Tewodros became an emperor, his name was Kassa. Kassa rose to the rank of Dejazmach in the 
Gonderian court in his youth. Kassa was, for his time, well educated and highly versed in ecclesiastical 
literature of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. Some historians believe that he had a working knowledge 
of Arabic due to the fact that he was born and raised in the town of Quarra. This town was located at the 
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border of Sudan and where Kassa became governor later in time. Kassa was a well recognized person 
for his leadership qualities. Consequent on that, Menen, the queen of Gonder, made him the governor of 
Quarra and married him to Tewabech, the daughter of Ali (Menen’s son and the de facto king of kings in 
Begemidir and Amhara). Kassa thus became loyal to the queen and Ali. Kassa, all this while had a 
vision of a united Ethiopia. He displayed unusual qualities which earned him admiration on the part of 
people like the British Consul named Plowden. Teferra Haile-Selassie (1997) tells us that “Kassa 
defeated the powerful regional chiefs one after the other including Ras Ali, the regent of the king of 
Gonder, in two years (1852-54)” (p. 16). Kassa was a fierce warrior who subdued his enemies.  These 
enemies were the regional rulers around Ethiopia. This period in which Ethiopia was ruled by disparate 
regional rulers is called Zemene Mesafint. In other words, there was no central or federal government in 
the Zemene Mesafint period. 
 With the regional rulers subdued, Kassa focused on the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. Kassa wanted 
to be the legitimate leader of Ethiopia, and this legitimization could be acquired through the agency of 
the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. The method he used to do that, according to Haile-Selassie (1997), was 
the following: “He [Kassa] . . . secured the full co-operation of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church by 
issuing an edict on doctrinal controversies that upheld the official position of Abune Selama, [an 
Egyptian prelate] the bishop of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church.” Haile-Selassie (1997, p.17) states that 
this edict yielded dividends to both Kassa and the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. Furthermore, the 
symbolic effect of the edict was that it legitimated Kassa’s plan to ascend to the throne. Now the 
question is- how did Kassa’s edict settle doctrinal controversies? Here is how Haile-Selassie (1997) 
answered it: 
The doctrinal controversies in the church were brought to an end by Kassa’s edict that 
proclaimed Tewahido (the two births of Christ) as the sole doctrinal basis of the 
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Ethiopian Orthodox Church. The Echegie, the Ethiopian religious head second to the 
Egyptian prelate, was forced to abandon his Sost Lidet doctrine (the three births of 
Christ) in favor of Tewahido. The humiliation caused to the Echegie by his 
submission to Tewahido was an outright victory to the Metropolitan Prelate, Abune 
Selama (p. 17). 
 With the Ethiopian Orthodox Church on his side, Kassa continued his battle against regional 
warlords. The last challenger was Dejazmach Wube in the province of Tigre. Wube rebelled against 
Kassa which triggered the battle of Dresgie on Feb. 9-1852. Wube was defeated and his defeat cleared 
up the last challenger in northern Ethiopia. Kassa, as a result of his victories over regional warlords, was 
anointed and crowned king of kings by Abune Selama (the Egyptian prelate/bishop). He was anointed 
King of Kings Tewodros II on Feb. 11-1855. After being anointed king of kings, Tewodros (no longer 
Kassa) marched to Shewa (central Ethiopia). Haile-Selassie (1997) states the result of Tewodros’ march 
to Shewa in the following way: “In the spring of 1855, Haile Melekot, king of Shewa, died of natural 
causes just before the opening of the battle. His army, after putting up some resistance, was defeated and 
Shewa was incorporated into the empire of Tewodros” (p. 18).  
The elimination of warlords meant the elimination of the fragmentation of the state. This in turn 
meant that he had to reconstruct and restore a unified state. In order to accomplish that, he instituted 
reform measures. He divided the empire into smaller administrative units; he structured a system of 
salary for state employees like judges, governors and others. He reformed the tax system. His tax reform 
waived the exemption privilege of the church. He also undertook other church reforms like every church 
was to be served by two priests and three deacons. It turns out that the church opposed the reforms he 
introduced. Consequently, that was a breach to Abune Selama. The church’s opposition created a rift 
between Tewodros and the church leaders. There was an undeclared understanding between Aba Selama 
Social Change:  A Pedagogic Inquiry of Ethiopian Ethnicity/Tribe/Gossa      33 
 
and Tewodros that each one of them was supposed to stick to his own domain. In other words, Tewodros 
was not supposed to interfere with the affairs of the church, and Aba Selama was not supposed to 
interfere with the affairs of the state. Tewodros’ interference in the affairs of the church was taken as a 
breach of the tacit understanding between him and Abune Selama. The result of this breach, Haile-
Selassie (1997) tells us that “The church retaliated by inciting its followers against Tewodros. The 
clergy resorted to rumor-mongering. False accusations of apostasy were spread against the emperor.” (p. 
18) The situation between the emperor and Aba Selama deteriorated. Due to the rumor-mongering and 
the accusation of apostasy, Haile-Selassie (1997) tells us what ensued in the following excerpt: 
Tewodros suspected Abune Selama of serving the interest of Egypt. His suspicion 
was confirmed when the Abune and the Patriarch of Alexandria, who was on a 
visit to Ethiopia in 1856, submitted a letter jointly drafted to Tewodros. The letter 
was a request to Said Pasha of Egypt to provide an Egyptian garrison for the 
Abune. To make matters worse the Patriarch signified his keen interest to review 
Tewodros’ army. The Patriarch’s interest in military affairs enraged Tewodros. 
He put both the Patriarch and the Abune under house arrest which led to further 
deterioration of the relations between the Church and monarchy. Abune Selama 
retaliated by excommunicating Tewodros in 1857 (p. 19). 
 With respect to the excommunication, Tewodros made sure that the Patriarch of Alexandria, 
Kerilos, lifted the excommunication before he was allowed to leave Ethiopia. This action by the 
Patriarch did not smooth the situation out. It still got worse when Tewodros ordered the arrest 
and detention of Abune Selama. Worse yet, Tewodros ended up razing “forty churches in 
Gonder” (Haile-Selassie (1997), page 19). The ultimate effect of this destructive behavior by the 
Emperor is expressed this way by Haile-Selassie(1997): “ Tewodros’ use of excessive force in 
Social Change:  A Pedagogic Inquiry of Ethiopian Ethnicity/Tribe/Gossa      34 
 
settling his differences with Abune Selama and the uncompromising disposition of the Abune 
were major factors that frustrated the realization of his vision of a united Ethiopia” (p.19). 
 Tewodros was considered progressive with respect to his foreign policies. He was very 
interested in introducing Western technology in Ethiopia. He was also interested in the support 
of European powers to help him out in the restoration of the lost territories of Ethiopia. He had 
close relationships with European diplomats like Consul Plowden of Britain, missionaries, 
explorers, and traders. These relationships gave him a positive outlook toward Europeans. 
Regardless of his disposition towards Europeans, he was unable to obtain Western technology. 
He was also unable to get the necessary recognition as a head of state. The beginning of the end 
of Tewodros’ emperorship was marked by the letter he wrote to Queen Victoria. Haile-Selassie 
(1997) explains the situation this way: 
The oversight of the British Foreign Office to act on his letter to Queen Victoria, in 
which he expressed his desire to send an embassy that would purchase arms and recruit 
skilled workers had wounded his pride. Regrettably the oversight of the Foreign Office 
resulted in the detention of the British consul, Cameron, and a few European 
missionaries and traders. The detention of the British consul in turn wounded the pride 
of Great Britain.  A plea by Great Britain for the release of its Consul and other 
European prisoners failed to be entertained by Tewodros.  Britain’s effort to resolve the 
differences between the two countries proved abortive. Then Great Britain, as a matter 
of national pride and honour, resorted to military initiative to free the prisoners. The 
Abyssinian Expedition under the command of General Napier was launched and 
succeeded in freeing the prisoners. The expedition ended the reign of Tewodros when 
the mountain fortress of Maqdella was stormed on 10 April 1868. Tewodros, who for 
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the first time in his career faced defeat, chose to end his own life rather than tasting the 
humiliating experience of surrender. Tewodros’ foreign policy collapsed as abruptly as 
his domestic policies did (p. 20). 
 Although Tewodros ended his own life rather than surrendering to General Napier, the 
progressive leadership he provided for his time is very important. Haile-Selassie (1997) ends his 
exposition on Tewodros this way: 
 Despite his shortcomings he had succeeded in sowing the idea of a united Ethiopia; the 
need for administrative reform, creating a standing army, developing infrastructure and 
a host of other progressive ideas. His ideas and vision constituted the very building 
blocks of the policies of his successors (p. 21). 
The reign of Emperor Yohannis IV (1872-89) 
 The death of Tewodros at the battle of Maqdella plunged the country into a power struggle. There 
were three protagonists in this struggle: Wag Shume Gobeze of Lasta, Dejazmach Kassa Mircha of 
Tigray, and King Menilek of Shewa. Immediately after the withdrawal of the British expeditionary force 
and the death of Tewodros “Gobeze crowned himself Tekle Giorgis, King of Kings of Ethiopia in 1868” 
(Haile-Selassie, 1997, p. 21). Ras Adale Tessema of Gojjam, who was a brother-in-law of Tekle Giorgis, 
immediately recognized the over lordship of the emperor. Kassa Mircha of Tigray, who was also the 
brother-in-law of the emperor, had his eye on the throne. Kassa, nonetheless, did not allow this political 
marriage to frustrate his ambition to be the emperor of Ethiopia. Menilek of Shewa had already 
expressed his interest for the emperorship by declaring himself Neguse Negest or King of Kings. 
Regardless of that, it did not take him too long to submit himself to the suzerainty of Tekle Giorgis. 
Emperor Tekle Giorgis clung to the throne for about three years without any meaningful power. It 
turned out that his own brother-in-law, Kassa Mircha of Tigray, overthrew him in July 1871 at the battle 
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of Assam. Soon after the defeat of Tekle Giorgis, Kassa consolidated his power in Northern Ethiopia. 
More importantly though, six months after his victory, “he was crowned by the bishop of the Ethiopian 
Orthodox Church, as King of Kings, in the throne name of Yohannis IV in Aksum in 1872” (Haile-
Selassie, 1997, p. 22). 
 Yohannis’s accession to the throne had its own challenges: the European scramble for Africa, the 
rise of Mohammed Ahmed, and the Mahdi of the Sudan. Yohannis’ reign was marked by efforts to 
protect the territorial integrity of Ethiopia against colonial powers, especially that of Italy. But, Egypt 
also had an expansionist policy towards Ethiopia. Concern about Egypt ended up being replaced in the 
1880s, by concern of a more fanatic religious movement called Mahdism. It must be noted that the 
Mahdists of Sudan were the ones who cut short the reign of Yohannis IV when a Mahdist stray bullet 
brought him to his demise in the Metema battle. Yohannis was mistakenly underestimated by people. 
With respect to this underestimation, Haile-Selassie (1997) tells us the following: 
He was underestimated as lacking drive for reform and political sensitivity but proved 
otherwise in defending the interest of his empire with puritanical zeal. He had even 
succeeded in restoring the bogus region in the present Eritrea from Egypt in exchange 
for rescuing an Egyptian garrison from the Sudan where it had been put under siege by 
the Mahdists (p. 22). 
 With respect to domestic policies, Yohannis, his predecessor devolved power to local administrators. 
This policy won him the loyalty of the local warlords who helped him fight back intruders like Egyptians, 
Italians, and Mahdists. Furthermore, Yohannis continued Tewodros’ vision of a united Ethiopia. An area 
where he differed from his predecessor was the fact that he was more sensitive to the needs of the nobility 
and the Church. This particular policy helped him win their critical support in his endeavors. What needs 
to be restated here is the positive effect that the power devolution had on the local warlords or kings like 
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Menilek of Shewa. Menilek had the disposition to rebel against Yohannis and it was Yohannis’s policy of 
power devolution that quelled that disposition. However, the power devolution policy did not smooth 
things out completely between King Menilek and Yohannis in that Menilek kept calling himself Neguse 
Negest, a title apropos to an emperor. Yohannis promoted several people to higher positions, one of whom 
was Ras Adale of Gojjam. Adale was promoted from a Ras to kingship. That obviously angered Menilek. 
However, Yohannis, because of his preoccupation with Egyptian forces, did not pay too much attention to 
Menilek. Nonetheless, the successive victories Yohannis enjoyed against Egyptian forces gave him some 
breathing space at which time he turned to Menilek. In 1878 Yohannis marched to Shewa for a fight 
against Menilek. Menilek, too, mobilized his army for a showdown. The seriousness of the situation 
forced the Ethiopian Orthodox Church to intervene thereby averting bloodshed. Yohannis and Menilek 
signed the Liche Agreement when Menilek accepted the suzerainty of Yohannis, meaning that Menilek 
was no longer considered Neguse Negest, or King of Kings.  
Something ironic sprang out of this compact; Yohannis’s son, Ras Araya, and Menilek’s daughter, 
Weizero Zewditu, were married to each other (Zewditu became empress of Ethiopia in 1916). This 
political marriage was seen as a symbol of the sincerity of the signatories to the Liche Agreement. There 
was an apparent peace in the country as a result of the Liche Treaty, giving Yohannis a chance to defend 
his empire against foreign intruders, while at the same time Menilek expanded his kingdom to the south, 
east, and west of Shewa. 
 The same doctrinal controversy that was settled by decree by Emperor Tewodros became a 
controversy again for Emperor Yohannis. Yohannis readily recognized that this controversy was a threat 
to his power and the unity of his empire. Haile-Selassie (1997) tells us how Yohannis resolved this 
controversy in the following excerpt: 
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He, [Yohannis] unlike his predecessor, resolved the controversy by convening an 
ecclesiastical council at Boru-meda. Under his chairmanship the Ethiopian Orthodox 
Church debated the controversies and reached a decision by consensus that upheld 
Tewahido (the Two Births of Christ) as the official interpretation of the nature of Christ 
in the Ethiopian Orthodox Church (p. 23-24). 
 Yohannis constantly worried about Ethiopia’s hostile neighbor, Egypt. When the Ottoman Empire 
vacated the Red Sea coast, Egypt filled the void. Although Yohannis defeated Egypt in two successive 
battles in the 1870s, this defeat did not have a restraining effect upon Egypt. Massawa, Ethiopia’s port 
town on the Red Sea remained occupied by Egypt. Egyptian forces penetrated deep into Ethiopia and 
captured Harare, a town on the east coast. Yohannis’ plea for restraint was completely ignored. In 1882, 
Egypt was occupied by the British and Egypt compelled to vacate the Red Sea littoral and the town of 
Harare on the eastern part of Ethiopia. The British occupation of Egypt, furthermore, forced the Sudanese 
Mahdists influence to disappear along with the Egyptians. Ironically, the Egyptian garrison in Sudan came 
under siege by Mahdists. This situation forced Egypt to seek help from Ethiopia. Britain was represented 
by Rear-Admiral Sir William Hewett. Hewett intervened between Ethiopia and Egypt on behalf of Her 
Majesty Queen Victoria to hammer out a treaty. The purpose of the treaty was to “establish an everlasting 
peace between them” (Haile-Selassie, 1997, p. 24). Ethiopia fulfilled her obligation to rescue the Egyptian 
garrison from the siege of the Mahdists and pave a safe passage out of Sudan. Britain, on the other hand, 
failed to exit the port of Massawa. What she did instead was to allow Massawa to be occupied by Italy. 
Egypt, however, stopped being a hostile neighbor to Ethiopia after the safe passage of its garrison out of 
Sudan. Egypt’s exit out of Ethiopia naturally created a vacuum; and this vacuum was filled by the 
Mahdists who were more hostile towards Ethiopians than Egyptians, presumably because Egyptians were, 
and still are, Moslems. The Mahdists jihad penetrated into Gonder, a town adjacent to Sudan, and 
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destroyed it in 1888. After the destruction of Gonder, Yohannis was given an ultimatum by the Mahdists. 
The ultimatum was that Yohannis must become a Moslem and that his subjects must convert to Islam in 
exchange for peace.  
Another problem Yohannis had in his hands was also the colonial ambitions of France towards the 
Red Sea coast. Seeing France’s ambition, Britain decided to frustrate that ambition by expelling Egypt 
from the Red Sea coast and allowing Italy to take her place. Soon after Italy replaced Egypt, she expanded 
her occupation of northern Ethiopia. She occupied Zulla located to the south of the port of Massawa, 
Sahati and Wai. Ras Alula confronted the Italians in 1887, 20 kilometers from Massawa. At Dogali, Ras 
Alula annihilated 500 Italian soldiers and only 12 of the Italian soldiers escaped Ras Alula’s punitive fury.  
 Following this victory, Emperor Yohannis of Tigray made one of the most serious mistakes in 
Ethiopian history. Here is how Haile-Selassie (1997) explains the mistake: 
The Italians, humiliated at the battle of Dogali, abandoned Sahati and Wai, and 
retreated to Massawa. The victory of the Ethiopians restrained the expansion of Italy 
into the interior of Ethiopia until Yohannis foolishly removed Ras Alula and replaced 
him by Fitawrari Dahab who had a record of defecting to the Egyptians, Mahdists, and 
the Italians. Yohannis marched to settle scores with the Mahdists without making 
adequate arrangements for the defense of his maritime province. Moreover the local 
tribal chiefs alliance with Italy was also a contributory factor for the unchallenged 
incursion of Italy into the Eritrean plateau.  
Yohannis, with his maritime province undefended marched to the Sudan border and his 
army clashed with the Mahdists’ force at Metema. It was a fierce battle where the 
Ethiopians had dominated the scene and the Mahdists were retreating when a stray 
bullet fatally wounded Yohannis and claimed his life. When the news of Yohannis’s 
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death reached the Mahdists’ camp, they regrouped their forces and charged against the 
Ethiopian forces that were shocked by the death of their emperor. The Ethiopians began 
to retreat and finally fled in the face of the Mahdists’ counter-offensive. The Mahdists 
succeeded in capturing the corpse of the emperor from the Ethiopians and severed the 
head from the body and presented their trophy to the Mahdi in Khartoum (p. 26-27). 
 Emperors Tewodros and Yohannis died while fighting their enemies. But, Haile-Selassie (1997), 
states that Yohannis expanded on what Tewodros started and left a better Ethiopia for his successor, 
Emperor Menilek II. The following excerpt explains it: 
Yohannis inherited a divided and a weak Ethiopia, but at his tragic death he left to his 
successor Emperor Menilek II, a united and much larger and prosperous empire. He 
should, more than anything else, be remembered for sacrificing his life in the defense of 
his country (p. 27). 
The reign of Emperor Menilek II (1889-1913) 
 The death of Emperor Yohannis opened the way for competition for the throne. Before the 
competition started, Ras Araya Selassie, only son of Yohannis and son-in-law of Menilek, inherited the 
throne from his father, but passed away soon after his father’s death, in 1887 without leaving an heir to 
the throne. The competition started in earnest between King Menilek of Shewa, and Ras Mengesha of 
Tigray. Haile-Selassie (1997) tells us: 
Yohannis, among the siblings of his three brothers at his death bed, chose Ras 
Mengesha to succeed him. The other two nephews of Yohannis, Dejazmach Meshesha 
Maru, and Dejazmach Bogale Ali contested Yohannis’s choice. The struggle for 
succession among the three cousins made conditions favourable [sic] for Menilek to 
seize the throne and crown himself as Niguse Negest [King of Kings] of Ethiopia. The 
Social Change:  A Pedagogic Inquiry of Ethiopian Ethnicity/Tribe/Gossa      41 
 
Tigrayn army which was battered and dispersed at the battle of Metema did not pose 
any threat to Menilek.  
Ras Mengesha, one of the contenders for the throne, who had felt that the throne had 
been usurped from him, declared his non-allegiance to Menilek and formed an alliance 
with the Italian governor of the colony of Eritrea, General Antonio Baldissera. The 
Italians who had been labouring [sic] to incite local chiefs against Menilek seized the 
opportunity and used it to their advantage. The friendship struck between Mengesha and 
the governor of the Italian colony of Eritrea reached its climax when they signed a 
convention on 6 December 1891. The vow of solidarity consisted of three articles 
whereby the contracting parties affirmed their friendship to stand against a common 
enemy. The Italians recognized Mengesha as the legitimate heir to the throne and he 
reciprocated by acknowledging Italy’s sovereignty in the occupied territory. Both 
parties entered into obligation not to do anything that might adversely affect the 
interests of the other. The final provisions of the pact affirmed the friendship between 
the Tigrayans and the Italians. The coded message of the vow of solidarity was that the 
Italians would support Menegesha should he choose to reclaim the throne from 
Menilek. In case of any aggression by Menilek the Italians would stand by Mengesha 
and vice versa. The Italians had also extracted from Mengesha his recognition of their 
sovereignty. The sovereignty provision of the covenant was shrouded in vagueness to 
conceal Italy’s ambition to occupy the whole of Ethiopia (p. 27-28). 
 This alliance between Mengesha and the Italians did not last that long. Mengesha knew that he 
compromised the interests of his country by allowing the Italians to extend their grip on Ethiopia all the 
way to River Mereb which eventually became the line of demarcation between Ethiopia and Eritrea. 
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 Menilek at around 12 years old was taken prisoner by Emperor Tewodros, where he had an 
opportunity to watch and observe Tewodros while growing up. He saw that Tewodros used excessive 
force in his governance. He also saw that Tewodros was deeply involved in the affairs of the Ethiopian 
Orthodox Church even to the extent of issuing a decree to solve doctrinal controversies.  In short before 
his escape to Shewa, Menilek had learned a great deal from Tewodros. His experience with Tewodros 
helped him develop his own convictions with respect to how a state should be governed. When he came 
to the throne in 1889, Mengesha rebelled against Menilek for a short while, but eventually submitted to 
the emperorship of Menilek. King Tekle Haimanot of Gojjam and King Michael of Wello did not 
challenge Menilek at all.  
Here the anticipation of future by Menilek should be noted. Menilek expanded his kingdom to the 
east, west, and south of Shewa, his power base while Yohannis was still the Emperor of Ethiopia. After 
Menilek incorporated these regions into his kingdom, he used this incorporation as groundwork for his 
final conquest of Harargie. Harargie was given to an Amir (by the Egyptians) when the Egyptian 
garrison left in 1885 because of the British siege on Egypt. Furthermore, Menilek was up to restoring the 
medieval empire of Ethiopia. As a result, he pressed for the re-conquest of the Ogaden in 1891. The fact 
here is that Menilek had accomplished most of what he wanted while he was still the King of Shewa, 
before he became emperor of Ethiopia]. Here is what Haile-Selassie (1997) tells us about Menilek: 
When Menilek became Emperor of Ethiopia he had completed a good portion of the 
restoration of the medieval territories and the unification of Ethiopia. The vision of 
Tewodros was realized by Menilek who excelled both of his predecessors in statecraft 
and diplomacy (p. 30). 
Menilek’s leadership capability went beyond what he did in Ethiopia. He had to have Ethiopia 
recognized as an independent and sovereign state internationally but more importantly by the colonial 
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powers that had their eyes on Ethiopia. Menilek accomplished that using diplomacy and resistance to 
colonial expansion. As stated previously, Menilek beat Italy in 1896 at the battle of Adwa. That alone 
forced Italy to recognize Ethiopia as an independent and sovereign state. Italy obviously was humiliated 
in the battle of Adwa. This humiliation was shared and felt by other European colonial powers. 
Consequently, the colonial powers in Europe followed Italy’s lead and recognized Ethiopia as an 
independent and sovereign state. Haile-Selassie (1997) tells us that:  “The invincibility of the colonial 
powers was shattered and Ethiopia won international recognition as a sovereign state with definite 
borders” (p. 31).  
Menilek’s success was the result of his great skill in diplomacy. He was very interested in diverse 
diplomatic contacts and this interest resulted in diplomatic contact with France, Russia, Italy, Great 
Britain, Egypt, and others, but he struck a close friendship with Italy and France. The Italians were 
aware of Menilek’s ambition to get to the throne.  Hence, they openly showed their friendship to him 
which created hostility between Menilek and Emperor Yohannis. Menilek continued his friendship with 
Italy after he became Emperor of Ethiopia and beat them at the battle of Adwa after he became an 
Emperor. The battle of Adwa brought about the Treaty of Wichale in which Ethiopia, if she wanted, 
could use the assistance of Italy in order to conduct business with European kings. In other words, it was 
optional for Ethiopia to ask for Italy’s assistance. However, the Italian version of the treaty was 
obligatory rather than optional. The Ethiopian government took this contradiction to be an intentional 
fraudulence on the part of Italy. As a result, the Ethiopian government unilaterally annulled the treaty. 
This annulment then triggered the battle of Adwa in 1896 in which Italy, a European colonial power, 
was defeated. A new treaty was hammered out on 26 October 1896. The new treaty contained, along 
with other provisions, Italy’s recognition of Ethiopia as a sovereign and independent state. The 
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preceding discussion outlines Menilek’s courage, strength, diplomacy, and capability to survive in the 
midst of European scramble for Africa. How about his domestic policies and performance?  
 Menilek was a monarch and he arranged a hierarchical system of leadership in his government. His 
government officials were faithful and devoted to him, and ordinary citizens cooperated with him in 
whatever he did; the reason was that they [the ordinary citizens] benefited from his government. 
However, as noted earlier, during this period Ethiopia had several different local chiefs or kings. One 
way for one king to rebel against another king was to refuse to pay tribute or taxes to the one deemed to 
be more powerful. A good example of this situation is what happened between Menilek and King Tona 
of Wolayyta. Haile-Selassie (1997) tells us the following after Tona was defeated by Menilek in a battle- 
“Tona. . . after his defeat was pardoned and reinstated to his previous position (kingship). Such gestures 
of magnanimity characterized Menilek’s style of government.” (p. 24) This kind of behavior earned 
Menilek love, respect, loyalty, on the part of his subjects. Haile-Selassie concludes Emperor Menilek’s 
reign this way: 
Menilek, during his long years of reign, restored and unified most of the medieval 
territories of Ethiopia and introduced administrative and social reforms of far-reaching 
implications. He injected into the nation the idea of modernity; above all enhanced the 
prestige of Ethiopia as an independent and sovereign state in the midst of European 
‘scramble for Africa.’ His reign was marked with peace, stability and prosperity (p. 36). 
 The reign of Emperor Haile Selassie I (1941-74) 
Lij Iyasu, the grandson of Menilek, was the choice of the Emperor to succeed him. Lij Iyasu was 
only sixteen years old at that time. The Emperor made his choice on his death bed in 1909 when his 
incapacitation forced him to make his successor known. While he was incapacitated, it was actually his 
wife, Queen Taytu who was in charge of running the government. She took this opportunity to appoint 
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people to high offices which drew the wrath of the Shewan nobility. Consequently, she was exiled to an 
area known as Entoto far into the outskirts of Addis Ababa. She was effectively kept in exile until she 
passed away. Lij Iyasu then became the Emperor of Ethiopia in 1911. He, too, drew the wrath of the 
Shewan nobility as a result of his close association with Moslems.  In fact Lij Iyasu converted to Islam 
which triggered, with the concurrence of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, his deposition from power. Lij 
Iyasu was then replaced by Weizero Zewditu, the daughter of Menilek. Ras Teferri Mekonnen, later 
known as Emperor Haile-Selassie I, was designated to be her regent and crown prince. Empress Zewditu 
did not have the required talent for state craft. Neither was she as keen as her step mother, Queen Taytu. 
Queen Taytu was the driving force behind critical decisions Emperor Menilek made. She was the one 
who instigated the abrogation of the Treaty of Wichale that Menilek signed with colonialist Italy. 
Zewditu had a modest educational background characterized with conservatism. Hence, she was viewed 
as a temporary replacement of Iyasu. Ras Teferri Mekonnen, in contrast to Zewditu, was viewed as 
progressive. The appointment of Zewditu to the throne and Ras Teffri as her regent and crown prince 
was actually taken to be a compromise between the traditional and the progressive. At this time in 
history, the progressives were led by Teferri, the future Emperor Haile-Selassie. The supporters of 
Empress Zewditu had dwindled due to attrition and repression by progressive forces. Now, the 
progressives demanded that Ras Teferri be crowned as king. Ras Teferri, then, became king in 1928. In 
other words, Teferri was not yet an Emperor. However, being a king would pave the way to the 
emperorship as he was the heir to the throne due to the fact that he was the crown prince. It turned out 
that two years later Teferri became king. Empress Zewditu, co-incidentally, passed away due to natural 
causes thus making the succession of Teferri to the throne possible.  
Teferri was crowned as Haile-Selassie I Emperor of Ethiopia, Elect of God and Conquering Lion of 
the Tribe of Judas, on 30 October 1930. Now that Teferri was Emperor Haile-Selassie I, he continued to 
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govern the country in comportment with what Menilek started. Haile-Selassie introduced modest 
reforms in education and abolished slavery. His historic landmark was the introduction of a constitution 
which was an imitation of the Japanese constitution of 1889. This constitution was the first of its kind. It 
dealt for the most part with the powers and prerogatives of the emperor, and the succession to the throne. 
Haile-Selassie attempted to introduce a bicameral parliament in which members of the Senate would be 
chosen by the emperor and members of the Chamber of Deputies would be elected by indirect means by 
those who owned immovable property. Haile-Selassie (1997) tells us that what Emperor Haile-Selassie 
did was “an important departure towards a constitutional rule in a society where the rights and duties of 
the people were determined by whims of an emperor” (p. 37). 
 Haile-Selassie had a good deal of inspiration from his tour in Europe while he was still Empress 
Zewditu’s regent and crown prince. In his tour, he visited Great Britain, France, Italy, Sweden, and other 
European countries in 1924. Haile-Selassies’ European visit broke Ethiopia’s isolation from the 
international community of nations. This exposure to European nations impressed him enough that he 
came back to Ethiopia intent on introducing some aspects of Western civilization. This favorable 
attitude towards European nations contributed to his determination to associate Ethiopia with prestigious 
institutions like the League of Nations and the International Labor Organization in 1919 and 1923 
respectively. 
 At this point in history, Nazi Germany was quite aggressive in its policy towards other European 
nations. As a result, Great Britain and France adopted a policy of appeasement towards Italy in order to 
keep her away from Germany. This represented, to Italy, the sense of apprehension Great Britain and 
France have towards Nazi Germany and Italy decided to take advantage of this apprehension by pressing 
both Britain and France to disregard the tripartite treaty they signed in 1906. This tripartite treaty 
recognized the independence and territorial integrity of Ethiopia. Italy, nonetheless, got a tacit 
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agreement of Britain and France and began to prepare to occupy Ethiopia while increasing its  
diplomatic offensive against Ethiopia. Britain concerned about  Nazi Germany, came up with a proposal 
that suggested that Ethiopia would retain sovereignty of the port of Zeila on the Red Sea provided that 
Ethiopia the Ogaden region to Italy. Anthony Eden took the proposal to Rome and Mussolini rejected it 
on 24 June 1935. The aggression of Nazi Germany became more and more intensified. Consequently, 
France and Britain became desperate and their need to befriend Italy grew stronger more so than before. 
The result of this intense situation, Haile-Selassie (1997) tells us that “. . . they worked out a plan that 
ceded more than half of Ethiopia to Italy and the remaining part to be Italy’s protectorate with an access 
to the port of Aseb” (p. 39).  
This plan was put together secretly and, obviously enough, when it was presented to Ethiopia, she 
rejected it. This plan that Britain and France constructed was a violation of the tripartite treaty the 
intention of which was to uphold the independence and territorial integrity of Ethiopia. The plan was a 
violation of the treaty, because it gave the green light to Italy to attack Ethiopia. Central to the violation 
of the treaty, of course, was that France and Britain wanted to befriend Italy. Eventually, though, the 
plan failed. Regardless, Italy had already gotten the assurances of its colonial allies to proceed and attack 
Ethiopia. And, Italy did just that on 3 October 1935. To avoid another humiliation in battle with Ethiopia 
Italy decided to use modern weaponry including mustard gas which was a violation of the gas Protocol 
of 1925. There was now a full blown war between two nations, Italy and Ethiopia. Italy had modern 
weaponry, aerial capability and mustard gas, while Ethiopia had horse mounted soldiers with spears. 
Ethiopia lost the war and Emperor Haile-Selassie fled to Jerusalem and then to Great Britain where he 
remained in exile until 1940. A few days after Haile-Selassie’s flight to Jerusalem, the Italians reached 
the capital city, Addis Ababa bringing a sad end to the independence of Ethiopia —one of the oldest 
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nations. Addis Ababa’s occupation paved the way for Italy to reshape east Africa by merging Ethiopia 
with its colonies, Eritrea and Somaliland.  
This newly created territory was given the name Italian East Africa. This huge colony was 
governed by a viceroy accountable to the Ministry for Africa in Rome. The internal Ethiopian territories 
were reorganized along ethnic lines. The Ogaden area was merged with Somaliland and Tigray and 
Danakel areas were incorporated with Eritrea. The other parts of Ethiopia were divided into four regions 
reflecting ethnic divisions. These divisions were: Amhara, Harare, Oromo-Sidama and Shewa. Each 
region, with an Italian governor, was autonomous but under the supervision of the viceroy. General 
Pietro Badoligio was the first fascistic Italian army leader to enter Addis Ababa from the colony of, 
Eritrea. He was replaced, due to poor health, by General Graziani who was known for his terror and 
extreme cruelty. As a result, an attempt was made to kill him in February 1937. This attempt on his life 
resulted into a massacre of unarmed civilians in Addis Ababa and monks, nuns, and clergies in the 
monastery of Debre Libanos. Graziani was replaced by the Duke of Aosta, who introduced major racist 
legislation.. This was shift in approach from terror and extreme cruelty to a system of racism. 
 Regardless of the atrocities Ethiopia went through, the Italian occupation of Ethiopia for five years 
had a transformative effect upon the Ethiopian society. Here is how Haile-Selassie (1997) puts it: 
The Italian occupation, despite the atrocities, had some significant inputs in changing 
the attitudes of the Ethiopian society towards the adoption of Western civilization. The 
introduction of Western values shook the fabric of the Ethiopian society which created a 
more conducive climate for any attempt to modernize the country. The introduction of 
the idea of entrepreneurship in commerce and industry, modern system of 
transportation, and even the top-heavy colonial administration had invaluable impact on 
the conservative mode of life that was prevalent in Ethiopia before the Italian 
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occupation. Furthermore, influences of traditional institutions in particular of the 
nobility and chieftaincy were undermined by Italy’s colonial policy. By 1941 a good 
number of the nobles who were threats to Haile-Selassie’s power had disappeared from 
politics by natural attrition and Italy’s scorched-earth policy which virtually destroyed 
the nobility as well as its power-base. After the restoration of independence, those 
nobles and chiefs who collaborated with Italy were disgraced and lost their social 
position of influence and were not of any consequence to pose serious challenges to the 
emperor. The concurrence of events made conditions favourable for the emperor to 
resume his modernization that was interrupted for five years by the Italian occupation 
(p. 41). 
 While Britain played a significant role towards Italy’s occupation of Ethiopia it flipped around and 
joined hands with Ethiopian patriots and expelled Italy from Ethiopia in 1941. The British and Emperor 
Haile-Selassie, then, began to think about who should be in charge of the administration in the country. 
The British wanted to be in charge of Ethiopia until a peace treaty was signed between Ethiopia and 
Italy. Haile-Selassie rejected the British view on the grounds that he had never renounced his 
sovereignty and, hence, he should continue his leadership that was disrupted by Italy’s occupation of 
Ethiopia. In addition to the disagreement between Haile-Selassie and the British, there were some 
British officials who felt that Ethiopia should be under British protectorate, at least for a short period. 
This view compelled Haile-Selassie to take some symbolic steps which serve as acts of defiance and an 
assertion of his power. His first act of defiance was appointing seven ministers without consulting with 
the British. In order to minimize his vulnerability to the British Haile-Selassie proceeded but told the 
British that the ministers were appointed in order to assist the British military force in running the 
administration of Ethiopia. The British reluctantly accepted the emperor’s explanation of why he 
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appointed the ministers. He then insisted that Britain should guarantee Ethiopian independence. Haile-
Selassie proposed that Ethiopia’s independence be guaranteed through the agency of an Anglo-Ethiopian 
Agreement. This Agreement was concluded and signed in 1942. Some of the elements of this 
Agreement were provisions of financial assistance, recruiting expatriate advisors, assisting in 
establishing an army, a police force, and courts. The agreement was in compliance with issues that were 
important to the British government. In other words, the British were in control of the coercive branches 
of the Ethiopian government, the army, the police force, the court system and the high court.  The 
agreement, furthermore, put the Ogaden region, the city of Dire Dawa, and the Franco-Ethiopian 
Railway Line under the British rule. In return for all this control, Haile-Selassie tells us that:  
Britain . . .  entered into an obligation to advance a four year subvention of  £3, 250, 000 
[British pounds] and train a standing army and a police force at her own expense and in return 
retain the post of the commander of police force” (p. 43). 
 The Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement was eventually annulled by Ethiopia in compliance with one of the 
provisions in the Agreement. Other Agreements were hammered out in which Ethiopia regained the 
control of the Franco-Ethiopian Railway Line, Dire Dawa, etc. from Britain. Although the colonialist 
impulse of Britain was palpable, it must be admitted that Britain played a significant role in restoring 
and reconstructing Ethiopia.  The fact that Britain trained a standing army, a police force, and introduced 
modern education attests to Britain’s importance to Ethiopia. Diverse international relations were one of 
the strong features of Emperor Haile-Selassie’s government. An act reflective of that was that the 
Ethiopian government invited the United States government to participate in development programs. 
United States accepted the invitation on the grounds of the strategic location of Ethiopia, and as a result 
of the invitation assisted Ethiopia in establishing a civil airline in 1946. Furthermore, a treaty known as 
Ethio-United States of America treaty of Amity and Economic Assistance was signed in 1953. After 
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signing this treaty the influence of the British faded until America completely replaced the British. 
Haile-Selassie  (1997) tells us that: “Ethiopia remained a faithful partner of the United States until 
Emperor Haile-Selassie was overthrown by a military junta in 1974” (p. 44). 
 Before the overthrow of Emperor Haile-Selassie, there was a great deal of upheaval and military 
action which resulted into a new government called Dergue. Dergue is, according to Haile-Selassie 
(1997), a body which “the army formally constituted” (p. 121). In other words, Haile-Selassie (1997) 
says that Dergue means “committee or council” (p. 121). The purpose and reason for the military set up  
the Dergue was to spark a political upheaval so that there would be a complete military take over of 
Ethiopia. In order to accomplish that, the so called Coordinating Committee started vilifying Emperor 
Haile-Selassie. Since the military support was the foundation of Emperor Haile-Selassie’s power, the 
vilification of the emperor by the military succeeded in bring down the emperor.  
The Dergue became more and more important in the eyes of the public and Emperor Haile-Selassie 
became an object of public condemnation. All this while, Ethiopia Tikdem was the motto of the Dergue; 
a philosophy ubiquitously promulgated in Ethiopia. According to Haile-Selassie (1997), the 
Coordinating Committee expressed its policy statement this way: 
Let us . . . work together in a new spirit for the everlasting unity, peace, and 
prosperity of our people. Let us not allow time to overtake us, nor let the 
opportunity of the challenge slip from our hands. Let us not allow personal 
conveniences to weaken our resolve. Let the vision of our ultimate objective guide 
our actions. May the Almighty be always with us (p. 118). 
 Interpreting this policy statement through the lens of history, the Dergue were saying: (a) 
We will maintain unity of the people of Ethiopia, (b)  prosperity of the people of Ethiopia would 
flow because of the Dergue and, (c) the principle of the end justifies the means would govern 
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their actions. What was the ultimate objective? It was the overthrow of Emperor Haile-Selassie 
and the complete military take over of Ethiopia. This was accomplished through a horrific period 
of bloodshed amongst Ethiopians belonging to different political parties. What emerged at the 
end of the bloodshed was the Dergue with Mengistu Haile Mariam as its leader and the 
bloodshed continued. An excerpt from the Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team (Equipo 
Argentino de Antropología Forense, EAAF) Report (2002): 
Between 1974 and 1991, under the leadership of Colonel Mengistu Hailemariam, 
Ethiopian state security forces tortured and executed thousands of persons suspected of 
belonging to urban opposition movements. During these same years, the military killed 
tens of thousands during indiscriminate campaigns against “dissident” ethnic groups in 
rural areas. The Dergue also bore large responsibility for exacerbating and perpetuating 
the famine that killed an estimated one million persons during the mid-1980s. 
According to Amnesty International, the Dergue compiled one of the worst records of 
human rights abuses in recent history during its seventeen years in power. (p. 1) 
The Dergue acted as the head of state until the monarchy was formally abolished by 
Proclamation No. 27, March 17, 1975. Although the monarchy was abolished in 1975, “the 
Dergue actually took over government in early 1974” (Haile-Selassie (1997, p. 133).  
The Dergue was viewed and declared itself a socialist government. This would eventually prove to 
be a cause of the Dergue’s demise. U.S Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Herman Jay Cohen 
brokered the end of the Eritrean-Ethiopian War and pushed for the Dergue to leave power. However it 
was perceived, the Dergue government actually reflected both socialistic and democratic characteristics. 
It was socialistic in the sense that it nationalized private properties and big companies; and, it was 
democratic in the sense that it had the principle of Ethiopia Tikden central to its structure and 
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functionality. Literally translated, the Amharic phrase Ethiopia Tikdem means let Ethiopia come first. In 
other words, there is nothing more important than Ethiopia. As a principle of the Dergue’s philosophy, 
there are several interpretations given to it, one of which is the following: “When we say Ethiopia 
Tikdem we mean a government of the people, by the people, for the people” (Haile-Selassie (1997), p. 
135). Despite the bloodshed, the Dergue upheld the rights of all Ethiopians, men and women. It made 
sure that the reforms enunciated by the philosophy of Ethiopia Tikdem were implemented. The reforms 
were carried out by teams of people called Yelewit Hawariat [apostles of change]. Haile-Selassie (1997) 
tells us the following about Yelewit Hawariat: “Yelewit Hawariat were cadres upon whom the Dergue 
relied for the implementation of the political, economic and social changes that were in the making” (p. 
149).  
Although the Dergue was both democratic and socialistic, a socialistic term included in the philosophy 
of Ethiopia Tikdem was Hibretesebawinet. This term, in the Dergue government, meant Ethiopian 
Socialism. With respect to Hibretesebawinet here is what Haile-Selassie (1997) says: “Ethiopia Tikdem 
means Hibretesebawinet and Hibretesebawinet means equality, self-reliance; the dignity of labour; the 
supremacy of the common good; and the inviolability of Ethiopian unity” (p. 153).  
This concept of Ethiopian unity is one concept that sets Dergue apart from the current tribe-based 
government. In other words, they are at odds in their interpretation of the doctrine of self-determination. 
Within the framework of Hibretesebawinet Haile-Selassie (1997) states the following as it relates to the 
doctrine of self-determination: “The right to self-determination within a unified Ethiopia will be 
realized” (p. 154). In other words, Dergue did not believe in the secession of Eritrea.  
As evidenced in the preceding Dergue had its good side; and, it also had its cruel side. One instance, 
of that cruelty was in 1977 when the Dergue issued an order for the public to surrender their fire-arms to 
a search team. Haile-Selassie (1997) states that: 
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The search team conducted a house-to-house search for fire-arms and anti-
revolutionaries from 24-29 March 1997. In the capital (Addis Ababa a search was 
declared and all citizens were instructed to stay at home, a dawn to dusk curfew was 
imposed and vehicles were prohibited from circulation. The search was conducted in a 
very tense atmosphere. Fire-arms were collected and alleged anti-revolutionaries, 
including the leader of EPRP, Tsegaye Debesay, were summarily executed by a search 
team. The search for arms and anti-revolutionary hunt was a prelude to the Red Terror 
(p. 179). 
 The influence of the Soviet Union was obvious in the Red Terror. The mass killings of prisoners 
and those deemed to be anti-revolution were rampant and carried out in the silence of the night, as 
happened when the Bolsheviks came to power. As stated by the, the Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia, 
Anatoly Rattanov, who was invited to a cocktail reception and in his conversation with an African 
diplomat, Rattanov reportedly said: “African socialism has its peculiarities and this (meaning the 
violence) is the feature of the Ethiopian revolution” (p. 119). Tola (1989) points out the Soviet 
connection with the Red Terror in the following statement: “he Anatoly played a major role both in the 
February palace coup against Emperor Haile-Selassie of Mengistu and in the terror against EPRP” (p. 
119).  
 Dergue was socialistic in its behavior and dealings with other parties. Haile-Selassie (1997) gives us 
a view of the harshest side of the Dergue government. 
The MEISON leaders or ‘right roaders’, as they were referred to by the government 
media, including the highly regarded ideologist of the MEISON and the chairman of the 
POMOA, Comrade Haile Fida, languished in prison and died a slow death in unknown 
circumstances. The entire leadership of the MEISON was liquidated. It died a premature 
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death because of the leaders’ excessive ambition for power and their decision to 
abandon the revolution to which it gave a sense of direction . . .  (p. 209). 
 The brutality of the Dergue is clear. The question is- was there any group or party that was not as 
brutal as the Dergue? The answer is no. My conversation with those Ethiopians who were in the thick of 
it revealed that Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP), All-Ethiopia Socialist Movement  
(MEISON), Tigrayan people’s Liberation Front (TPLF), Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), 
Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), and others were murderers for the causes they stood for. In fact, they 
credit the Dergue government for keeping the country together in view of the fact that it was 
simultaneously being attacked from three directions; Somalis on the east, being subverted within the 
country by its own security forces who passed critical information to the rebels (TPLF and EPLF) in the 
north, and by Dergue security personnel who northern rebels bribed for information that allowed the 
rebels to annihilate the Dergue military force. A critical question now is- where did the TPLF, EPLF get 
their fighting power from? Here is how Haile-Selassie (1997) answers the question: 
Some Arab countries showed their disapproval of the new political orientation of the 
country by stepping up their assistance to the Eritrean secessionists in the northern part 
of the country. The scale of their interference was worrisome to the regime. Moreover 
the Arab interference was exploited by the regime to rally the Ethiopian people behind 
it under the pretext that the territorial integrity of the country was threatened by the 
collusion of external forces with secessionists. The Eritrean problem had always been a 
cause for straining relations between Ethiopia and some Arab nations even under the 
monarchy. During that time the radical Arab states of Syria, Iraq, and Libya and from 
the moderates Egypt and the Sudan were assisting and harbouring [sic] secessionist 
elements (p. 170). 
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At this point, it must be pointed out that without the unceasing support of Arab countries Eritrea 
wouldn’t have been able to secede and the TPLF rebels would not have been able to take over Ethiopia. 
In addition to the role the Arabs played, the role that the United States played was the more decisive in 
the entire theater whose theme was to bring down the Dergue socialist government and possibly to put 
Ethiopia into the political and religious orbit of the Arabs. The question is- how did the United States 
play a more decisive role?  
It is important to remember the London Peace Talks of May 28-1991. Several delegations were sent 
to this peace talk, chaired by Herman J. Cohen, U.S Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. One 
of the delegations was the Dergue representatives. With respect to the Dergue [Ethiopian government] 
delegation, here is what Haile-Selassie (1997), who was at that time Ethiopian Ambassador in London] 
tells us: 
 Representatives of the Ethiopian government abandoned the talks at an early 
stage because they felt that the crucial decision to let EPRDF take the military and 
political control in Addis Ababa has been decided unilaterally by the US without 
the consultation and consent of the Ethiopian government (p. 326). 
Haile-Selassie (1997) states the following regarding the reaction of the European Parliament with 
respect to the way the United States of America handled the London Conference: “. . . the European 
Parliament which passed a resolution expressing its displeasure with the US Government’s handling of 
the conference and its concern about developments in Ethiopia after the EPRDF takeover” (p. 327). The 
political developments got worse and worse for the Dergue. Haile-Selassie (1997) sums up the end of 
the Dergue and the rise of the tribe-based government: 
 . . . , the London Peace Talks became irrelevant on account of the disintegration 
of the government’s armed forces caused by the flight (of Mengistu to Harare, 
Social Change:  A Pedagogic Inquiry of Ethiopian Ethnicity/Tribe/Gossa      57 
 
Zimbabwe) of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the appalling 
ineptitude of the government in Addis Ababa to provide a leadership that was 
required in a crisis, the absence of neutral international observers and impartial 
mediators (p. 328). 
Oromo/Galla Migration into Ethiopia 
     It is my belief that historical authenticity overrides politics, hence I use the term Galla rather 
than Oromo throughout this section. 
     This is a short and general outline of Galla migration into Ethiopia as published by the 
honorable Yilma Deresa (1959) who was the Finance Minister of Ethiopia during Emperor 
Haile-Selassie’s reign. Yilma Deresa (1959) tells us that some of the Galla history that he 
recorded was passed down to his generation through oral history. For instance, around the 10th 
century A.D., because of Somali and Somali-Bantu attack, the Gallas migrated in the south-
eastern direction from the Hargeisa (British Somaliland) area. This migration ended up in the 
settlement of the Gallas somewhere between the Wabeshebele and Juba rivers in the Benadire 
area (p. 213-214). In this area, the Gallas led a nomadic life for about 100 years. All this while, 
unlike the Somalis, the Gallas did not inter-marry or do business with Arabs. It is important to 
note that Somalis becoming Moslem and inter-married Arabs coincided with the Somalis 
receiving firearms from the Arabs which they to war against the Gallas. In the Benadire area the 
Gallas were attacked by the Somalis in the north, and by the Somali-Bantus in the south. This 
situation triggered another migration of the Gallas into southern Ethiopia. Deresa (1959) tells us 
that the fertility of this area was like the biblical land of milk and honey. As the Gallas were 
nomadic people, southern Ethiopia was great for cattle grazing. Most importantly, the warring 
Somalis and Somali-Bantus were now out of their way, and no one else was hostile towards the 
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Gallas. Here, the Gallas led a peaceful, prosperous, and semi-settled life, which, according to the 
author, was confirmed by the oral history transmitted down through generations. Since life was 
stable at this juncture, the Gallas’ population increased and spread to the east, west, and northern 
parts of Ethiopia. The peaceful surrounding and the absence of hostility made it possible for their 
families to flourish and for them to develop a sociopolitical system known as Gada, the 
definition and some characteristics of which will follow just below. The peaceful and settled life 
continued all the way to the 16th century. A special note must be made here pertaining to Gada. 
As indicated below, Gada is both defensive and expansionist in purpose. The Gallas did not use 
it in Somalia either for expansionistic or defensive purposes. They used it after they settled in 
southern Ethiopia; hence logic suggests that they must have constructed it after their arrival in 
Ethiopia.  
 The Gada system 
     The book Gada (1973) was the result of Dr. Asmarom Legesse’s dissertation. Dr. Asmarom is 
a native of the former northernmost province of Ethiopia called Eritrea. Since it seceded from 
Ethiopia on May 24, 1993 (Vestal, p. 9), it is considered a sovereign nation state. Nonetheless, 
Dr. Asmarom Legesse (1973) defines the Gada system, along with some of its characteristics, in 
the following way: 
The Gada system is a system of classes (luba) that succeeded each other every 
eight years in assuming military, economic, political, and ritual responsibilities. 
Each Gada class remains in power during a specific term (Gada) which begins 
and ends with a formal power transfer ceremony. Before assuming a position of 
leadership, the Gada class is required to wage war against a community that none 
of their ancestors had raided. This particular war is known as butta and is waged 
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on schedule every eight years. It is this event that most directly connected with 
the pulsating frontier of their dominions in the sixteenth century leading toward 
the conquest of nearly half of Ethiopia’s land surface (Legesse, p. 8). 
     As the above definition indicates the Gada system has a characteristic of raiding community 
properties (land) and incorporating them through conquest into the land or territory the Gallas 
already owned.. To somebody familiar with Ethiopian culture way of life, Gada also reflects 
some animistic characteristics. For instance, if there is a discussion going on that has the 
intention of instituting social rules and regulations or laws, and assuming that somebody wants 
the discussion to be postponed till the next day, then all this person has to say is “I am holding 
butter” (literal translation) (Deresa, p,221). In the same paragraph, Deresa (1959) points out that 
if everybody, on the same day and in the same discussion, accepts the rules/laws to be instituted: 
Then the leader of the discussion kills beef the following day. Then a stick-like item called 
bokoo is dipped, by the discussion leader, in the blood of the beef and then thrown into the 
ground and the law is declared permanently instituted (Deresa, p. 221). Please, note that the 
Gada system is a great deal more complicated than what is outlined here. I just made sure that a 
translation of what is necessary for purposes of this dissertation is recorded. To conclude the 
presentation on the concept of Gada, four of its characteristics should be restated: 
1.   The Gada class leadership is elected every eight years. 
2.   The act of holding/clasping butter indicates the suspension of public discussion till 
       the following day. 
3.   The ceremonial act of dipping the bokoo in the blood of a slain beef and driving it   
into the ground permanently institutes a law, and 
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4.  The incoming Gada leadership goes out and kills non-Galla communities in order to 
take their land and incorporate it into what they have already gained through conquest. 
The Creation of Eritrea 
      If a person went to Ethiopia in 1888 they would not have found Eritrea at all. Eritrea is a 
creation of Italian colonialist attack against Ethiopia in the late 19th century. Dr. Kendie (2005) 
tells us that “Eritrea appeared on the world map in 1890, when the Italians established it as their 
first colony in Africa, and christened it with the old Greco/Roman name for the Red Sea—
Eruthraeum Mare” (p. 42). However, Negash (1997) answers the same question in the following 
way:  
The death of Emperor Yohannis (1889) and the shift of the center of power from 
Tigrai to Shewa created favorable conditions for Italian colonial expansion. As 
early as 1887, Minilik, the king of Shoa [a province in central Ethiopia], had 
expressed readiness to negotiate with Italians for the supply of arms in exchange 
for a cession of territory, if this would ensure his speedy accession to power . . . . 
Minilik seized the opportunity provided by the political vacuum created by the 
death of Yohannis and sealed an Italo-Ethiopian pact, i.e. the treaty of Wichale, in 
May 1889. A small area of northern Tigrai was thus ceded to Italy. In return the 
Italians agreed to supply him with arms to support his bid for the emperorship. 
However, since the treaty of Wichale had to be ratified by the Italian government, 
the Italians in Eritrea used the period between the signing of the treaty and its 
formal ratification, which took place in October, to expand their possessions well 
beyond the areas designated in the document of May 1889. On January 1, 1890, 
these disparate possessions were consolidated into a single political entity 
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henceforth to be known as Eritrea. For the first ten years of its life, the colony was 
administered by the Ministry of War from the port town of Massawa (p. 13-14). 
      I think that what makes the picture of Italian aggression against Ethiopia more meaningful is 
to answer the question- how did Italy manage to get a foothold in Ethiopia in the first place? 
Pankhurst (2001) explains it this way: 
The opening of the Suez Canal, in November 1869, made the Red Sea, for the 
first time since the era of the Pharaohs, an annex of the Mediterranean. This 
greatly increased interest in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden area on the part of the 
Europeans, and in particular of the Italians. The latter that were to achieve their 
national unity in the following year, were beginning to look outwards beyond 
their own peninsula. Symptomatic of Italy’s new interest in the Red Sea area was 
the purchase on 15 November 1869 of the port of Assab. It was bought by an 
Italian Lazarist priest, Giuseppe Sapeto, on behalf of an Italian firm, the Rubattino 
Shipping Company, from a local sultan for 6,000 Maria Theresa dollars. This was 
a remarkable, but not entirely unique, case of a European missionary serving the 
interest of nineteen-century European colonialism. The port was subsequently 
declared an Italian colony, in 1882- an indication of rapidly escalating Italian 
government interest in the region (p. 169). 
      It is important to notice the historical account of the creation of Eritrea by colonialist Italy. 
What Pankhurst (2001) described above is true; suffice it to state that it can be subject of much 
misinterpretation. For instance, the Lazarist priest may have paid the money for the land he 
purchased out of his pocket. But, according to what Gnogno (1984) wrote, the Lazarist actually 
hammered out an agreement with two local Moslem chiefs, Sultan Abrahim and Sultan Hasan 
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Mohamed. The sultans responded to the Lazarist priest saying that he could buy as much land as 
he wanted. Then and only then did Sapeto go back to Italy and inform the shipping company. 
Then the shipping company gave Sapeto the amount of money he needed to buy the port. The 
day after he bought it, an Italian flag flew over it. The shipping company tried to use it for 12 
years and finally realized that it did not really have any use for it. After this realization, the 
company ended up selling it to the Italian government for 417, 000 Lira, in 1874 during the reign 
of Emperor Yohannis. In the same year on June 19, the Italian government declared the port of 
Assab its colony. At this time, farther north, the port of Massawa was occupied by Egypt. 
Nonetheless, some of the major players in the sphere of colonialism were the English, the 
French, and the Italians. The French has already colonized North African nations like Tunisia, 
Morocco, and Algeria. The English had colonized Sudan, but were having problems with 
Sudanese opposition forces. 
         It was at this point that the English and the Italians hammered out an agreement so that the 
English would drive the Egyptians out of the Ethiopian port of Massawa and let the Italians take 
over (Massawa), while the Italians sent some military force to Sudan and helped England fight 
against the insurgents. Italy, in the mean time, secretly brought about 800 soldiers into Massawa 
on January 28, 1877. With Massawa in Italian hands, Italy made sure that both the ports of 
Massawa and Assab were blocked so that no arms intended for Ethiopia could get through. 
While this was going on, there was a rush of inquiry made by Minilik, King of Shewa, as to how 
Italy got into the port of Massawa. And, an admiral of the Italian government gave an answer to 
the inquiry made by King Minilik. His answer was that Italy was permitted by Emperor 
Yohannis to send soldiers into Massawa, which was of course a lie. Minilik transmitted that 
response to his superior, Emperor Yohannis. Emperor Yohannis told Minilik to tell the Italian 
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government to send an emissary that would explain the actions of the Italian government. The 
emissary arrived in Ethiopia with an explanation- the explanation was that the Italian 
government was trying to protect Ethiopia from the siege and assault of the Sudanese Mahdists, 
which was another lie. Despite this lie, it turned out, coincidentally, that the Mahdists were 
poised to attack Ethiopia (Gnogno 1984, p. 132-134).  
      Pankhurst (2001), who is an Englishman, presents the same portion of Ethiopian history, as it 
pertains to the creation of Eritrea, this way: 
. . . , the Italians seized Massawa. This action was taken with the support of the 
British Government, which favoured Italian expansion on the Red Sea coast as a 
way of curbing that of France, its principal rival in the European Scramble for 
Africa. The Italian naval officer responsible for the occupation, Rear-Admiral 
Pietro Caini, issued a proclamation to the port’s inhabitants announcing that his 
action had been taken in agreement with the British and Egyptian Governments, 
and promised, ‘No obstacle shall be put by me on your trade.’ Such friendly 
protestations were, however, before long abandoned, for as soon as they were in 
position to do so the Italians, like the Egyptians in the previous decade, seized 
the coast adjacent to Massawa, and instituted a blockade to stop the supply of 
arms to Yohannis. Italian troops then advanced inland as far as Sa’ati and Wi’a, 
both around 30 kilometers [18.6 mi.] from the sea. 
      Ras Alula [Ras is a title for a leader of warriors- it means head] protested 
against this unwarranted Italian penetration, but the invaders replied by 
strengthening their fortifications in the areas they had occupied. He thereupon 
rode down from the highlands, and attacked the Italian garrison at Sa’ati, on 25 
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January 1887, but was repulsed, with heavy casualties. The interlopers then sent 
in more troops, which Alula intercepted and virtually annihilated at Dogali on 
the following day. Italian troops then evacuated Sa’ati and Wi’a, and declared 
an intensified blockade on all ships bringing supplies for Ethiopia. The 
engagement at Dogali had a remarkably mixed impact in Italy. Many Euro-
centric Italians bitterly condemned it as a ‘massacre’, while their anti-colonialist 
compatriots lauded Emperor Yohannis and Ras Alula as patriots in the tradition 
of such Italian heroes as Mazzini and Garibaldi (p. 171-172). 
      An interesting and equally perplexing act was displayed by Emperor Yohannis. Short of the 
details that Paulos Gnogno (1984) has delineated, Emperor Yohannis was made aware of the fact 
that there were 17,700 Italian soldiers in Massawa and the surrounding areas. The Emperor put 
together 159,000 soldiers and marched against the Italians in Massawa. He and his army reached 
an area known as Sebergoma near Sa’ati, where the Italians were fortified. There, the Emperor 
and his soldiers waited for the Italians to come out of their fortification. The waiting went on for 
two months at which time Yohannis got word of King Teklehaimanot of Gojam having lost a 
battle to the Mahdists and decided to drop his intention to fight the Italians and, instead, headed 
out to confront the Islamic (Mahdists) aggression from Sudan on March 22,1880. Emperor 
Yohannis continued his journey towards the Mahdists on April 15 from Asmara after having 
dislodged Ras Alula from his governorship thus leaving the Italians to strengthen their hold on 
the Red Sea area. The Emperor confronted the Mahdists at the town of Metema, where he was 
killed by a stray bullet. Emperor Yohannis created two conditions which were favorable to 
Italian expansion: He ousted Ras Alula from his gubernatorial position in the region covering  
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today’s Eritrea and failed to replace him created a power vacuum, and left the Sebergoma and 
Sa’ati area, where the Italians were fortified without firing a shot.  
      These two conditions provided the Italians with a commanding military grip over the Red 
Sea area, and simultaneous with that the Emperor’s death in the hands of the Mahdists in 1882 
gave a free reign for them to tag the Red Sea area, under their control, with the name Eritrea. 
Gnogno (1984) makes an extremely detailed presentation of the fall of a portion of Ethiopian 
territory into the hands of colonialist Italy. All this happened, according to the preceding 
historical accounts, during the reign of Emperor Yohannis. An important fact to know is that 
Emperor Yohannis, before confronting the Mahdists and after having beaten King 
Teklehaimanot of Gojam, headed directly to beat King Minilik of Shewa. The Emperor, on his 
way to Shewa, discovered that King Minilik was waiting for him right by river Abay, the source 
of the Blue Nile. This awareness confirmed the hostility between Emperor Yohannis and King 
Minilik. Keeping in mind the norms of the politics of the time, the question that must be 
answered now is- why did Emperor Yohannis interrupt his plan to fight against the Italians at 
Sebergoma and come to Metema, without firing a shot, to confront the Mahdists? Gnogno (1984) 
explains it this way:  
 King Minilik went to help King Teklehaimanot of Gojam. The reason for this help is 
that the Mahdists beat Teklehaimanot in a battle. This situation, the Emperor thought, 
would create the possibility of a kind of rapprochement between Minilik and 
Teklehaimanot. It was the possibility of this rapprochement that compelled Emperor 
Yohannis to quit his plan to fight the Italians and march to confront the Mahdists. 
Although that was the initial thrust of the Emperor’s move, he nonetheless failed to 
confront the Mahdists as planned. Instead, he went to the province of Gojam, past 
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Metema, to beat on Teklehaimanot’s army that was already beaten and weakened, not 
too long ago, by the Mahdists. In simple terms, the reason for Yohannis to pick on a 
weak king like Teklehaimanot was to stop the possible rapprochement he could have 
had with Minilik. This rapprochement probably could have meant the beginning of 
Yohannis’s loss of the emperorship to Minilik. With the flow of events the way they 
were, Minilik decided to befriend the Italians secretly in order to give himself a sense of 
security vis-à-vis Yohannis’s emperorship. Yohannis eventually came face to face, in 
war, with the Mahdists on March 1, 1881. A war in which Emperor Yohannis was hit 
by a stray bullet that brought him to his death. But before he passed away, he made it 
known to the nobilities around him and the public that the emperorship should be 
passed on to Ras Mengesha. Ras Mengesha now is the heir to the throne. Emperor 
Yohannis passed away the day after he bequeathed the emperorship to Ras Mengesha. 
The Ethiopian army was weakened when they found out that the Emperor was hit with a 
stray bullet. Now, the army started retreating with the Emperor’s dead body in a wax-
sealed casket. While retreating, the army took some time to rest at which time a tent was 
set up for the Emperor’s casket. There were honor guards all around the tent. As it 
turned out, the Mahdists snuck up on the army and another battle ensued. It was in this 
battle that the Mahdists killed almost all the guards and those who were not killed 
surrendered. What followed this attack was that the Mahdists cut the heads of the dead 
army leadership and sent them to Caliph Abdulahee, their leader in Sudan. They did not 
stop there; they proceeded to break into the tent thinking that there was money to be 
looted. Unexpectedly, they found Yohannis’s casket and broke it open. And, the head of 
the Emperor’s dead body was cut off and sent to their leader, Caliph Abdulahee. The 
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Sudanese [in Sudan] then put the Emperor’s head on a stick and rode around town on a 
camel’s back to show it off for public consumption and pleasure. (Gnogno, p.133-139) 
      With Emperor Yohannis dead and gone, who might be the next Emperor of Ethiopia, Minilik 
or Ras Mengesha, the chosen heir to the throne? Before we get to the answer, it must be stated 
that both Yohannis and Minilik were/are known to be fierce warriors. Minilik, furthermore, is 
said to have been a great diplomat in public relations. That was widely known by the nobilities 
important enough to assume high positions in the country. With the preceding political context in 
mind, it turned out that those who could vie for power against Minilik came and submitted 
themselves to him and explicitly stated that they accept his aspiration to the emperorship. Ras 
Mengesha, being an unknown quantity, did not have people submitting themselves to his 
emperorship. But curiously enough, the nobilities in the province of Tigre (Yohannis’s province) 
rejected Minilik’s accession to the emperorship in favor of Mengesha. This historical fact, the 
imperial crown moving from the province of Tigre to the province of Shewa, is a widely known 
Tigre resentment against Shewa that still plays a significant role in Ethiopia. Minilik heard about 
Ras Mengesha’s refusal to accept his emperorship. Consequently, Minilik conferred with his 
team of leadership and decided to inaugurate himself to the emperorship; and Minilik became the 
Emperor of Ethiopia on Oct.25,1882. Despite the spat between Ras Mengesha and Emperor 
Minilik, a little while later Ras Mengesha submitted himself to the emperorship of Minilik and 
started a rapprochement that lasted just for a short while.  
      The recounting of these portions of Ethiopian history helps us understand the sort of political 
problems that suffuse the Ethiopian society to this day. In fact, one should be in a position to 
explicate, from the glimpse of the history above, why the current tribe-based sociopolitical 
system has taken place. The current tribe-based system was crafted and is maintained by Tigres 
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which corresponds to the sort of divide-and-rule scheme colonialist Italy used in order to pit one 
tribe against another in a way that would keep intact its colonialist schemes. What the Tigres are 
doing today is not just splitting the people along tribal lines but go so far as reorganizing the 
internal provincial territories into tribal enclaves, such as Oromia Kilil, and Amhara Kilil.  
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY 
 The research method employed in this dissertation is the historical research method.  
Gall and Gall, (1996) define the historical research method as “a process of systematically 
searching for data to answer questions about a past phenomenon for the purpose of gaining a 
better understanding of present institutions, practices, trends, and issues in education” (p. 644). 
       The historical research method can be used as a spring board towards social change. History 
can be studied to build up a picture of past social conditions which one can link to current 
institutions and design social change as needs dictate. Consequently, this dissertation looks at 
some past historical events of Ethiopia and the Russian empire to the extent necessary for critical 
understanding of current institutions and social conditions in Ethiopia. This research method 
helps our grasp of the historical vectors that gave rise to current institutions and problems, better 
positioning us to solve the problems we are confronted with. Both primary and secondary 
sources were used in the production of this dissertation.  
 The secondary sources are the books used while doing the research on the history of the 
Russian empire around the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries, when the 
development of the Soviet Union was happening  in earnest, through military conquest of 
neighboring nations, by Lenin and Stalin (Richard Pipes, 1964). Another set of secondary 
sources are the books that relate to the history of Ethiopia, as it relates to how Eritrea was created 
at the end of the 19th century. The research on the historical accounts of the creation of Eritrea is 
intended to clarify some questions about the Ethiopian student movement of the 1960s and 
currently the Oromo Liberation front is charging Ethiopia with colonizing Oromia. A study of 
some portion of Ethiopian history is, therefore, indispensable in order to answer these and other 
perplexities.  
Social Change:  A Pedagogic Inquiry of Ethiopian Ethnicity/Tribe/Gossa      70 
 
 The part that is a primary source for my research is my observations of the dialogue. . 
The participants were presented with some questions and the dialogue starts between two or 
more Ethiopians. The point here is that the views exchanged between these Ethiopians are 
directly given to me as a listener. The discussions were not simple and ordinary discussions, 
although they were all about real Ethiopian lives. To wit, they were about issues that currently 
affect Ethiopian lives. The reason they were not simple and ordinary is because such questions as 
brought up in the discussions do not appear in casual conversations. They are philosophical, 
investigative, and explicative. They are the inner reflections of Ethiopian lives and identities 
today as a result of historical changes. 
       Some sample questions  help demonstrate the philosophical aspect of the discussions.  
 What is Gossa/tribe?  
 On what grounds does one believe in the existence of Gossa?  
 Is a social construct (language and culture) existentially equivalent to some concrete 
thing like a chair or a human being?  
 How does one justify one’s answer?  
In what way does this kind of dialogue contribute to the dissertation? This dialogue informs me 
and others  about the nature of the views Ethiopians have about ethnic federalism. Ethnic 
federalism is a sociopolitical system in which each tribe has its own enclave within Ethiopia  The 
reason for these tribal enclaves within Ethiopia is that tribal autonomy is expressed in terms of 
cultural, linguistic, educational, and other forms of autonomies. The logic of such scheme is the 
final disintegration of Ethiopia. This ethnic federalism is one of the concepts that drew, and still 
draws, the strongest possible opposition on the part of Ethiopians. Ethiopians have lived together 
and built families together for centuries regardless of tribal origin. With that in mind, it is not 
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surprising that ethnic federalism turns out to be alien to our history and psychological make up. 
It is a system superimposed upon the people of Ethiopia. With the tribal enclaves in mind, it is 
clear that the formula used to rule the people of Ethiopia is the divide-and-conquer scheme. This 
did not happen; the Tigres completely failed to recognize this invisible social force that ties the 
people of Ethiopia together. Ethiopians are people who move freely from place to place. One 
area is not different enough from another area, hence, lessening the need for adjustment. Their 
failure became much more pronounced when they assumed that the people of Ethiopia support 
their concept of ethnic federalism.  
 Although the historical research method plays the major role in this dissertation, there 
is, to some degree, hermeneutics playing the role of making sense out of actual historical events. 
For instance, looking at the creation of Eritrea and observing the chronological order of events 
one cannot help but make a judgment as to who handed Eritrea over to the Italians (Yohannis or 
Minilik). In addition to that, the flow of history with respect to the Galla migration into southern 
Ethiopia forces one to make a judgment as to when the Gada system was constructed. Given the 
primary characteristics of the Gada system (defensive and imperialistic), the notion that it was 
constructed after they (the Gallas) migrated into southern Ethiopia makes sense. This 
interpretation sounds plausible, if one tries to ponder over why the Gallas were unable to defend 
themselves against the Somalis and Somali-Bantus. 
Research Questions 
1. How do various doctrines such as Lenin’s— the right of nations and nationalities to 
   self-determination, and other factors influence social change in Ethiopia? 
2. What are the identities of Ethiopians living in the United States today? 
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CHAPTER FOUR: PLATONIC DIALOGUE 
Prologue to Platonic Dialogue 
 In the context of the historical accounts presented above and noting that social change 
is the purpose of this dissertation, it is important to explain what this broad concept of social 
change has to do with notion of Gossa/tribe. This was one of the primary tasks of the dialogue 
between by Almaz (An Ethiopian woman), Ketema (an Ethiopian man), and Habte (researcher 
and Ethiopian man). All these three Ethiopians are graduate students in the United States and the 
dialogue took place on a Saturday midmorning breakfast time in Almaz’s porch. 
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The Participants 
 Almaz  
Almaz is a brilliant Ethiopian woman who was born and raised in Addis Ababa, the  
capital city of Ethiopia. She went to Haile Selassie 1st University in the mid 1960s. She studies 
sociology and history. She worked as an educator in Ethiopia. 
     Ketema 
Ketema is an Ethiopian who also went to Haile Selassie 1st University and studies political 
science and geography in the 1960s. After graduation, he worked for the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. 
     Habte    
Habte, too, is an Ethiopian born and raised in Dire Dawa, eastern part of Ethiopia. He went to 
Haile Selassie 1st University in the 1960s. He was an educator under the Ministry of Education. 
This dissertation is a part of Habte’s work to earn a doctorate in critical pedagogy. 
 
Platonic Dialogue 
Habte:   Let me take up the notion of social change and make a statement about it. Social change 
may be a broad concept but, we know what it means. However, what does it have to do 
with Gossa? Let us look at the notion of change. We’ve all used the term change in the  
past. For example, let us look at the statement- I have changed my mind. What does that 
mean? Well, it means that one had accepted a certain belief or view in the past and  
a little while later one may change one’s mind. In other words, what I accepted no  
longer holds. I may have put on hold what I accepted, or canceled it altogether.   
Fundamentally, change is what is/was no longer is. Change can be partial or complete 
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transformation. Change is revolutionary, if its impact affects an entire society for the  
better; it is not revolutionary if its impact is regressive. To wit, change is revolutionary,  
if it affects society in a significant and progressive manner conducive to its well being. 
Change is not revolutionary, if it involves bloodshed. The reason is that any change  
brought about through bloodshed indisputably shows the presence of dictatorship or the  
 impulse towards dictatorship. So, pertaining to Ethiopia, Gossa/tribe [social force in 
Ethiopia] is looked at in order to bring about social change. Implied in the preceding 
statements is a complete rejection of a Marxian illusion of proletarian revolution stated 
in the last paragraph of The Communist Manifesto (1948). The need for social change 
becomes clear if one understands that Gossa/tribalism is the source of the current 
problems in Ethiopia. 
Ketema: Habte, how does Gossa relate to social change? 
Habte: Ketema, would you agree that there is tribal hostility in today’s Ethiopia? 
Ketema: Yes. 
Habte: Would you, Ketema, agree, too, that there are tribal killings in Ethiopia today? 
Ketema: Yes. 
Habte: Does that not, therefore, suggest that we, as Ethiopians, should look into what precisely 
Gossa is in order to change these conditions? In other words, should we not make a 
philosophical examination of Gossa so that people can understand the reality/unreality 
of Gossa and be able to quell tribal hostilities and killings? 
Almaz: Yes, I do agree with what you are saying, Habte. But, what seems to be implicit to your 
 language, for me, is that Gossa, or the notion of tribe, is something simple to change.  
 There is nothing concrete about it that is external to the mind and simple enough to  
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 solve. 
Habte: Almaz, you are absolutely right! That is what must be clear to people. Thank you for  
 pointing out that Gossa is conceptual; and, that there is nothing representative of it   
               outside the mind. 
Ketema: I agree. Habte, continue please. 
Habte: What seems to be evident to me is that people do not differentiate between the concept  
 of Gossa, this is a mental entity, and the human being per se. That is to say that the  
 concept and the concrete human being are united or merged together in people’s 
 minds. This is the Aristotelian instance of hylomorphism, which is actually  
               misconstrued. To Aristotle, matter and form cannot be perceived independently of each  
               other. It is actually the union of the two that makes both of them apparent to our  
                perception. Form confers dimensions upon matter. No material object can be said to be  
                rectangular, triangular, trapezoidal, or any other shape without form conferring its  
                shape upon it. Simply put, Aristotle does not believe that matter and form can exist  
                 independently of each other. It is the hylomorphic union of the two that makes  
                 everything perceptible to us. 
Almaz: Isn’t there a contradiction in what you are saying, Habte? Firstly, the notion that matter 
    cannot be perceived goes against human experience. That, right there, is the first 
               contradiction. Secondly, there is a denial in the first contradiction that a human being is 
               not an instance of matter. Human experience confirms the notion that we are 
               surrounded by material things. Could you respond to these contradictions, please? 
Habte:   Yes, I will. I want to point out that the contradictions you pointed out actually make my 
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             point.  If I ask Aristotle whether or not it is possible to [hylomorphically] unite Gossa 
(the concept or form) with a human being [an instance of matter]? His answer would be 
no, they cannot be united. His reason would be that matter, as a potential (Aristotle’s 
view), is not perceptible, while form is that by virtue of which matter becomes 
perceptible. Here, by potential, Aristotle meant to suggest the inherent capacity of 
something that is not realized yet. Consequently, he considers potentiality as being 
imperceptible. Needless to point out that Plato and Aristotle do not agree on this score, I 
am inclined to fall in Aristotle’s column. Aristotle would interpret the fact of being a 
human being as a realized potential, in the sense that matter and the human form have 
hylomorhically united, thus making the human material/body apparent. Coming back to 
your question, Almaz, Aristotle would reject the notion of unity between Gossa and the 
human being. So, Gossa, as a concept, remains precisely as a concept. Hence, it is 
imperceptible. The Human being, in contrast, is perceptible. The very perceptibility of the 
human being (the human body) sets it apart from Gossa (the concept). Aristotle, 
therefore, does not accept Gossa as a form. Gossa is just an understanding of something 
external to the mind. In other words, it is not a creation of the mind. To wit, Gossa traces 
its origin to something outside the mind. The question that must be answered in this 
dialogue is- what is this “something” that Gossa traces its origin to? It is social 
knowledge which is part of one’s social environment which includes culture and 
language. Take note that social knowledge, social environment, culture, and language are 
all social constructs. To wit, they have no ontological/existential presence of their own 
apart from human beings. How about the notion of Gada that is claimed to be a system of 
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democracy by those who claim to be members of the Oromo tribe. The question, 
therefore, is- is Gada a system of democracy? 
Ketema:  Good question! Let us dialogue on that. 
Almaz:    I completely support that. That is one of the false claims we are faced with in Ethiopia. 
               To wit, the claim that Gada is a system of democracy.  
Habte:     I am curious about why you use the phrase “false claim” in your language. Can you,  
                please, explain why, Almaz? 
Almaz:     Well, we all know that Ethiopia has always been a system of dictatorships through out 
                 its history. This assertion is true before and after the arrival of the Gallas, or in current  
                 parlance Oromos, in southern Ethiopia. The Gallas/Oromos were nomadic people in  
                 Somale. The question now is- did these nomadic people have the Gada system in their 
                 nomadic life? The answer is no. Is it possible for a system of democracy to exist in the 
                 midst of dictatorship? The answer, once again, is no. Why do today’s Oromos  
                 consider Gada as a democratic system? The answer, most simply, is that there is an  
                 election every eight years, the intention of which is to change the leadership in place.  
                 If we look at Emperor Haile Selassie’s government, there was an empire-wide election  
                for the parliament. As magnanimous as His Majesty Haile Selassie was, he was viewed  
                 as an absolute dictator. That suggests that the presence of election does not guaranty  
                 the presence of democracy. Differently put, election does not necessarily entail  
                 democracy; while, the presence of democracy necessarily entails some form of  
                 election. The asymmetry between dictatorship and democracy makes it impossible to  
                 accept the assertion that Gada is a system of democracy. Habte, that is what I meant  
                  by “false claim.” 
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Habte:       Very good, Almaz. Thank you for your compelling view. 
Ketema:     Can we embark on the determination of whether or not Gada is a system of demo- 
                   cracy? Suffice it to say that Almaz’s logical view is impossible to reject, I am  
                   interested to see if we can come to the same conclusion from the stand point of  
                   history. 
 Habte:    Ketema, thank you for your exhortation. That is one of the central issues in this  
                dissertation. Today, a lot of Oromo claimants, including OLF [Oromo Liberation  
                Front], present the concept of Gada as an Oromo democracy. They blame the Amhara  
                tribe for demolishing it, which is absolutely false. So, the question is- is Gada,  
                according to the definition Dr. Asmerom Legesse provided, a system of democracy?  
                Almaz, could you respond to that? 
Almaz:   Thank you, Habte. It is widely known, around the civilized world, that the ancient 
               Greeks invented democracy. It was very much practiced by ancient Athenians.  
 tells us that freedom and equality are viewed as abiding principles of democratic  
constitutions. Now, let us look at what Pausewang, Tronvoll, and Aalen (2002) tell us 
about how democracy is viewed by OLF, at least, during the 1991 London conference 
when opposition forces against the Derg [socialist] government convened under the 
leadership of Herman Cohen of the United States African Affairs.  
 In 1991, leaders were confronted with democratic traditions of more powerful 
contemporary relevance. The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), for example, one 
of the ethnic resistance movements which participated in the 1991 peace 
conference in London and later in the governing coalition, and was actively 
involved in forming the Transitional Charter of 1991, had its own visions of 
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democracy. It maintained that the Gada system of the Oromo was a genuinely 
democratic tradition with the potential to be revived, in modernized forms, for a 
new indigenous democratic state order. Gada is essentially a social order of age 
cycles. Every male Oromo goes through age cycles, usually of eight years, 
which assign his status and his role in the division of labour in the 
predominantly pastoral Oromo society . . . . Women are excluded, as are slaves 
and minorities;  
. . . . The Gada system is far from an ideal democracy, but Oromo leaders 
considered it a base on which to build a modern political order which people 
would understand and cherish as their own. In June 1992 Aba Chala Lata, the 
governor in Dembi Dollo the zone in Wollega . . . that was then administered by 
the OLF, concluded: ‘Why talk about democracy, a foreign concept which people 
don’t understand? We should call it Gada instead At this point and given the 
above excerpt, the Gada system is absolutely not a system of democracy. As a 
matter of fact, we saw that women and minorities are excluded  from full 
participation in the Gada system. In the ancient Athenian democracy, all the  
           citizens participated except women and slaves, who, by the way, were Greeks. If we ask  
           the question- are freedom and equality the identifying characteristics of Gada? The  
           answer would be no they are not. Furthermore, as Dr. Asmarom Legesse pointed out in  
            his definition, the Gada system is more imperialistic than anything else. The new Gada 
            leadership, before it assumes power, must go out and kill nearby communities and take  
            their land and incorporate it into what they already own. That is an act of taking 
            somebody’s land through conquest. The Gada system is animistic, and hence primitive.  
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             And, that is the system OLF wants in Ethiopia, in the 21st century. Would you agree,  
             Ketema? 
Ketema: I completely agree, Almaz. Dr. Asmarom Legesse, the author you just  
              mentioned, furthermore, tells us the destruction it (Gada System) perpetrated once the  
              Gallas/Oromos migrated into southern Ethiopia. He tells us the following: 
 When the exodus was at its peak in the sixteenth century, there were several 
kingdoms in central and southern Ethiopia that fell under Galla domination. These 
were the kingdoms of Bale, Fattagar, Hadia, and Dawaro. Today there is little 
evidence that these societies ever existed. All of them were apparently absorbed 
by the Galla. We should, of course, assume that in the course of being absorbed 
they in turn had an influence on Galla culture, because encounters of this 
magnitude are almost always dual in character  
            Let me point out, too, that Dr. Asmarom, in his ethnographic study of the Borana Galla, 
reinforces what is already stated by the honorable Yilma Deresa in his description of 
Galla migration into southern Ethiopia. Dr. Asmarom states what he calls  
             the cradle of the Oromos. Here is what he says: 
It is significant that the area usually recognized as the cradle land of Oromo 
culture by most of the Gallinna speaking Ethiopians is in the general area of 
present-day Guji and northern Boranaland. The Borana themselves point to 
an area north-east of their present territory as the place where they 
originated. Both the oral traditions and historical documents indicate that 
the Guji-Borana region was roughly the area from which the Oromo 
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launched their massive invasion [of Ethiopia] in the sixteenth century 
(Legesse 2000, p. 9). 
Habte:    I completely agree, too. With that clear position on Gada, it seems to me that we should  
               proceed to determine what Gossa is. I mean to suggest that what something is what  
               its constitutive elements are. Differently expressed, when we think of Gossa or hear it 
               used in a sentence, there is something that comes to mind. What is it that comes to  
               mind? Can we claim that we have an understanding of Gossa without something  
              representative of it coming to mind? As you all know, we have to determine whether or  
              not Gossa exists in real terms. This determination is central to our session/dialogue now.         
Ketema:  In other words, we need to define Gossa. 
Almaz:    Right! That is what I had in mind. 
Habte:     Well, we have to be careful here. When we think of the definition of Gossa, it cannot  
                 be some kind of definition that some western anthropologist or sociologist  
                 constructed. Let me explain further. I don’t believe that a western academic can define  
                  the concept of Gossa better than we can. In fact and since the definition should reflect  
                  the way we Ethiopians understand it, I do believe that we are in a better position to  
                  define it. Our definition of it, after all, only pertains to our society. 
Almaz:   Thank you, Habte. I understand the approach better now. Here is what I understand: We  
               know what we mean by the term Gossa. We can imagine one of the Gossas in Ethiopia 
               and try to state or construct a definition with its constitutive elements in mind. You are, 
               therefore, saying that it is from that stand point that we need to construct the definition  
              of Gossa. 
Ketema:  Here is a problem; I find the term definition too formal and restrictive. What is wrong  
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                with just enumerating the constitutive elements of Gossa? 
Habte:      I mean to suggest that what something is what its constitutive elements are. 
                At the risk of being repetitive, when we think of Gossa or hear it used in a sentence, 
                there is something that comes to mind. What is it that comes to mind? Can we claim  
                that we have an understanding of Gossa without something representative of it coming  
                to mind? As you all know, we need to determine whether or not Gossa actually exists 
                in real terms. This determination is central to our session/dialogue now. 
Ketema:   In other words, Habte, if we identify the constitutive elements of Gossa, we have  
                thereby identified the elements confirmatory of the existence of Gossa. Is that right? 
Habte:      Ketema, we have to be careful about what we mean by constitutive elements. When I  
                use that phrase, I mean to suggest elements particular to a specific Gossa. Since the  
                ultimate purpose of this discourse is social change, we need to set up some sort of  
                criteria by virtue of which the existence of something, whatever it is, is indisputable. 
                For our purposes here, let us agree that in order for us to assert that something exists  
                we must first establish its tactility and perceptibility. In other words, its existence can  
                be confirmed due to the fact that we can see it and also be able to touch it. After all, we  
                rely on these two qualities in our everyday lives. What might serve as a simple  
                example of our reliance on the two qualities is our daily trip to work. We cannot get to  
                work, if we cannot see and be able to touch. We need to see our direction; if we are  
                driving to work, we need to be able to steer our car in the direction of where we’re  
                working. The act of driving a vehicle simultaneously involves both qualities, tactility  
                 and perceptibility. Hence, does it not make sense for us to accept the existence of  
                 something if it possesses these two qualities, i.e., tactility and perceptibility?  
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Ketema:   I believe that if something possesses the two qualities, tactility and perceptibility, then 
                 the fact that it exists is indisputable. I wonder if Almaz would agree with that. 
Almaz:     Yes! I do. But, it might sound a bit digressive to relate those two criterions to the  
                 notion of God who, because He lacks the two qualities, might be deemed nonexistent. 
Habte:       With due respect to you Almaz, I don’t see how the notion of God is related to the  
                  sort of social change we are concerned about here. God is not the problem, people  
                  are. 
Almaz:      Excuse me, Habte. I was thinking in terms of the applicability of the two qualities. I  
                 did not mean to get involved in a theological debate. Since we are concerned about  
                 social change, God actually is irrelevant. May be a better example might be, let’s say,  
                 this chair you are sitting on. If we apply the two qualities to this chair to determine  
                 whether or not it exists, it definitely exists because it possesses the two qualities. That  
                  is to say that it is both tactile and perceptible.  
Habte:     Almaz, you have a clear understanding of what I am saying. So, we all agree that if 
                our inquiry into the existence of Gossa dissatisfies the two criterions, then we can,  
                with certainty, assert the nonexistence of  Gossa. Would you both agree with what I  
                 am saying? You’re both nodding; I take that to mean yes. Now, let us come back to  
                 the constitutive elements of Gossa. What do you think these elements are? 
Ketema:   Alright when I think of Gossa, what comes to my mind is a group of people claiming  
                 to share the same tribal identity. 
Almaz:     Ketema is right. When we think of Gossa, a group of people comes to mind. But,  
                Gossa implies a bit more than that. In other words, there are two more elements  
                concomitantly present with the group of people, viz., culture and language. 
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Ketema:   I agree. 
Habte:      I agree too. It seems to me, therefore, that Gossa has three constitutive elements to it: 
                 a group of people, language, and culture. 
Ketema:    The way to verify the validity of our conclusion about the constitutive elements of  
                  Gossa is to look at one of the Gossas (tribes) in Ethiopia, ex. Amhara or Oromo. If  
                  We look at the Oromo tribe, for instance, we find out that there are people who claim 
                   that they belong to the Oromo tribe, which confirms one of the constitutive elements,  
                  i.e. people. This group of people claims that they have their own culture, which, once  
                   again, is confirmatory of the second constitutive element, i.e. culture. Lastly, the 
                   same group of people claims to have its own language, which confirms the third  
                   element. 
Almaz:       Hence, your assertion is that people, culture, and language are the constitutive  
                   elements of Gossa. I accept Ketema’s understanding of Gossa. 
Habte:        I do too. Given our understanding of Gossa, What is it that sets apart one Gossa from 
                   another? Take one of the tribes, either Oromo or Amhara. 
Almaz:       Prima facie, culture and language set the tribes apart. Those who claim to be the  
                  leaders [those who spearhead the Oromo movement] of the Oromo tribe are quite  
                  vocal about Oromo culture and history. I guess what I should ask is- is there such a  
                  thing as Oromo history and culture? Ketema, could you try to answer that question,  
                  please? 
Ketema:    Thank you, Almaz. If you allow me to reformulate your question, what you are saying  
                  is- is there a culture known as Oromo culture such that this culture, by virtue of its 
                  identifiable characteristics, sets itself apart from, presumably, other cultures? That is  
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                  the first question that your question suggests to me. The second question is actually  
                  triggered by the phrase “Oromo culture.” This phrase suggests that Oromo culture is  
                  monolithic in constitution. To wit, all Oromo claimants, all over Ethiopia, have one  
                  and the same culture, regardless of their region in Ethiopia. Is Oromo culture  
                  monolithic? Almaz, what do you think? 
Almaz:     Yes, that was the perplexity I have been experiencing all along. I mean I was born and 
                 raised in Ethiopia and I don’t believe for a single second that Oromo claimants all  
                over Ethiopia can claim to have one and the same culture. Can an Oromo claimant in  
                Addis Ababa claim to have the same culture as the one who was previously known as  
                 Kotu/Qotu in Hararge? Or, in fact we can consider the Oromo claimants in Wellega or  
                 Keffa vis-à-vis the one in Addis. The thing that amazes me is that those Oromo  
                 claimants who somehow get their books published on Oromo culture and history talk  
                 as though there is some nation (or country) some place in the world called Oromo.  
                 Somewhere along the line, could we bring ourselves to discuss whether or not there is  
                 such a nation as that, i.e. Oromo nation. To answer your question most directly,  
                 Ketema, there is no such thing as Oromo culture. Oromos and other Ethiopians share 
                 the same cultural-pool with regional differences being apparent. With respect to the  
                 cultural and linguistic diversity among the Gallas/Oromos, here is what Professor 
                 Donald Levine (1974) says: 
      The Galla are the most widely dispersed of all the peoples of Greater Ethiopia. 
They comprise about a dozen tribal clusters distributed over ten provinces. Nearly 
all of them still speak mutually intelligible dialects of a single East Cushitic 
language, Gallignya. The traditional self-name of the Galla is Oromo, but this is 
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not known or accepted by all the Galla peoples today. The Galla tribes now differ 
considerably in religion, style of life, and local political organization, though all 
of them retain some features of their traditional patrilineal descent system (p. 38). 
     Ketema, I hope that answers your question about Oromo culture being monolithic. In 
fact, furthermore, Dr.Levine points out the regional differences in the language [the 
dialects] that the Oromo claimants speak, although this language diversity is something 
that Oromo claimants hide from people in the west, viz., people in the United States. In 
order to find sympathy among people of the west, they single themselves out and claim 
oppression by the Ethiopian government. The Ethiopian government oppresses 
everybody, except people in the Tigre tribe as they are members of the current tribe in 
leadership positions. People in the west are naïve about Ethiopia. Consequently and not 
surprisingly, they [people in the west] fail to ask if they are the only ones being 
oppressed. In other words, they are not oppressed any more than other Ethiopians. 
Actually, the reason behind their complaint is to go the way of secession as Eritrea did. 
The Oromo Liberation Front is currently making an appeal for help from westerners 
using the doctrine of self-determination as a vehicle, which has the façade of democracy. 
The proper question for the Oromo claimants to answer is- why do they feel that they are 
entitled to secession in view of the pogrom they perpetrated against the people of 
Ethiopia from the 16th through the end of the 19th century? Why is it that it is only  
            Oromos, with the exception of Tigres, who use their tribe for organizational purposes, 
           with the exclusion of others? Go ahead, Ketema. 
Ketema:  Alright Almaz, there is really no such thing as Oromo culture and neither is there a  
               nation called Oromo nation. But for now, let me respond to the claim of Oromo culture. 
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              Some people define the concept of culture, as you know, as a way of life. Nonetheless  
              with Ethiopia in mind, I define culture as a psycho-social reality [shared by a people],  
               the dimensions of which inform the behavior, economy, social organizations, political  
        activities, and perception and interpretation of social realities. It is the congregation 
 of  all these and others, probably not mentioned here, that gives rise to the very being of 
a person in a society. Consequently, is it not plausible to acknowledge the notion that a  
               multiplicity of people born and raised in the same social and national environment  
              share cultural values? I see that you both agree; you just nodded your heads. 
Habte:    Let me reinforce Ketema’s view by citing my own experience when I first became a  
              teacher. I was sent, by the Ministry of Education, to teach in the province of Wellega, 
              which is now part of Oromia as a result of the internal restructuring of provincial  
              territories into tribal enclaves by the current tribe-based government. Wellega, at that  
              time was almost exclusively populated by those who claimed to be Oromo. I genuinely  
              expected it to be shockingly different from my own background. I was completely  
              surprised to find out how similar the people were to the people in my own province, 
              Hararge. Granted that there were some regional differences, the fact that they were/are 
              Ethiopians was indisputable. Therefore, I do understand and believe Ketema’s  
             assertion that there is no such thing as Oromo culture. How about Oromo history?  
            Almaz, can you say something on that? 
Almaz:  Absolutely! Let me add a little bit more to what has been said so far. When the Oromo  
             claimants or tribalists use the phrases Oromo culture and Oromo history, they are  
             denying the presence of other Ethiopians in the way they see and interpret what they  
              think are history and culture. They are involved in an existential struggle with their own  
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              sense of social reality. They seem like they are stuck in what they think is their own  
               sense of tribal identity, which is primitive and obscurantist. There has never been, in the  
                history of Ethiopia, a nation state or a sovereign state called Oromia. Hence, there is no  
                such thing as Oromo history; neither has ever been such a thing as Oromo culture. The  
                fact that they merged into the Ethiopian society [after their migration] precludes the  
                claim of Oromo history and culture. Ethiopian history and culture are as much theirs as  
                 anybody else’s. Let us not forget that the tribal enclave called “Oromia Kilil” was  
               constructed 16 or 17 years ago by the exclusive Tigray tribal leadership. 
Habte:    Almaz, you used a good phrase that is aptly expressive of what is going on with the  
               Oromo tribalists. The phrase you used was “existential struggle.” The question is how  
               did this existential struggle come about? In other words, what is it that gave rise to it?  
               There was, as a matter of historical fact, nothing that singled out the Oromo tribalists  
               for oppression vis-à-vis others in Ethiopia. Everybody was and still is oppressed. I  
               know I was oppressed all through my life. It is not just the political leadership that is  
               oppressive; our parents, teachers, and in fact all Ethiopians are oppressors, as a result of  
                the way we are brought up. What does that mean? It means that Oromo claimants  
                themselves are oppressors too!! The first province I was assigned to go and teach was  
                Wellega, as I pointed out. A province almost completely populated by people who  
                claim to be Oromos. One of the first stories told to me by my students was that of the  
                Jote lordship. Jote, I was told, owned slaves. And if any one of the slaves misbehaved,  
                 he would be tied to a huge rock at the precipice of a huge ditch and then pushed down  
                 into the ditch to die. The question is- who is Jote in terms of tribal identity? He is an  
                 Oromo! How about the slaves? They are Oromos too! This is an instance of an Oromo  
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                  oppressing Oromo people. The critical question is- is this kind of oppression limited  
                   to the Oromo people? The obvious answer is- no!! it is not. Other tribes are  
                   oppressive too. As a matter of fact, those Oromo claimants, who are obsessed with  
                   Oromo history and culture, are oppressors themselves. This obsession is an  
                    expression of their hunger for power. Granted that there is not the slightest  
                    suggestion of democracy in the Ethiopian society, those Oromo claimants who are  
                    secessionist in their views look at Amhara and Oromo tribes as though they are  
                    two distinct and separate people. Dr. Jalata (1998), who claims to be an Oromo,  
                    stated the following: 
Oromos and Ethiopians fought one another between the 16th and the 
end of 19th centuries without one imposing colonial establishment over 
the other (Jalata, 1993: 36-37). That is why Levine (1974: 128) 
considers these two peoples as “great historical antagonists.” The 
Oromo resisted colonial expansion and domination both militarily and 
culturally in localized and scattered ways during the second half of the 
19th century and the first half of the 20th century ( Jalata, 1993, pp.2-3)  
 What is important to notice in the preceding quotation is that Dr. Jalata quotes an 
excerpt from Professor Levine’s book in order to lend legitimacy to his purpose driven  
 misinterpretation of not only Ethiopian history but also Professor Levine’s language. 
Actually, Jalata used Professor Levine’s language as a lever to lie. The question now is- 
how did Dr. Jalata misinterpret the Professor’s language? Dr. Jalata confuses or 
completely fails to discern the difference between hostility and social dialectics. Social 
dialectics pertains to the Hegelian notion of dialectics, or forces contradictory to one 
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another, which get resolved into a synthesis. It is this dialectics that Dr. Jalata purposely 
mistakes for hostility in order to lend support for his primitive and third world tribal 
sentiment. I compared Dr. Jalata’s quotation against Professor Levine’s writing and the 
following is the way Professor Levine (1974) stated it: 
The Oromo are in many ways the antithesis of the Amhara. Not only did the 
two people confront one another for centuries as great antagonists, but the 
traditions they brought to the encounter contrast radically. Where the 
Amhara system is hierarchical, the Oromo is egalitarian. Where the Amhara 
is individualistic, the Oromo is solidaristic. Where religious and political 
functions are segregated in Amhara institutions, for the Oromo they are 
fused. Where the Amhara historical project is to build an empire, that of the 
Oromo is to maintain a parochial tradition. The historical consequence of 
these and related contrasts will be assessed after we have examined the 
Oromo system itself (p. 128). 
 Looking at the above excerpt, it is now necessary to render an interpretation of it and 
also answer the following questions: is there hostility implied in Professor Levine’s 
excerpt as Dr. Jalata seems to claim? Does the history of Galla migration into southern 
Ethiopia help explain the predisposition to war of the Galla migrants? In other words, 
could the hostile Galla relationship with Somalis and Somale-Bantus have shaped their 
predisposition to war? How can one see, in Professor Levine’s (1974) excerpt, the 
Hegelian thesis-antithesis picture rather than Dr. Jalata’s misinterpretation of it as a 
colonial tension between the Gallas, whom Dr. Jalata mistakenly calls Oromos, and 
Ethiopians? 
Social Change:  A Pedagogic Inquiry of Ethiopian Ethnicity/Tribe/Gossa      91 
 
        Responding to Dr. Jalata’s notion of hostility attributed to Professor Levine’s language, all 
        one has to do is to see the content section of the book that pertains to Professor Levine’s 
 language and conclude that Dr. Jalata’s understanding of it is wrong. The reason for this  
conclusion is that Professor Levine explicitly uses the words thesis and antithesis in 
reference to the part of the book that contains the excerpt. My own suspicion is that Dr. 
Jalata mistook the term antagonists to mean hostility. For purposes of clarity and certainty, I 
decided to look up the Hegelian version of dialectics within the thesis-antithesis framework 
in a dictionary of philosophy published by Angeles (1981). Here is how Professor Angeles 
defines it: 
 The process of necessary change involving a triad (three elements) consisting of 
(a) an existing thing or thought (thesis), (b) its opposite or contradictory 
(antithesis) and (c) the unity (synthesis) resulting from their interaction and 
which then becomes the basis (thesis) of another dialectical movement (p. 61).  
Professor Levine undoubtedly knows that the thesis-antithesis process goes on ad infinitum. 
It does not start from the 16th century and finish up at the end of the 19th century, as Dr. 
Jalata conclusively stated. In other words, dialectics, in the Hegelian sense, is an on-going 
process.  Let me at this time point out that the term Oromo did not exist at all when the 
Gallas migrated into Ethiopia. Hence, the term Oromo in reference to the Gallas previous to 
[may be] the 1950s would be historically inauthentic. The term Galla incidentally was not a 
term created by Amhara, whom the Oromo claimants blame for calling them Gallas. Rather, 
I shall now, arguably, assert the notion that they, the Gallas, came with it into Ethiopia. Why 
do I say that? When the Somalis just arrived in the United States, I made an effort to 
converse with them. My conversation with them was triggered by my own curiosity about 
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how Somale language sounded very similar to Oromo language. One of my conversations 
with a Somale fellow yielded a shocking hint that I never expected. The shock was that he 
told me that the Oromo people went into Ethiopia from an area, in Somale, called Galcaio, 
which spawned the term Galla. Without making a big deal about it, I went home and looked 
at the map of Somale in the Internet. Sure enough, there is Galcaio east of the horn of Africa 
that subtends the Ethiopian territory. In my next conversation with the same Somale, I 
discovered that the name Gaallcacyo has several meanings to it. One of the meanings told to 
me was this- infidels or unbelievers get up and go away. This translation was sensible in 
view of what I read in history books. The use of the word “infidel” suggested something 
Islamic. So, I went into the internet and looked at en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mogadishu to find 
out when Islam came to Somale. I found out that people from the Arabian Peninsula came in 
contact with the people in the coastal regions of the Indian Ocean where Mogadishu, the 
capital city of Somale, is located. This happened sometime between 800-900 A.D. These 
Moslems from the Arabian Peninsula settled around the Mogadishu area and intermarried 
with the local Somalis. Hence, the introduction of the Islamic faith in that region is obvious. 
Consequent on that, it seems plausible to infer the notion that the Gallas were not Moslems 
at that time [otherwise they wouldn’t have been called infidels]. As pointed out in their 
history of migration into Ethiopia, the Gallas were chased out of Somale as infidels or 
unbelievers; and that precisely is what the term Galla means in Ethiopia. What does that 
mean? It means that the so called Amhara did not give them the name Galla. It was given to 
them by the Somalis, who derived it from the name of the town they chased them out of, 
viz., Gaallcacyo. Nowadays, they repudiate the name Galla. The reason is political; and it is 
the result of the few Oromo elites who are hungry for power and presume to represent all 
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Oromos without being elected. Such presumptuous Oromos are Drs. Asafa Jalata, Mohamed 
Hassen, and others, who appear to be unaware of the history of the Galla migration into 
Ethiopia. 
 The social history of the Gallas before they came into Ethiopia was characterized by a 
chronic attack against them by the Somalis and Somale-Bantus, which no doubt informed 
their relationship with non-Galla people they found in Ethiopia. That is to say that the Gallas 
constructed a defense mechanism as a nomadic society. This defense mechanism is called 
Gada, the definition of which was already given on page 54. The point here is that this 
defense and imperialistic mechanism did not exist when the Gallas led a nomadic life in 
Somali. That was why they were being incessantly attacked and driven out by the Somalis 
and Somali-Bantus. The institutionalization of the Gada defense and imperialistic 
mechanism, constructed after the Gallas came into southern Ethiopia, now puts them in a 
position to attack others in their new surrounding. Logic suggests that that was why after the 
eight-year leadership cycle, the incoming leadership, as stated in the definition of Gada by 
Dr. Asmarom Legesse, was required to go and conquer new territories and annex them to 
what they have already occupied. The Gallas are no longer defenseless and their 
imperialistic foray against Ethiopia was simply incomprehensible. The honorable Yilma 
Deresa (1959 ), a former Finance Minister and an Oromo, tells us that in the 16th century, 
after they migrated into Ethiopia, the Gallas had a long enough time to organize themselves 
and militarily advance in all directions (East, West, North, and South) in Ethiopia. 
According to Yilma Deresa (1959 ), they were subdivided into four tribes called Kereyu, 
Tulema, Mecha, and Wello for the purpose of further attack and territorial expansion. The 
Kereyu tribe was assigned to go into the southeast area and conquer (including Bale); 
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Tulema was assigned to go north and conquer the Shewa area (central Ethiopia); the Mecha 
tribe was assigned to conquer western and southern Ethiopia; and the Wello tribe was 
assigned to conquer the district of Angot stretching from the province of Wello (name given 
by the tribe) to the province of Tigre (page, 225-226). The imperialistic expansion of the 
Gallas became incomprehensible after a Moslem zealot, commonly called Gragne 
Mohamed, with the help of  Somalis and some Gallas rampaged all over Ethiopia chopping 
off the heads of Christian Ethiopians, if they refused to covert to the Moslem religion. This 
Islamic war on Christian Ethiopia weakened the leadership of the time; and this was the 
moment the Gallas were waiting for to continue attacking and expanding their hold on 
Ethiopia. This historical event took place between 1520 and 1532  (Deresa, p. 226). What 
went on in the 16th century seems to escape Dr. Asafa Jalata and his ilk. Here is what 
Professor Mordechai Abir (1968) states pertaining to the Galla invasion against Ethiopia: 
      As the Galla who invaded Ethiopia in the sixteenth century were deeply 
disunited, had no ‘ideology’ and were only seeking a better land to settle in, the 
Ethiopian rulers considered the Galla invasion far less serious than the Muslim 
threat [i.e. Gragne Mohamed mentioned earlier]. However, the fact was that the 
Galla migration had far-reaching consequences for the future of Ethiopia. From 
the sixteenth century until the nineteenth the Galla advancing from the south 
along the rift valley lakes occupied part of Harare plateau, subjugated most of 
Showa, advanced as far as Lasta and penetrated the Sidama countries. They 
methodically displaced or absorbed the Amhara Sidama and Agaw peoples in the 
provinces they conquered and by the second half of the eighteenth century they 
had begun to invade the heart of the Christian Amhara-Tigrayan provinces in the 
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north. While this was happening the Solomonic dynasty had deprived itself of 
some of its most important assets. Since the beginning of the seventeenth century 
it had completely given up its mobility and settled for the comforts of court life in 
Gondar, and after the expulsion of the Portuguese, it had cut itself off from the 
material resources of the Christian world. In the eighteenth century the emperors 
began to rely more and more upon Galla troops and had slowly allowed the Galla 
chiefs to replace the Amhara and Tigrayan nobility in their courts. Once the court 
of the Solomonic rulers in Gondar became dominated by Galla elements whose 
daughters the emperors married, it no longer represented the Christian Semetized 
Ethiopia and was no longer able to provide the link which held the country 
together. Thus, since about the middle of the eighteenth century the disuniting 
factor in the country completely triumphed, and had it not been for the fact that 
the Galla themselves lacked a unifying ‘ideology’, the country could have passed 
altogether into the hands of the Galla immigrants (p. xxii-xxiii). 
      The preceding quotation cited from Mordechai Abir’s (1968) book proves the fact that 
Dr. Asafa Jalata (1998), in so far as the quotation from his book demonstrates, either was 
ignorant of Ethiopian history or blatantly lying. Logic, it seems to me, reveals that one 
cannot read or learn about the so called Oromo history without being aware of what went on 
within the framework of the history of Ethiopia. Dr. Asafa Jalata has left a hint in his 
language suggestive of his knowledge of what went on in Ethiopia with respect to what he 
calls Oromo history. What is the hint? Well, the hint is the war that took place between the 
16th and the end of the 19th century, which, as Mordechi Abir (1968) stated, the Oromos 
simply killed the communities 
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in their way and took the land of those communities. Hence, it must be the case that he 
[Asefa Jalata] must be purposely lying. I know I have gone through a lengthy presentation 
of history pertinent to the dialogue. Should I stop here and see if you have any question, or 
give you the time to state whatever you might have on your mind? 
Ketema:   I am fascinated, please continue. 
Almaz:     I agree. 
Habte:     Thank you. What has to be clear from the historical accounts is that the Oromo  
                claimants today must understand that the Gallas, their ancestors, attacked and killed  
                Ethiopians to the extent that it was easy for them to go as far north as the province  
                of Tigre and as far north-west as Gondar and penetrated into the emperor’s court.  
                Furthermore, intermarriage between Ethiopians and Gallas took place as the historical 
                accounts clearly state. 
Almaz:    Habte all the while you are presenting what transpired in Ethiopian history, there were  
                several questions that perplexed me. Here are some of them; why do today’s Oromo 
                claimants act and talk as though they are oppressed more so than other tribes in the  
                country? Should have I used the word “nation” in place of the term “tribe”, as they do 
                today? You keep using the term “tribe” rather than “nation”, could you clarify that? 
Habte:      I will answer your questions gladly. In the Amharic language [the official language of 
                 Ethiopia] we use the word Gossa in reference to a tribe. You know that the word  
                 Gossa in English means “tribe”. So straightforwardly, Oromos and other tribes as such  
                 do not constitute a nation, for example, in the sense that the peoples of the United  
                 States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, and other nations do. So, why do Oromo  
                 claimants use the phrase “Oromo nation” to refer to their tribe as Drs. Asafa Jalata and  
Social Change:  A Pedagogic Inquiry of Ethiopian Ethnicity/Tribe/Gossa      97 
 
                 Hassan do? Here, I want you to recall that we have discussed a bit of the history of the  
                 Soviet Union as it pertained to the way it [the Soviet Union] was built up. Recall, too,  
                  that it was at that time [end of 19th century and beginning of 20th century] that  
                  the doctrine of “the right of nations to self-determination up to and including  
                   secession” was formulated by Lenin and Stalin. The word “nations” was correctly  
                   used in the language of the doctrine because the Soviet Union was built by  
                   colonizing nations like Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and others. Now, the Ethiopian  
                   university students of the 1960s, who were Marxist-Leninists, stole it and started  
                   applying it in reference to the tribes without any awareness of what they were doing.  
                   That is the source of the word “nations,” which the Oromos are using wrongly. 
                   But, the tribe-based government uses it in the text books published for 9th grade  
                   students thereby introducing false information to young Ethiopians. It [the 
                   government] also constructs its policies using the word nation, rather than tribe  
                   which is what they are historically. Here is an example of their 1994 educational  
                   policy pertaining to languages and education [note their use of the terms nations and  
                   nationalities]: 
Cognizant of the pedagogical advantages of the child in learning in 
another tongue and the rights of nationalities to promote the use of 
their languages, primary education will be given in nationality 
languages. 
Making the necessary preparation, nations and nationalities can either 
learn in their own language or can choose from among those selected 
on the basis of national and countrywide distribution. 
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 The language of teacher training for kindergarten and primary 
education will be the nationality language used in the area. 
Amharic [the official language of Ethiopia] shall be taught as a 
language of countrywide communication. 
       In the preceding policy statements, we see the words “nations” and “nationalities.” 
It is clear that these words were plagiarized from the language of the principle of self-
determination constructed by Lenin and Stalin as pointed out in the literature review 
section. We recall that Russia colonized the surrounding nations to build up the Soviet 
Union, as Dr. Pipes (1964) had explained. In the context of the problems Lenin and 
Stalin encountered, the term “nation” refers to the colonized nations and the term 
“nationalities” refers to the condition or state of belonging to some specific nation. For 
example, the entire people of Ukraine constitute a nation. Hence, if I pose the question 
to one of the people of Ukraine saying “what is your nationality?”; he or she will say 
Ukrainian. Why? The reason is that that individual has a sense of belonging to the 
Ukrainian nation. In contrast, no tribe in Ethiopia ever constituted a colonized nation. 
Because of this asymmetry, the tribes do not constitute a nation; hence, they have no 
nationality of any kind based on tribal grounds. Before the power hungry tribalists 
came along, they were all Ethiopians. The tribal sense of identity was hard to notice, 
as far as my own experience is concerned. 
Almaz:    Habte, given the Russian historical context, what do you think is the reason for their  
                use of the terms “nations” and “nationalities?” 
Habte:      Thank you for your question, Almaz. I was just going to come to that. If you look  
                 around to see who started using these terms [nations and nationalities], you will find  
Social Change:  A Pedagogic Inquiry of Ethiopian Ethnicity/Tribe/Gossa      99 
 
                 out that it was the Marxist-Leninist students of the 1960s. Then, the tribalists, like  
                 Oromos, Eritreans, and Tigres who were hungry for power, usurped them and started  
                 using them in an attempt to round up [mobilize] people on the basis of tribal identity.  
                 The first reason for using those terms is to establish a tribal sense of identity as the  
                  principle around which they can organize people for political purposes. This is the  
                  primary reason for using those terms. Note that the people who are hungry for power  
                  are not concerned about solving social problems like poverty, lack of human and civil  
                  rights, lack of freedom and equality for all Ethiopians, and other undemocratic  
                  elements. Beyond this, what I like to remind you is that, as already pointed out in the  
                   excerpt on the educational policy of the government in Ethiopia, education is  
                   politics. This notion had been stated in A Pedagogy for Liberation (1987) in which  
                    Paulo Freire clearly states that “. . . , education is politics” (p. 46). What that  
                     suggests is that we need to question and break down the status quo in order to  
                      liberate ourselves. In other words, we need to desocialize the status quo, as Ira Shor  
                      (1992) would say in Empowering Education  (p. 114).  The second reason is what  
                      is widely known among Ethiopians. That is the tribal Tigre leadership, taking the 
                     Tigre Kilil with it, plans to secede and declare itself an independent nation like  
                     Eritrea after having inculcated the ideology of nationhood through the cultivation of  
                      a tribal sense of identity thereby showing the way for the other tribes, like the  
                      Oromo tribe, to follow suit. The third reason for the use of the terms “nations” and  
                       “nationalities” is that the individuals in the Tigre tribe leadership were part of the  
                       student movement of the 1960s; most particularly the Prime Minister of Ethiopia  
                       and the President of Eritrea. These two fellows picked up the terms [nations and  
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                       nationalities] from the leaders of the student movement possibly without  
                       understanding precisely what they meant and as well as being ignorant of their  
                        historical origin. Most critically, the political conditions that gave rise to the  
                        currency of “nations” and “nationalities” at the turn of the 20th century remained  
                         unknown to the student movement. The students in the 1960s fell under the sway  
                         of Marxism and Leninism, which were accepted with complete lack of critical 
                         thinking on the part of the students.  
Ketema:   Habte, what is the purpose of all this discussion in view of the fact of your denial of  
                 the reality of Gossa/tribe? In other words, there is no such thing as Gossa/tribe in real  
                 terms. 
Habte:     Yes, that is what I am saying. 
Ketema:   Very good, demonstrate that! 
Almaz:     I am already convinced of what Habte is saying, but go ahead, Habte. 
Habte:      Remember that the overarching purpose of this dialogue is social change. With that in 
                mind and given the current tribe-based turmoil in Ethiopia, it is indisputably certain  
                 that social change is needed. So, the question is how should we respond to the divide- 
                and-rule scheme implemented in Ethiopia today? Here, we must acknowledge that  
                tribalism is the tool employed to divide the people along tribal lines in order to rule  
                them. The natural propensity, therefore, is to un-divide the people. It is this propensity  
                that forces us to doubt and, if reason dictates, reject the reality or existence of tribes in  
                Ethiopia. Let me go through some questions with you, Ketema. Here is a chair that I  
                can point to and say- this is a chair. Ketema, my question to you is- is there anything  
                 palpable, as in the case of the chair, that I can point to and say- this is a tribe? 
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Ketema:   No.  
Habte:      Here is a mental experiment.  Let us say, furthermore, that you are born of an Oromo  
                family. Let us say, too, that two or three days after you were born, we take you to a  
                Tigre family so they can raise you in their environment and just the way they raise  
                  their own children. Now, imagine that we are coming back to see you twenty or  
                  twenty five years later. At this time, you are about twenty or twenty five years old. 
                  Based on this scenario, let us pose the following questions to you- what language do  
                  you speak? 
Ketema:   Tigrigna. [language spoken by the Tigre tribe.] 
Habte:      What tribe do you identify yourself with? 
Ketema:    Tigre. 
Habte:      What culture do you identify yourself with? 
Ketema:   The Tigre culture. 
Habte:       As you know Ketema, lots of Ethiopians speak several Ethiopian languages  
                  depending on the social environment they are from i.e., an Ethiopian may speak  
                  multiple local languages. That said, do you think that all the answers you gave to my  
                  questions actually point to the social environment you were raised in or the tribe of  
                  your parentage? In other words, were your answers contextual? 
Ketema:     Yes, I do believe that my answers point to the social environment I was raised in. As  
                   you said, Habte, they are all contextual. Because, the language I speak, the culture I 
                   identify with, and probably other social characteristics belong to that specific social 
                  context or environment I was raised in. So, I completely agree with you. Basically,  
                  the notion of Gossa/tribe/ethnicity seems to be conceptual rather than real; contextual  
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                  rather than genetic. The notion of ethnicity/tribe/Gossa is a mental phenomenon. 
Habte:       So, all your claims are context-dependent rather than existence-dependent, right? 
Ketema:    Yes, they are contextual rather than existential. Let me elaborate a little bit. The term 
                  contextual suggests to me a reflection of the characteristics of the social environment 
                  that one comes out of; while the term existential suggests the existence of something 
                  regardless of the context it comes out of. A rock, for example, is a rock regardless 
                  of where it is, i.e., the context. To wit, that by virtue of which something exists  
                  remains unaffected by any social environment, such as one’s humanity. Would you  
                  agree, Habte? 
Habte:       Yes, I do agree. Ketema, social environments are socially constructed. Culture and  
                  language are social constructs too. Social constructs, as already pointed out, have no  
                 ontology of their own. That means that they have no existential presence in the same  
                 way that a chair does. If you take away human beings, there will be no language and 
                 culture. But, tribe is uniquely characterized by language and culture. Hence, if  
                  language and culture are social constructs, then tribe/Gossa must be a social construct  
                  too. The reason is that language and culture are the primary features of a tribe/Gossa.  
                What does that mean? It means that tribe/Gossa/ethnicity has no ontology of its own; it  
                 has no existential presence at all. The conclusion, therefore, of the preceding  
                 discussion is that tribe/Gossa/ethnicity does not exist at all. Let me ask you this  
                  question, Ketema- if something has no existential presence, can we claim that it  
                  exists?  
Ketema: No, we cannot. There is a contradiction in that view. It sounds like we are saying that  
               something exists and does not exist at the same time. That is to say that something  
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               reflects existential characteristics, like tactility and perceptibility, and at the same time  
               we are saying that it does not reflect those existential characteristics. That is an obvious  
                contradiction. Simply put if people reflect characteristics of a social environment, can  
                we not deduce that there has to be something existential about that social environment? 
Habte:     You are right, Ketema. Remember that the social environment is what some people call  
                social milieu. This social milieu constitutes the totality of human experience in a  
                particular milieu or environment. The environment includes human behavior, human  
                interaction with each other and their natural surroundings, their family lives, and other  
                things that constitute their experience in that particular milieu. So when we talk about  
                the characteristics of a social environment, we are talking about the characteristics of  
                the entire social milieu. That is beyond the experience of an individual.  Now changing  
                the perspective and looking at the concept of tribe/Gossa from the stand point of a  
                group, we find that tribe/Gossa does not exist. Here the notion of a group is implicit to  
                 the notion of tribe/Gossa. What, in other words, is clear is that tribe is not made up of  
                  just one person. It consists of a multiplicity of people, i.e. a group of people. Let us  
                  assume that you have a group of four people in front of you, Ketema. Look at the  
                people in front of you and tell me what you see. 
Ketema:   I see a group of people. 
Habte:     Do you see a group of people or the individuals that comprise it? 
Ketema:  Actually, I see both the individuals and the group. 
Habte:    Let me state to you, Ketema, that you don’t really see the group. You only see the 
               Individuals that comprise it. Let me take a moment and explain the reason. Think of  
               which one has an existential presence, the group or the individuals?  
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Ketema:  I see your point. Existential presence can only be attributed to the individuals and not 
                to the group. The reason, from what we talked about previously, is that the group is a  
                mentally organized totality; i.e. the mind organized the individuals into a group. The 
                individuals, in and of themselves, have totalities of their own. I am curious, Habte. Is 
                that not too metaphysical for ordinary, down to earth, everyday people? 
Habte:  Ketema, you need to be careful. The way you use the word metaphysical makes it sound  
             like metaphysics is outside human experience. That is not true. Metaphysics is human  
             experience itself. Note that metaphysics, among other definitions, is the study of reality.  
             If you look at what we’ve been discussing so far, they all strictly relate to human affairs,  
             issues or experience. Am I clear, Ketema? 
Ketema:   Yes, you are clear, Habte. I am glad to know the definition of metaphysics too, at least 
                in this case. With that out of the way, you are saying that existence, as a property,  
                 cannot be attributed to the group; but, it can be attributed to the individuals that  
                 comprise the group. That is why tribe/Gossa does not exist. Do I understand you  
                  correctly, Habte? 
Habte:    Yes you do, Ketema. What I want to know now is- are you convinced of what my argu- 
               ment asserts? 
Ketema: Yes, I am. Now the question is- what does the existence or nonexistence of tribe/Gossa  
               have to do with social change?  
Habte:    Ketema, in order to bring about social change certain conditions must give way to the 
              sort of social change we want. One of the conditions is to raise the consciousness of 
              people pertaining to the need for social change through dialogue. It is in this type of 
              dialogue that critical consciousness comes into being. It is in this type of dialogue, too, 
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              that we will come to understand that we cannot cling to primitive notions of  tribe and 
              still aspire to social change. I took a keen look at European societies and tried to learn  
              something from them pertaining to how they were able to transform their societies. For  
              instance, I am sure at one point in their history they must have had tribes in their  
              societies. Sure enough, Germany had tribes as Holborn (1982) states it; here is what he  
               says: 
 Charlemagne’s subjugation and Christianization of the Saxons in the 
late eighth and early ninth centuries were the central event in bringing 
the Teutonic tribes under a common government. . . . Germany 
consisted in 911 of the five tribal, or, as Germans call them, 
“stem”(Stamm), duchies of Saxony, Franconia, Bavaria, Swabia, and 
Lorraine. . . (p.4). 
                 The preceding excerpt shows that, indeed, there were tribes in Germany centuries 
                 ago. Given the influence and contribution of Germany to the intellectual history of the  
                 west, it is not a surprise that it (Germany) was able to transcend their primitive stage  
                 of tribalism. In contrast to Germany, the Ethiopian tribe-based leadership fosters  
                 tribalism. There is no open dialogue on the issue of tribalism; there is no open  
                 dialogue with respect to the fact that the prime minister of Ethiopia is mentally locked  
                 into the primitive framework of tribalism; there is no dialogue of any kind; so, the  
                 question then is- how does one try to bring about social change in view of the fact that  
                  any form of dialogue, free press, free speech, and other democratic elements, are  
                   stifled? Looking at the Oromo Liberation Front and since they are aspiring to secede  
                   as Eritrea did, I cannot help but conclude the fact that there is a great deficiency in  
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                    the awareness of one’s own history. A dialogue would clear up this deficiency. A  
                    dialogue pertaining to the 16th century migration into southern Ethiopia of the  
                    Gallas/Oromos, then the attacks, the killings, and the conquest of communities in  
                     order to take their land would make their complaint of oppression unnecessary in  
                     view of what they themselves [the Gallas] did to Ethiopians. This is not to say that  
                     oppression is acceptable. But to single out oneself and disregarding others, as the  
                     Oromos are doing, is to commit an act of injustice against humanity. The historical  
                      accounts attest to the fact that the ancestors of the Oromo claimants attacked and  
                      killed to the extent that it was easy enough for them to go as far north as the  
                       province of Tigre and as far northwest as Gonder and penetrated into the  
                       emperor’s court [in Gondar]. Furthermore, intermarriage between Ethiopians and  
                       Gallas had taken place, as the historical accounts clearly suggest, to the extent that  
                        to claim that one is an Oromo, Amhara, or anything else is sheer nonsense. 
Almaz:     Habte, all the while you are presenting what transpired in Ethiopian history, there were 
                 several questions that perplexed me. Here are two of them; why do the Oromo  
                 claimants act as though they are oppressed any more than other tribes in the country?  
                  Should have I used the term “nation” instead of the term “tribe”? Nowadays, people  
                  use phrases like “Oromo nation” and “Amhara nation.” In other words, the tribes are 
                  referred to as nations and not as tribes. You keep using the word tribe yourself rather  
                  than nation. Could you take some time to clarify that? Sorry, I am repetitive here. 
Habte:      We have already discussed this question. Nonetheless, it is an extremely important  
                 question that must be answered. Let me try to answer it. In the language of Amharic,  
                 we use the word Gossa. You know that the word Gossa in English means tribe. Oromo  
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                  is a Gossa, and Amhara is a Gossa. So, both are really tribes. The confusion between  
                  the terms tribe and nation was started by the Ethiopian Marxist-Leninist university  
                  students in the 1960s. These students were not that well versed in the English  
                   language as they were all undergraduate students, mostly political science majors.  
                   They were reading Marxist and Leninist literature. It looks like one of them, I  
                    assume Birihanemeskel Reda, came across a Leninist/Stalinist literature entitled  
                    Marxism and the National  Question. Looking at the title, one can easily see that the  
                     title is specific to a nation. What nation is it specific to? Obviously, the Russian  
                      nation! The title did not point to any other nation. Then, one can also take a look at 
                       the phrase National Question. It was made clear in the review of Russian history  
                       that the phrase National Question referred to the questions and perplexities that the  
                       Russians and the so called ethnics had about the sociopolitical problems resulting  
                       from the fall of the tsarist empire. There was, in fact, no national question in  
                        Ethiopia in 1913. It was during the 1960s that the few Ethiopian elites, hungry for  
                        power, who started using the word nation in reference to the tribes. Be that as it  
                        may, the term nation was used historically by the Russians like Lenin and Stalin  
                        in reference to the surrounding nations that were made part of the Soviet Union  
                        through military conquest. This military conquest, as a matter of fact, is  
                        reminiscent of the Gada driven conquest the Galla migrants perpetrated against  
                        Ethiopia in the 16th century. What is mostly set aside by Dr. Asafa Jalata and his  
                         likes is that the nations that Lenin and Stalin had in mind, when they used the  
                          term nations, were Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine, Belorussia, The Moslem Border  
                          Lands, Azerbaijan, etc. These nations were sovereign nations with their own  
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                          sociopolitical systems, their own economic systems, their own well defined  
                          geographical territories, their own culture, and other entitlements as free nations. 
                          Now the question is- did the Oromos have all the characteristics of a nation just    
                          mentioned above?  The answer is- no they did not. In fact, they were nomadic. In  
                          fact, they were nomadic before they came into Ethiopia; and after they migrated  
                          into Ethiopia, they became part of an established nation with an ancient 
                         civilization of its own. Pointing to this ancient civilization, Professor Donald 
                         Levine (1974, p.92) tells us that Ethiopia had its own script in the first 
                          millennium; a script in which Oromos have as much alacrity as any Ethiopian.  
                          However, today the few Oromo elites, who have the aim of secession, like  
                          Eritrea, claim to have a Latin script that to me looks like the English alphabet. 
                           Coming back to your question, Almaz, the Oromos do not, in the least,  
                           constitute a nation. But, as you know, the purpose of this dissertation 
                           transcends tribal bickering. The purpose is social change. The reason we went 
                           into the history of Ethiopia and a philosophical inquiry into the notion of Gossa/ 
                           tribe is to reflect on these issues and pave the way for social change. Social  
                           change goes against the status quo. The notion of tribes is part of the status quo.     
                           It is this status quo that this study is trying to breakdown. As you can see 
                            replacing the word tribe with the word nation has contributed a great deal  
                            towards the degradation of the Ethiopian society. We need to look at the  
                            advanced nations like United States, Great Britain, France, and others to see if  
                            we can learn something from them. I am most particularly fond of the  
                            American sociopolitical system in which the thesis versus antithesis  
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                            contradiction can openly be witnessed by anybody. Here, what I have in mind 
                             is the Civil Rights Movement, The Black Power Movement, and currently the 
                            American people rising up in opposition to former President George Bush’s  
                             war in Iraq. In our case, when the university students replaced the word tribe  
                             with the word nation no explanation was offered for that replacement. There  
                             was no thesis-antithesis dialogue going on. The following excerpt  
                             demonstrates the liberty the Ethiopian students in America enjoyed in the  
                             1970s. The excerpt below was published in 1975 in a pamphlet called 
                             Challenge volume xiv [prepared by Ethiopian Students Union in North  
                             America]. Here is the excerpt:  
                 “      The essential elements of a revolutionary national program for the Ethiopian  
                         Empire reduce themselves to the following propositions: 
                   the recognition of the right of nationalities and peoples to self-determination up to  
                  and including secession” (page, 28-29). This doctrine served as the springboard for  
                   the secession of the province of Eritrea. The same doctrine still suffuses the  
                    Ethiopian sociopolitical system.  The Oromo Liberation Front is currently utilizing  
                    the same doctrine to assert its right to secede; one can look into  
                    www.oromoliberationfront.org and click on their mission in the menu. As it may  
                    have been evident by now, today one’s sense of tribal identity is emphasized to the  
                    highest possible degree. Why? Because, that is the only way the leadership can have  
                   one tribe pitted against another tribe by virtue of which the Tigre tribe ensures its  
 grip on power. In other words, the political hegemony of the Tigre tribe remains 
intact with tribalism in place. How does this work? Well, let us assume that the         
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Amhara tribe opposes the tribal/ethnic policies of the Tigre tribe, which is currently  
in power. What the Tigres, then, do is that they feed false information to the Oromos  
                   about what the Amhara are doing and saying against them. The Oromos rise up in  
                   arms, mainly in rural Ethiopia, and start killing those deemed to be Amharas. This is  
                   a method the Tigres use to quell any opposition against them. This sort of political  
                   maneuver, costing economic and sociopolitical growth, demonstrates the tremendous  
need for adult education in Ethiopia. Critical to note here, as Paulo Freire (1985, 
2002) and Ira Shor (1992, 1996, and 2000) recognized, is that education is politics. 
Politics, tribal or otherwise, influence the direction and nature of education. 
Consequently, it is one of the solemn responsibilities of critical pedagogy to raise the 
consciousness of the oppressed and the oppressors through adult education.  
What is most important to note, too, is the purpose driven infusion of the self-
determination doctrine and the tribal sense of identity as a nation. And, this is where a 
dialogue, in the form of adult education, is  indispensable. In this dialogue, the 
question whether or not the tribes are nations must be answered. Recently, I had an 
opportunity to talk to a college educated Ethiopian about how the tribes came to be 
viewed as nations. He did not know it, i.e. he did not know the origin of the word 
nations in the translated [into Amharic] version of the self-determination doctrine. 
Suffice it to say that I recommended Dr. Richard Pipes’ (1964) book, a critical 
endeavor should be made with respect to how the society can transcend this tribal 
strife and aim at democracy and economic growth. The need for straightforward 
transcendence can be better understood in terms of Professor Michael Apple’s (1990) 
theory of reproduction of social values through the employment of educational 
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institutions, which are used by oppressors to maintain the status quo. In other words, 
being aware of the value-recycling effect of traditional education, adult education 
should break down this value-recycling routine. The Ministry of Education, at the 
instigation of the tribal government, enforces as a matter of policy that each tribe be 
taught in their own tribal language.  The intention of this policy is to subvert the use 
of the national language, which is Amharic. Now at this point, I should remind the 
reader that if he/she replaces the words tribe and tribal with the words nations and 
nationalities he/she would end up with the language of the 1913 Lenin-Stalin article 
entitled  Marxism and the National Question.  Here in this dissertation, the word tribe 
is used instead of nation to maintain the social and historical authenticity of the 
people of Ethiopia in correspondence to the doctrine of historical dialectics. In other 
words, the dialectics of the historical developments in the life of a people is the only 
one that assures the people’s nationhood rather than a forced or an imposed status of  
 nationhood. At this point, what might serve as an example of imposed status of  
                  nationhood is to look at articles 5 and 39 in the Ethiopian Constitution from the  
                  internet ( www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/Ethiopian_Constitution ). The following is  
                  what it states: 
           Article 5 Language 
1.    The official language of the Federal Government shall be Amharic. 
2.    All Ethiopian languages shall enjoy equal state recognition. 
3.   The member states of the federation shall determine their respective official 
       language. 
      Article 39  The Right of Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples 
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1.   Every nation, nationality or people in Ethiopia shall have the unrestricted right 
      to self determination up to secession. 
2.   Every nation, nationality and people shall have the right to speak, write and  
      develop its language and to promote its culture, help it grow and flourish, and  
      preserve its historical heritage. 
4.   The right to self determination up to secession of nation, nationality, and  
       peoples may be exercised. 
Take note, please, of the fact that the Leninist-Stalinist language of nations, 
nationalities, and the concept of self-determination have found their way into the 
Ethiopian constitution. Look at the language of the third part of article 5. Take note of 
the phrase “member states.”  
      How true are the phrases and clauses used in the constitution? Recall that these 
phrases and clauses were injected by the Ethiopian student movement of the 1960s 
into an uncritical and unquestioning political system which still, in the 21st century, 
accepts it uncritically.  And, it was the self-determination doctrine that was exploited 
as a spring board to pave the way for Eritrean secession. Here one may wonder if the 
secession of Eritrea was governed by the dialectics of historical development; the 
answer to that query is- no! Why? Well, although the question is specifically about the 
secession of Eritrea, it is nonetheless inclusive of the Oromo Liberation Front. The 
reason is that the Oromo Liberation Front is currently appealing to the same Leninist-
Stalinist doctrine of self-determination that the Eritreans and the Tigres employed 
deceptively to accomplish the secession of Eritrea, i.e. the dialectics of  
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historical development did not play a role. Lastly, a statement needs to be made on the 
phrase “member states.” It sounds western and very deceptive. The phrase actually 
stands for the tribal enclaves called Kilil [see map at the end]. The phrase is not, in the 
least, suggestive of the tribes, while for example, Oromia Kilil and Amhara Kilil are; 
Oromia Kilil is for the Oromo tribe and the Amhara Kilil is for the Amhara tribe. 
When one looks at the preceding views from the stand point of social utility versus 
disutility, it is clear that social disutility is preponderant.  
Ketema:    Habte, pardon my interruption. Could you elaborate on your concept of historical 
                 dialectics, please? And then, if you can, relate that to why you think that the secession 
                 of Eritrea is not the result of historical dialectics. 
Habte:      Thank you, Ketema. First off, historical dialectics is not the same as historical  
                 materialism that Marx and Engels set forth in The German Ideology written in  
                 1845-1846 but published in 1932  
                 (www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology). What I call  
                 historical dialectics, which occurs due to historical necessity, is  
                 the dialectics that takes place within the framework of the history of a given nation.  
                Here, when I use the word nation I mean the entire people of sovereign nations like  
                Ethiopia, United States, and others. In other words, the term nation does not mean  
                 tribe. More precisely, the term dialectics is meant to suggest the Platonic conception  
                 of it as exemplified in his dialogues, ex., Theatetus. To wit, the thesis-antithesis  
                 contradiction constantly operating to produce the synthesis, which in turn becomes the  
                  thesis that will contradict its own antithesis [dialectics is a logical interplay between  
                  contradictory forces]. The constant interaction of the triadic logic [thesis-antithesis- 
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               synthesis] then reaches a more complex stage than  when started. Succinctly, therefore,  
               the thesis-antithesis tension is inherent to Plato’s dialogues. It is in this sense that the  
                term dialectics is used. Now to come back to the Eritrean issue, was there any kind of  
                dialogue that had taken place among the people of Ethiopia with respect to the  
                secession of Eritrea? The answer is- no! Was there any kind of dialogue between the  
                tribal leadership (TPLF/EPRDF) and the people of Ethiopia? The answer to this  
                question is also no! Then, how did the secession of Eritrea come to pass? In other  
                words, what acts actually clinched the secession of Eritrea? Here is how Professor  
                Vestal (1991) explains it: 
                    In May 1991the U.S. government responded to a call from 
  Mengistu’s regime and the insurgent groups to hold a peace 
                    conference in London for all parties in the Ethiopian civil war.  
                    While the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs 
                     Herman Cohen attempted to broker peace, the EPLF [Eritrean 
People’s Liberation Front] and EPRDF [Ethiopian People’s 
Revolutionary Democratic Front] broke the back of the remnant 
Derg military. The EPLF occupied all of Eritrea while the EPRDF 
breached the defenses of Addis Ababa. At that point, the U.S. 
government arranged for the departure of Mengistu [ Ethiopia’s 
socialist leader 1974-1991] to exile in Zimbabwe. . .  . 
                     In London, the Marxist-Leninist skeletons in the closets of the EPLF 
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 and EPRDF were kept firmly under lock, while their leaders, Issayas 
Afewerki and Meles Zenawi respectively, took on the rhetorical 
mantles of democrats to win support of Western powers. 
                     Issayas and Meles played Cohen like a well tuned Masinko, the 
                     Ethiopian one stringed “violin.” In effect, the United States anointed 
                     the EPLF with de facto sovereignty over Eritrea, and EPRDF was 
                     given a green light to enter Addis Ababa to “restore public order and 
                     prevent further bloodshed” (p. 4-5). 
             Professor Vestal is in a reasonably good position to understand Ethiopian 
sociopolitical affairs. The reason is that he taught in Ethiopia as a Peace Corps 
Volunteer in the 1960s. Hence, as evidenced in the above excerpt, he can tell when 
deceptive activities take place in the Ethiopian political realm. Teferra Haile-Selassie 
(1997), the Ethiopian Ambassador in Great Britain, discusses the same event that 
Professor Vestal discussed in the excerpt above. Here is what he says: 
 The London Peace Talks between the government and three insurgent 
organizations, EPLF, TPLF [Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front], and 
OLF [Oromo Liberation Front] were to be convened in London under 
the chairmanship of Mr. Herman Cohen, Assistant Secretary of State 
for African Affairs, in London in the Old Admiralty Building on 28 
May 1991. . . . The insurgents [EPLF, TPLF, OLF, and EPRP] with the 
support of the mediator [Herman Cohen], determined the participants to 
the talks despite the government’s [Ethiopian gov.] insistence to 
involve all organized opposition forces, including the EPRP [Ethiopian 
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Peoples Revolutionary Party]. Representations were made to the 
Western allies by the Ethiopian embassies, including the London 
mission which explained the need to include all opposition groups in 
the talks, in the interest of a lasting and enduring peace. The view of 
the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office was to start the Peace Talks 
with the EPLF, EPRDF/TPLF and OLF, and to co-opt others as the 
talks progressed. . . . Mr. Cohen declared that the points raised by the 
Prime Minister were not different from his line of thinking. He, 
however, advised the Prime Minister that at the meeting the question of 
proportion of representation in a future transitional government should 
not be emphasized and a special package for Eritrea must be 
considered. He reassured the Prime Minister that any unilateral action 
by the EPLF to change the status of Eritrea prior to the adoption of a 
new constitution would be resisted by the US government and this had 
been made clear to the EPLF leadership (p. 312-314). 
        Mr. Cohen’s attempt to give a formal and official façade to the chicanery he was  
leading against the people of Ethiopia by excluding the government delegation from 
negotiation and secretly conferring with EPLF and EPRDF/TPLF is obvious from the 
preceding excerpt. Worse yet, the turning point that played a decisive role in clinching 
the secession of Eritrea is stated under the rubric of The Proposed Argument of the US 
Government. Teferra Haile-Selassie (1997) states it this way: 
  An Eritrean administration will be set up immediately in Asmara. 
 This administration will co-operate with the Provisional Government 
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  in Addis Ababa and members of it will sit on the Provisional 
Government.  On June 1, 1993, a referendum will be held in Eritrea 
under appropriate international supervision to determine the political 
future of Eritrea (p. 315) 
             Most importantly, one could arguably look at the history of Ethiopia in the 19th 
century, during the reign of Emperor Yohannis, and squarely put the responsibility of 
Italian colonization of Eritrea right at the Emperor’s doorstep. How? Well, before his 
death, the Emperor, on his way to Metema, stopped at Asmara. In Asmara, he dismissed 
Ras Alula from his governorship over the entire area north of Mereb Melash river and 
proceeded to Metema, according to Paulos Gnogno (1984, p. 137), without filling the 
power vacuum the dismissal of Ras Alula created. And as noted earlier, the Emperor was 
hit with a stray bullet in the war at Metema against the Mahdists. The Italians received 
word of the Emperor’s death and the fact that Ras Alula was no longer in charge of the 
area north of the Mereb Melash river. These two conditions gave the Italians in Rome a 
chance to assign a new army General and ordered him to occupy the entire area north of 
Mereb Melash. The Italian General did exactly that. And, it was at that point that the 
name Eritrea was tagged to that part of Ethiopia by the Italians. History points out that 
Emperor Yohannis passed away March 1-1881 [E.C.]; and Minilik became Emperor on 
October 25-1882 [E.C], about seven months or so after the death of Yohannis. What does 
this historical fact mean? It means that it was actually Emperor Yohannis who 
unwittingly ceded [to Italians] the geographical land mass north of Mereb Melash river 
which was later named Eritrea by the Italians. Therefore, Minilik had nothing to do with 
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the Italian acquisition of Eritrea; and the Italians had all the conditions they needed to 
acquire the geographical land mass, which they later named Eritrea. 
Almaz:   Let me make a statement at this point, please. 
Habte:    Please, go ahead. 
Almaz:   I completely understand what you are saying. So far, what seem to be evident in your  
               account of Ethiopian history are the following:  
1. Emperor Minilik was not the one who handed Eritrea over to the Italians. 
2. It was actually Emperor Yohannis who handed Eritrea [before it was called 
               Eritrea] over to the Italians months before King Minilik became Emperor. 
3. The second assertion is true for the following reasons: 
a. Emperor Yohannis marched to Sebergoma to fight against the Italians, and  
              wasted two months waiting for them to come out of Sehati, where they were 
              fortified.  Yohannis finally left without firing a shot.   
b.           He, Emperor Yohannis, created a power vacuum when he dismissed Ras 
              Allula from his governorship over the entire region north of Mereb Melash 
              river, which the Italians later named Eritrea. 
c.           The Emperor, after dismissing Ras Allula, went to Metema to war against the  
 Mahadists, where he met his demise.  
4.          The Italians, after getting word of all the conditions in #3, proceeded to 
             colonize the entire region they later named Eritrea. This happened in 1881 
              [E.C] soon after the death of Emperor Yohannis but before Minilik became 
              Emperor, according to Paulos Gnogno  (1984 (E.C), p. 138). 
 5.          The historical timeline, as stated above, is such that #3 and #4 happened before  
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 Minilik became Emperor. Hence, what #2 asserts must be true.  
               That is my summary of the views you put forth, Habte. Would you agree? 
Habte:    Yes, absolutely. The reason it is important to know that historical fact is that in the  
                1960s Eritrean and Tigre university students in Ethiopia were charging that Emperor  
                Minilik sold Eritrea to the Italians; he [Minilik] exchanged Eritrea for Italian arms; and  
                Ethiopia colonized Eritrea. All these charges are not true so far as the history of  
                Ethiopia is concerned; to wit, my reading of it and what has been recounted in this  
                dissertation do not support any of the charges. A response, however, to the charge  
                 leveled against King Minilik [not yet Emperor] by Dr. Tekeste Negash (1997, p. 13)  
                 as one who ceded Eritrea for Italian arms must be made to collapse due to  
  Dr. Tekeste’s failure, as a historian, to make his readers aware of the fact that Eritrea, 
for all practical purposes, was already colonized during Emperor Yohannis’ reign. It is 
true nonetheless that King Minilik of Shewa was competing for the emperorship against  
 King Yohannis of Tigre [a province north of Shewa]. King Minilik finally decided to 
pay tribute to King Yohannis at which time King Yohannis became the recognized 
Emperor of Ethiopia. Now, when Dr. Tekeste (1997) pointed out that King Minilik 
ceded Eritrea for Italian arms, he failed to point out that appealing to European powers 
for arms by  Ethiopian kings and emperors was a customary thing in order to fight and 
dominate another regional king or chief. This sort of thing was not unique to Minilik, 
suffice it to point out that he [Minilik] did it after the death of Yohannis to campaign 
for the emperorship. The Italians also approached King Minilik secretly while 
Yohannis was still the Emperor. Here is an instance pointed out by Professor Pankhurst 
(2001) in which Yohannis, Minilik’s predecessor, did exactly the same thing:                                                                                            
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 Yohannis, at the beginning of his reign, was under strong pressure 
from the Egyptians, whose Khedive Pasha, had officially received the 
port of Massawa from his nominal overlord, the Sultan of the Ottoman 
Empire on 20 May 1868. They shortly afterwards occupied the nearby 
mainland port of Zulla, and instituted a rigid blockade to prevent the 
import of arms by the Ethiopian ruler. Faced with Egyptian hostility 
Yohannis decided to appeal to European Christendom. In August 1872 
he sent his English aide, Kirkham on a visit to Europe, with appeals to 
the governments of Austria, Russia, Germany, Britain, and France  
(p. 164). 
      The preceding excerpt demonstrates that Yohannis did exactly what Minilik did: 
appeal to European powers for arms. But the descendents of Yohannis [both Tigres and 
Eritreans] were and still are critical and hostile to Minilik based on their own falsified 
version of Ethiopian history.  Dr. Daniel Kindie (2005) states that Minilik’s critics are 
silent, when their own people [Eritreans and Tigres] handed parts or all of Eritrea over to 
Italy unsolicited. Here is what he says:  
. . ., Menelik accepted the request of the Italians for a cease-fire and 
peace negotiations. 
                  Eritrean political activists have been very consistent in their criticism 
                 of Menelik for having “betrayed” their homeland. They have never 
                 raised a word about Eritrean warlords, who actively collaborated with 
foreign powers inviting them to come and occupy their homeland. Ras 
Wolde Mikael Solomon, who came from the hereditary rulers of 
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Hamassien- the Hazzega, is a good example. He was appointed 
Governor of Hamassien and Bogos by Yohannis in 1869. But soon he 
started to plot with the Egyptians and received a large batch of weapons 
in return. They appointed him a Ras because he allowed them to occupy 
Senhit. After the defeat of the Egyptians, he devastated Bogos and 
killed two Governors- Hailu and Bariau, who were appointed by the 
Emperor Yohannis. As if that was not enough, he had contacts with 
Napoleon 111. He also encouraged his son-in-law to join the Italians as 
a mercenary, and, who in turn encouraged them to move into the 
highlands. Similarly, Bahta Hagos was armed at first by the Egyptians 
and worked as a mercenary to undermine Ethiopia. Subsequently, he 
worked as an Italian agent. He fought for them in 1887 and 1888 
against the Ethiopian army, converted to Catholicism, and appointed 
Governor of Akele Guzaie by the Italians. Debbebe Araya was a 
prominent ally of the Italians. He used to say “I wish to be the chief 
without having other chiefs.” Debbebe received money and war 
material from the Italians to put his mercenary service at the disposal of 
Rome and started to harass the Ethiopian army at Ghinda. He led his 
2000 troops and occupied Segeneiti for the Italians. He then fought and 
killed in battle Dejach Kifle Eyesus marched into Keren with the 
Italians and helped them raise the Italian flag there. The same was true 
of the Ben Amir chiefs who collaborated with the Italian invaders and 
assisted them in the occupation of their homeland (p. 87). 
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      The preceding excerpt demonstrates how Tigres (Eritreans) were helpful to the 
Italians and the Egyptians against the people of Ethiopia. The politics of the 19th 
century is clearly baffling. It seems to me, however, that trading land for arms was a 
common practice. It was the psychology of the time. Incidentally, why was it a 
common practice? Amazingly enough, just reading the history, the purpose was to 
dominate some other Ethiopian politician. It was not even to fight off foreign invaders: 
the Italians and the Egyptians. 
Ketema:   Excuse me, Habte. Could you elaborate on why one politician was interested in  
                 dominating another politician more so than fighting off the aggression of foreign  
                 invaders like Egyptians and Italians?  
Habte:      The first reason is power struggle, Ketema. In other words, one regional leader like  
                 Minilik, the King of Shewa province, wants other regional feudal lords or warlords to 
                pay tribute to him which is interpreted to be a sign of submission [to the one who  
                receives the tribute]. If any one of them would not pay tribute, the result might be war. 
               And, it is the prospect of this war that gives rise to the regional feudal lords to  
               negotiate, for arms, with foreigners like Egypt, Great Britain, Italy, and others. Logic  
               suggests, therefore, that the foreigners with colonial intensions would drive the  
                negotiation towards trading arms for land. The fact that this sort of situation was  
                widespread points to a lack of central government. To wit, different regions were ruled  
                 by different kings/warlords which would give a chance for the colonialists to play one  
                 warlord against another. This period in Ethiopian history is called The Era of the  
                  Princes. Henze (2000) tells us that “The Era of the Princes began with the death of  
                   Iyasu II in 1755 and lasted until the crowning of Tewodros II in 1855” (p. 119).  
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                   Richard Pankhurst (2001) informs us that, just before The Era of the Princes, there  
                   were several assassinations. And, it was these assassinations that set The Era of the  
                   Princes in motion. In his characterization of the period, here is what he says: 
 In this period which followed [i.e. the assassinations], central 
government disintegrated. The provinces became to varying degrees 
independent, the emperors were reduced to the status of little more 
than puppets in the hands of one or other feudal lord, and there was 
frequent civil war. Ethiopian historians later spoke of this time as the 
era of the Masafent, i.e. judges, or princes, for it recalled the biblical 
time, referred to in the Book of Judges 21:25, when ‘there was no king 
in Israel : every man did that which was right in his own eyes’  
(p. 130). 
Almaz:     There is something that perplexes me about Ethiopia. The history of Ethiopia that we  
                 have seen so far suggests to me that Ethiopia should have disintegrated and  
                disappeared centuries ago. Why is Ethiopia still here? Habte, could you make a  
                 statement on that? 
Habte:      Certainly, Almaz. You’re right, it is perplexing. There is something that holds the  
                 internal forces of the society together. If you look at the horn of Africa, there is a  
                 general socio-cultural similarity of the people in that area. For instance if you observe  
                 the way the Somales and the Ethiopians behave, you will see some similar elements in  
                 their behavior. That is why the Somales walk straight into Ethiopia and live there  
                 comfortably without second thought. In other words, they live there without going  
                  through any period of adjustment [culture shock], or without being hassled by the  
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                  government. In fact once they are in the country, they claim that they are citizens.  
                  These Somales stick to the easternmost part of Ethiopia where the Ethiopian border is  
                   geographically congruent with the Somale border. That is why Professor Levine  
                   (1974) gave the title Greater Ethiopia to his book and used it to refer to the sort of  
                    people-to-people relationship that he was able to see while he was there in person.  
                    From what he says, the word kindred seems to be expressive of his understanding.  
                    Here is what he says: 
                     . . ., the Ethiopian Empire of the twentieth century 
consists of a number of previously autonomous and distinct “African” 
tribes subordinated under an alien Semitic minority. This view is a 
natural consequence of beginning Ethiopian history, as scholarly 
convention has had it, with the supposed Semitic immigrations of the 
first millennium B.C. A different view is obtained, however, if one’s 
perspective begins not three but six thousand years ago, not in Arabia 
but in Africa; not in the Semitic importations but with Ethiopian 
peoples at home. Such a view may justify replacing, or at least 
correcting, the image of arbitrary empire composed of numerous 
isolated and vastly diverse subject peoples with the image of a vast 
ecological area and historical arena in which kindred peoples have 
shared many traditions and interacted with one another for millennia. I 
propose to refer this latter image as Greater Ethiopia. The present 
boundaries of the Ethiopian state roughly circumscribe the area in 
question, although some of the peoples in Greater Ethiopia now 
Social Change:  A Pedagogic Inquiry of Ethiopian Ethnicity/Tribe/Gossa      125 
 
straddle the borders of Sudan, Kenya, Somalia and French Territory of 
the Afars and Issas; . . .(p. 26-27). 
Ketema:   Professor Levine has, more or less, a good picture of the people of Ethiopia. The term 
                kindred, in his depiction of the people of Ethiopia, makes a lot of sense. He mentions  
                the nations that share borders with Ethiopia. The French territory that he mentioned is  
                Djibouti located adjacent to the Indian Ocean and the southern tip of the Red Sea. It is 
                no longer a French territory. Would you agree with me, Habte? 
Habte:    Absolutely! As a matter of fact since my home town, Dire Dawa, is right next to  
               Djibouti, Professor Levine’s depiction of the people in that area is to the point. People 
               come to Dire Dawa from Djibouti for vacation; and there is an immediate psychological 
               convergence between the Djiboutians and the people in Dire Dawa. The reason is that 
               these Djiboutians are Somales who went to Djibouti from Ethiopia and Somale. There  
               is, therefore, no significant cultural aperture between these people. Furthermore back  
              when I was assigned to teach in the province of Wellega, I saw that some of the  
              Ethiopian women were married to Sudanese men. The Sudanese men were Moslems  
              and the women were Christians. Regardless of that divide, this union reflects the socio- 
              cultural similarity of the people in the horn of Africa, yet confirming Professor Levine’s  
              use of the term kindred in reference to the people of that area. By the way, is Gossa/tribe  
               biological? In other words, are people, who belong to the same tribe, biologically  
               related? The term “Zer” (in Amharic) is used to suggest that it is biological. A lot of  
  Ethiopians use that term. They say “Gossa is Zer.” How would you respond to that,  
               Almaz? 
Almaz:  Thank you, Habte. Implicit to the term Zer is biological relation. As you know,  
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               biological relation means genetic relation. The interest here is not biology or genetics,  
               suffice it to point out that the term Zer implies biological relation. What I want to point  
               out at this point is that biological relationship is the result of sharing physical and other  
               characteristics that are genetically transmitted. Do you agree with me so far? 
Ketema:  Yes. 
Habte:      I agree too. 
Almaz:  Very good! Now, let us all remember that when we just started to establish our under- 
               standing of the notion of Gossa/tribe, we agreed on the three constitutive elements of 
               Gossa- namely, culture, language, and human beings. Consequent on that, asserting the 
               notion that Gossa/tribe is biological is asserting the notion that Gossa/tribe is   
               genetically transmissible. What that obviously means is that all the three constitutive  
               elements of Gossa/tribe are genetically transmissible. That, of course, is absolutely  
               absurd. Let me ask you this; are language and culture genetically transmissible?  
Habte:    No, they are not. 
Ketema:  I agree. 
Almaz:    Thank you, we all agree on this. Culture and language are learned from one’s own  
                social environment. The characteristics of human beings, physical and otherwise, are  
                Genetically transmitted. Hence, Gossa/tribe is not biological; it is not Zer. Would you  
                agree with that conclusion? 
Habte:     Yes. 
Ketema:   Yes, I do agree. At this point, could you make a few statements on whether or not  
                 Ethiopia ever colonized Eritrea and Oromia? If so, when? Furthermore, could the 
                  Marxist-Leninist doctrine have solved the economic and sociopolitical problems,  
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                  Habte? 
Habte:      Thank you, Ketema. We have touched on all those questions earlier. Nonetheless and  
                 most directly, the answer to all those questions is- no! In order to be certain of this  
                 answer, we need to answer some critical questions. Let us go over them step by step.  
                 Has there ever been a sovereign political territory/entity called Oromia before the  
                 arrival of the tribe-based government in Ethiopia? The answer is- no. That  
                 demonstrates that the claim that Ethiopia colonized Oromia is false; in fact, Oromia  
                  never existed before 1991. How about Eritrea? Was it ever colonized by Ethiopia?  
                  No, it was never colonized by Ethiopia. As a matter of fact, it was part of Ethiopia  
                 ever since Ethiopia came into being. How so? As history itself attests, Tigre, the  
                  northernmost province of Ethiopia, had the geographical land mass of Eritrea as its  
                  northernmost part. In other words, a portion of northern Tigre province was what 
                  was renamed as Eritrea by colonialist Italy. Eritrea, therefore, was part and parcel of  
                  the Tigre province, which in turn is part and parcel of Ethiopia. Hence, Ethiopia never  
                 colonized Eritrea or Oromia. I hope that answers your questions. 
    Now, it is an illusion to think that Marxist-Leninist philosophy (economic and 
                 sociopolitical) can solve Ethiopia’s problems. In principle, in order to solve a problem 
                 one has to understand the problem. What actually triggered the problem must be clear. 
                 In other words, the problem being the effect, the cause must be understood. For  
                  instance racism is a problem in the United States. The cause for this problem is the  
                  belief in the notion of race. Hence, in order to solve the problem of racism the notion  
                 of race must first be looked at. Solving social problems like racism and tribalism from  
                 the structural stand point is impossible. In other words, the belief in the existence of  
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                 black and white people is the first impediment that must be overcome. Similarly, the  
                 belief in the existence of tribes like the Amhara and Oromo tribe must be subjected to  
                 epistemic scrutiny. What that means is that the very texture, the very fiber, the  
                 essential constitution of the structures themselves must be rigorously interrogated. In  
                 fine, the structures are the problems. The structures are those without which the  
                 problems cannot exist. Take away the structures and there will be no tribalism or  
                 racism. What must be clear at this point is that rearranging or renaming the structures  
                 will not work; they just must, logically and through dialogue, be destroyed. The  
                 intention of the dialogue is to arouse critical consciousness. Dialogue is the propelling  
                 force of critical pedagogy. Did I answer your questions, Ketema? 
Ketema:   Yes, thank you. 
Habte:       How about you, Almaz? Are you happy with my response? 
Almaz:      Yes. Thank you, Habte. 
Habte:      Now, we can bring this arduous dialogue to a finish. And, if you permit me, I am  
                 going to present the conclusions of our dialogue, which is an informal adult education  
                 via the entire pedagogic inquiry into Gossa, the ultimate goal of which is social  
                 change. I am going to do that through my narrative, which in effect is my own story.  
 
 
Answer to the Research Question 
 How do various doctrines such as Lenin’s the right of nations and nationalities to self-
determination and other factors influence social change in Ethiopia? 
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 The term nation may have different connotations depending on the country we are talking 
about. In the United States, the term nation can be used in reference to the Indian tribesmen. Ex., 
the Cherokee nation. For purposes of clarity, I looked up the term nation in the internet 
dictionary [dictionary.com]. Here is the first and one of the meanings it stated- “a large body of 
people associated with a particular territory, that is sufficiently conscious of its unity to seek or 
to possess a government peculiarly its own.” I do agree with this definition. So, when Lenin used 
the term nation, he did not mean to suggest Gossa/ethnicity. He meant to suggest the colonized 
nations [by the Russian empire] like Ukraine, Armenia, and others (Richard Pipes, (1964), Lenin 
(2004)). The case of Ethiopia does not involve colonization of Oromos or Eritreans. Italy tried to 
colonize Ethiopia and failed, as the research shows. What happened was that Italy occupied a 
portion of the Tigre province [northern Ethiopia] in the late 1880s. She managed to colonize a 
portion of the northern part of the Tigre province and called it Eritrea in 1890. Consequently, 
Eritrea was never colonized by Ethiopia. This has been demonstrated by the research. 
 Now, the case of Oromo claimants is different from that of Eritreans. The Oromos [used to 
be called Galla at that time] simply migrated into southern Ethiopia (Legesse (1973)) from 
Somali. Logic suggests that they constructed a defense system called Gada in southern Ethiopia. 
The primary responsibility of the Gada system was that the in-coming Gada leadership was 
expected to go out and conquer/colonize territories that were not theirs and incorporate them into 
what they already own. As the research demonstrated, it was through the employment of the 
principles of the Gada system that the Oromos conquered almost the whole of Ethiopia (Abir, 
(1968)) in the 16th century. That means that the Oromos were not colonized, as Oromo 
secessionists assert nowadays. Instead, one may reasonably argue that Ethiopia was colonized by 
the Oromos. Despite what happened in the 16th century, Oromos became part of the Ethiopian 
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society. Oromos are now seen as one of the tribes in Ethiopia. Oromos, therefore, do not 
constitute a nation. 
 
How have the identities of Ethiopians living in the United States been affected by historical 
change? 
 Finally looking at the consequence of the implementation of Lenin’s doctrine, it is obvious 
that the degeneracy this doctrine inflicted on the Ethiopian people has been delineated in this 
dissertation. Social change by definition is some sort of betterment/improvement; betterment and 
degeneracy are antithetical to one another. Therefore, it must be concluded that Lenin’s doctrine 
of “the right of nations and nationalities to self-determination . . .” as implemented in Ethiopia, 
did not bring about any form of social change. The results of implementing this doctrine are 
economic oppression by the Tigre tribe, stifling of freedom of the press, hegemony of one tribe 
[the Tigre tribe] over other tribes, lack of human rights, Ethiopians running out of the country in 
droves, and several other oppressive policies. With results such as the ones mentioned, Lenin’s 
doctrine is a failure. 
         Gossa/ethnicity is the primary ingredient in the social chaos in Ethiopia today. Gossa is    
interpreted to mean nation. Amhara is a Gossa; Oromo is a Gossa; Tigre is a Gossa, and so on 
and so forth. Beginning with the student movement of the 1960s all the way to the present tribe-
based government, the tribes in Ethiopia are viewed as nations by Marxists and Leninists- the so 
called revolutionaries. Setting Gossa to the concept of nation is the foundation upon which the 
administrative super-structure is built. What that means is that if there is something incongruent 
in the equation of Gossa equals nation [i.e. Gossa=nation], this incongruity is going to seep 
upward into the super-structure. In other words, what is incongruent or illogical will be reflected 
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in the operation of the super-structure. And in fact, that was what was taking place in Ethiopia. 
The current chaos confirms that ethnic federalism, a policy currently implemented, has not 
worked in Ethiopia [Ethnic federalism means autonomy of tribal enclaves, equality of ethnics, 
the right to secede, and others]. Obviously enough, to declare a belief in the equality of the 
tribes/ethnics and yet implement the hegemony of the Tigre tribe over others is a contradiction. 
That is one of the reasons for the dysfunction of ethnic federalism, as conceived by the Tigres. 
Furthermore, if we recall, the notion of federalism [equality of ethnics] was not accepted by 
Lenin (Pipes, (1964)). In both Ethiopia and Russia ethnic federalism was not a functioning 
concept. Therefore, it only makes sense that the notion of Gossa/ethnicity should be put aside in 
Ethiopia. The logical way to do that is by starting a public dialogue [accessible to all]. This 
dissertation has demonstrated the non-existence of Gossa in the dialogue. That means that the 
path to social change is cleared up in order to focus on meaningful policy construction and 
implementation. An important fact to recognize, at this point, is that realizing the non-existence 
of Gossa/ethnicity in and of itself is a form of social change. 
 With respect to Eritrea and her secession from Ethiopia, it was made clear that the 
secession was the result of Lenin’s doctrine of self-determination. Consequently, Eritrea should 
be brought back to Ethiopia, the historical owner of the landmass [of Eritrea]. Once Eritrea is 
brought back to Ethiopia, the logical step to take is to merge it with the province of Tigre from 
which it was severed in the first place. This political and historical measure will make sure that 
that part [northern part] of Ethiopia will forever sever its colonial link to Italy. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: MY JOURNEY IN ANDRAGOGY 
 Andragogy is adult education. This is an educational dialogue I carried out Ethiopian 
adults, some of whom have families and some do not. These Ethiopians are people who already 
have an impressive wealth of knowledge about the Ethiopian society. Consequently, they have 
definite positions on a lot of social and historical issues. This educational dialogue is the single 
most important dialogue, for me, in my journey in adult education. The reason is that the 
dialogue brought me face to face, in an existential engagement, with people who might turn out 
to be social change agents themselves. There are some, amongst them, who claim to be Amhara; 
there are some who claim to be Oromo, some Gurage, some Welamo, and others who identify 
themselves with other tribes. All these people communicate with one another using the Ethiopian 
official language called Amharic. In other words, their tribal language is not in use. I found this 
to be a fascinating experience for me. Since I was part of the dialogue, I personally fluctuated 
between English and Amharic as some of them did. The use of the English language was 
important where Amharic was deficient in terms of certain technical concepts better expressed in 
English rather than in Amharic. 
 Was this dialogue transformative? My own experience suggests that it was transformative. 
In the course of the dialogue, what I found to be invariably true is that Ethiopians take it for 
granted that they know what Gossa is. I did the same thing myself until just before this 
dissertation I found myself stuck when trying to explain it to myself. So, we are all complacent 
with respect to articulating what Gossa is, because, we were born and raised in a culture where 
the term Gossa is such a part of the common parlance we do not feel the need to explain it. Be 
that as it may, I made sure that I posed my critical questions in comportment to the needs of this 
dissertation by first setting the way they should understand my questions. I set up an 
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epistemological framework within which they could understand and interpret my questions. Here 
is an example of a method I used: In my dialogue, I point to something concrete like a car. Then, 
I point to it with my finger and say, “This is a car.” I, then, follow that statement by going into 
the explanation of how I know that it is a car. To wit, I see it. Without seeing it, I could not even 
point to it.  
  My question, after framing the dialogue this way was: What is it that we are referring to 
when we use terms like Gossa, Oromo, Amhara, and other social phenomena? This question was 
followed, on the part of the dialogue participants, by a long silence and absolutely nonplused 
facial expressions. My duty at this point was to maintain my silence and watch everybody’s eyes 
and faces. This particular moment was a transformative moment. Before I elucidated the notion 
of Gossa, which they already know but could not articulate, I posed another question. If there 
isn’t anything I can point to and say, “this is Gossa,” is it reasonable for me to assert the notion 
that Gossa is only and only a concept? In other words, there is nothing outside the mind that 
comports with our concept of Gossa in the same way that car is a concept that exists concretely 
outside the mind.  We agreed that Gossa is a mental entity. Establishing this fact is of critical 
importance to solving the problem in Ethiopia.  
 Dr. Merera Gudina (2003), in identifying the problem, states: “The root cause of the lasting 
crisis of the Ethiopian state and society centered around and resulting from ethnic nationalism is 
the creation of the modern empire-state in the last quarter of the 19th century and its subsequent 
evolution” (p. 2). 
 Gudina (2003) correctly identifies ethnic nationalism as the source or origin of Ethiopia’s 
problem. Sadly however, nowhere in his book does he explain what it is that he understands or 
means to suggest by the term ethnic. I think that the term ethnic may be more fashionable than 
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the term tribe in Europe where he wrote his dissertation. This suggests to me that in European 
circles, or maybe in western views, the two terms are interchangeable. 
Nonetheless, the reason I am particular about these two terms is that clarity of ideas and concepts 
are critically important when solving social problems. Without looking into ethnicity per se, the 
failure to solve Ethiopia’s problems is guaranteed.  
  Approaching the problem through the prism of ethnicity is more structural than anything 
else. A structural approach to solving the problem of Gossa, or ethnic nationalism, as Dr. Merera 
calls it, leaves the problem intact. The solution does not lie in the structural relationships. Rather, 
it lies in the very fiber of the structures themselves. Hence, looking into Gossa from the stand 
point of its constitutive elements is better suited to solve Ethiopia’s problems than the structural 
approach. Approaching it from the stand point of the constitutive elements would put the so 
called Ethiopian elites on the spot. These elites are the ones who used ethnic nationalism to 
catapult themselves to power. As a political scientist, Dr. Merera Gudina (2003) has pointed out 
this fact. Here is what he says: 
. . . political mobilization is an essential part of the politics of ethnicity and 
nationalism. It is no exaggeration to say that as a rule the elites are more than a 
catalyst, usually they are the factual political engineers of ethnic nationalist 
movements (p. 34). 
 But, who are these Ethiopian elites? They are the so called educated Ethiopians, including 
Dr. Merera Gudina (2003) himself. He represents an Oromo group and is a member of the 
Ethiopian parliament. The Ethiopian elites are, therefore, the ones who must be confronted with 
the philosophical difficulty inherent to the problem of Gossa. Nevertheless, Gudina (2003) points 
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out how the concept of nations and nationalities came into vogue and political scene in Ethiopia. 
Here is a summary of what he wrote on ethnicity and nationalism. 
     The “national question” (and associated terms such as ‘nation,’ ‘nationalities’) 
came into Ethiopian national politics in the high days of the Ethiopian Student 
Movement (ESM), which was captivated by Marxist-Leninist ideas in the 1960s 
and early 1970s. All the leftist political parties which were an offspring of the ESM 
carried them over into their political programs. 
The principle of ‘the right to self-determination of nations and nationalities, up to 
and including secession,’ like the above-mentioned terms came into the Ethiopian 
political vocabulary with the Ethiopian Student Movement of the period and the 
political parties it gave birth to. With the rise of the military regime that began to 
use socialism as passport to power and the growth of ethnic-based liberation 
movements with the political objective of liberating their own ethnic constituency, 
this principle not only has come to dominate political discourse in Ethiopia but has 
also become the main basis of the Ethiopian constitution and the reordering of the 
state. In fact it has been the most used and misused principle in Ethiopia by both the 
various regimes and their opponents to a level of religious faith and/or hypocrisy  
(p. 38). 
 Gudina (2003) is absolutely right, most particularly, with respect to the principle of self-
determination. The language reordering of the state, is vague in the sense that the phrase tribal 
enclave, as pointed out in this dissertation, is more precisely expressive of the political reality 
than Dr. Merera’s language. If one looks at the phrase tribal enclave, it would be clear at first 
glance that it is a tribal territory within a larger territory. 
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 This journey is an actual dialogue I had with Ethiopians. This dialogue included reading 
historical materials; the materials were in book form and they were read in partial amounts, by 
individuals or an individual reading a few paragraphs to a group. It was a very satisfactory 
journey. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
 From the research readings on the concept of race (as understood in the United States), I 
have concluded that race is no longer a scientific problem. It is, rather, a problem for the social 
sciences. 
 Both tribalism and racism are rooted in the purpose of dividing people into different 
groups. Race is normally the result of skin difference. That is, skin difference does not in the 
least suggest that one is white, black, or anything else. To label a skin as white or black is adding 
information that is not there. The skins just are. They are naturally constructed. That is to say that 
they are not social constructs. So the research question is- what epistemological grounds is there 
for the existence of race? 
Conclusions 
 Social change starts out as a concept. The origin of this concept is empirical. The reason is 
that we see, observe, and experience something in a social setting that we simply cannot accept. 
Consequently, we feel that which we cannot accept needs to be changed due to its oppressive and 
inhumane impact on the lives of human beings. The hegemony of one tribe over other tribes in 
the Ethiopian society is one example that needs to be changed. In other words, the conditions that 
are oppressive and inhuman will have to be changed to non-oppressive and favorable conditions 
to human beings. This sort of transformation constitutes social change. 
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 Here, one needs to remember what colonialist Italy did when she entered Addis Ababa. As 
already mentioned, Haile-Selassie (1997) tells us about the creation of Italian East Africa, a 
creation which consisted of Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somali— the entire Horn of Africa. Ethiopia 
was further divided along tribal lines. Here are the tribal divisions according to Italy: Amhara, 
Harare, Oromo-Sidama and Shewa. This serves as a model for the Tigre tribe to follow. It serves 
them as a divide-and-rule scheme that t them in power so far.  
  The Tigre tribe is now in complete control of the Ethiopian treasury and with widespread 
unemployment among non-Tigre Ethiopians. non-Tigre and young Ethiopian girls are forced to 
seek employment in Arab countries like Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and others. The inhumanity that 
happens to these girls is unspeakable. What is interesting to note is that none of these girls is a 
Tigre girl. This is not a coincidence. It is a logical outcome of the misguided policy of the tribe-
based government in Ethiopia. It is the result of tribalism as implemented by the Tigre tribe. In 
short, there is an over-emphasis on tribalism. It is this over-emphasis on tribalism that set 
Lenin’s doctrine of self-determination in motion. Ethnic federalism, thus, became the 
overarching policy of the tribal government in Ethiopia. It is helpful to recall that federalism was 
rejected by Lenin, as pointed out in the Russian history delineated in this dissertation. But,  
Lenin’s doctrine of self-determination was invoked to realize the secession of Eritrea. I 
personally remember the university students asserting the notion that the question of Eritrea is a 
question of colonialism. The implication of this assertion being that Ethiopia colonized Eritrea, 
which is false. The fact that this assertion is false can be verified by looking at the map of 
Ethiopia during the period of ancient Axumite Empire. Another assertion that I recall is Menilek 
sold Eritrea to Italy. Once again, that is false. The research for this dissertation has demonstrated 
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that it was Emperor Yohannis who, because of his miscalculations, handed the entire land mass 
of Eritrea to Italy.  
  These assertions were two of the most prominent ones among others like land to the tiller. 
Who was behind the student movement of the 1960s?  Most actively, it was the Eritrean 
university students who were the instigators of the non-Tigre students. These Eritrean students 
played the non-Tigre students to their advantage. They played them against Emperor Haile 
Selassie’s government and his ministers. They played the role of being revolutionaries, in 
support of the secession of Eritrea. Looking revolutionary with the little beard on the chin was in 
vogue. That was what the non-Tigre students saw. They did not see their deficiency in education. 
They did not know their own history. If they did, they would have easily discerned that Ethiopia 
never colonized Eritrea and neither did Emperor Menilek sell Eritrea to the Italians. The Ministry 
of Education is used as a conduit for indoctrination today. Students are not being taught the way 
I was during Emperor Haile Selassie’s time. The curriculums must be reconstructed focusing on 
education rather than on the virtues of the tribal government. Setting educational issues aside for 
now, it must be pointed out that the secession of Eritrea is a burning issue in the hearts of all 
non-Tigre Ethiopians. Today after seeing what happened Ethiopians believe that the support the 
student movement gave to the secession of Eritrea was a grave mistake. In fact, most all of them 
reject Marxism and Leninism today. What is important to note is that the secession of Eritrea 
was realized by the tribalist’s government in Ethiopia. Remember that Eritrea, before the arrival 
of colonialist Italy, was part of the northernmost province of Tigre. At that time there was no 
such thing as Eritrea.  
  After the secession of Eritrea, Ethiopia and Eritrea were involved in a war against one 
another over a tiny, dusty, and God-forsaken rural town of Badime where almost nobody lives. 
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Meles Zenawi, the tribal Prime Minister of Ethiopia, went to war and sacrificed 70,000 non-
Tigre Ethiopians. One wonders why he went to war after ceding Eritrea and the two ports of 
Massawa and Asab to secessionists. In view of what he ceded to the secessionists, he should 
have given up Badime to Eritrea. That would have saved 70,000 Ethiopian lives. A replica of the 
Eritrean secessionist act is now being played by the Oromo Liberation Movement. In other 
words, Eritrea now is a model for secessionist Oromo Liberation Movement.  
 Since the restructuring of the internal provincial territories into tribal enclaves (or Kilil), 
the Oromo claimants have been fighting to exercise their right to what Lenin’s doctrine asserts 
the right of nations to self-determination up to and including secession. Now, I must point out 
that not all Oromos want to secede. If one looks at the Kilil map, one can see that there is a Kilil 
labeled Oromia and that Kilil is set aside for the Oromo tribe. It is with this Kilil that they want 
to secede. Fortunately, the Oromo movement is now on the wane as a result of their realization 
of who they are- Ethiopians. To finish up this part, the purpose of creating the tribal enclave of 
Oromia by the tribalist’s government was so that secession and the final disintegration of 
Ethiopia could be accomplished with ease. 
 Social change in this dissertation is an appeal to reason, through dialogue, for the purpose 
of doing away or solving social problems. In this case, social problem means the act of dividing 
people (Ethiopians) along tribal lines. Consequently, an inquiry is made into the reality or un-
reality of Gossa/ethnicity. In other words, the existence or non-existence of Gossa/ethnicity is 
determined by the three dialogists. Given the fact that Gossa/ethnicity is a social construct, the 
inquiry into Gossa/ethnicity led to the conclusion that, apart from human beings, Gossa/ethnicity 
does not exist. Gossa/ethnicity turned out to be a learned persona or façade. In other words 
Gossa/ethnicity is not intrinsic to the nature of human beings. Gossa/ethnicity, in other words, is 
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extrinsic to the humanity of human beings. That in turn means that nature did not encode Gossa 
into our nature. This sort of awareness would help recognize the problem of Gossa/ethnicity as a 
social impediment. This is where education can play a significant role in bringing the necessary 
awareness on Gossa/ethnicity. This awareness will eventually lead to the non-existence of Gossa. 
The non-existence of Gossa suggests that the way to social change is paved. 
 Finally as the election for the prime minister’s office is currently underway, it is evident in 
the debates that the secession of Eritrea is one of the burning issues. This issue has not 
disappeared at all. The fact that Ethiopia has lost her historical ports of Massawa and Asab to 
secessionist Eritrea is alive and burning in the minds and hearts of non-Tigre Ethiopians. These 
ports were occupied by Turkey and Egypt long before colonialists Italy, England, and France 
came on the scene. The situation created by the Tigres can only suggest war in the future as that 
can be evidenced by the degree of hostility towards them. 
 An important characteristic unique to the Tigre tribal government is that it fractured the 
country into tribal enclaves and gave away Ethiopia’s historical territory to secessionist Eritrea. 
In contrast, the governments that preceded this tribal government dedicated themselves to the 
unity of the people of Ethiopia and worked hard towards it. 
 Social change must consist of reversing all the policies that the tribal government 
instituted. Educational policies must aim at the entire Ethiopian nation rather than nations and 
nationalities, i.e. tribes. Freedom of movement, free economic system, free press, and free 
election to any public office, and other meaningful democratic features should be part of the new 
Ethiopia. This reversal should include the restoration of the provincial subdivisions of Ethiopia. 
Social change, as one of its ingredients, should aim reunification of Eritrea through negotiation 
and dialogue. Once Eritrea is back, it should be merged with the province of Tigre which is/was 
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the original home of Eritrea. This action would, once and for all, wipe out the footprints of 
colonialist Italy. 
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